Model Interventions: The Evolution of Media Development Strategies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia from 2000 to 2007 by Johnson, Hawley M.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Interventions: The Evolution of Media Development Strategies  
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia from 2000 to 2007 
 
 
 
Hawley Johnson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
under the Executive Committee 
of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences 
 
 
 
 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
 
2012 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 
Hawley Johnson 
All rights reserved 
ABSTRACT 
Model Interventions: The Evolution of Media Development Strategies  
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia from 2000 to 2007 
 
Hawley Johnson 
 
The United States, in cooperation with European governments and international aid 
organizations, has sponsored the development of independent media as a major component of 
both conflict interventions and democratization programs, and more recently as part of nation 
building efforts. This study explores the evolution and export of those dominant democratic 
media models and their impact on recipient communities in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia 
from 2000 to 2007. International donors came to see media development as a silver bullet for 
democratization efforts to foster freedom of speech, civil society, good governance, as well as 
an engaged citizenry. Donors and practitioners initially believed that institutions, once 
established, would function in a specific way, and coupled with assistance to professionalize 
and commercialize the media sector, would create or at least jump start systems similar to 
those in the US and Europe. Over the years, policy makers have identified the vital parts of a 
democratic media system, but what they have failed to fully understand is the dynamic 
interaction among them. Now, more than fifteen years after the end of the Bosnian war and 
twelve after the end of the war in Kosovo, numerous assessments by government sponsors 
and independent evaluators have reported success in achieving fundamental media freedoms 
in these countries, yet these media sectors have not demonstrated their anticipated 
transformative power – leaving struggling or dysfunctional organizations in the wake of donor 
financial retreat. This study argues that media organizations and institutions are trapped 
between pressures to commercialize and professionalize, which have become conflicting 
rather than enabling forces when combined with weak economic environments. In each of the 
countries in this study, a lack of synchronization among reforms, political divisions, and poor 
economic growth have contributed to a web of interrelated challenges. Despite significant 
economic reforms, growth and stability have never reached a threshold for systemic change.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Freedom of Expression is the matrix, the indispensable condition, 
of nearly every other form of freedom.  
Benjamin Cardozo 
 
The role of a free press in supporting democratic processes has been debated by scholars and 
politicians in the United States since the country’s inception; but since the end of the Cold 
War, how to export or foster a free press in transitional societies has become a US foreign 
policy concern. The United States, in cooperation with European governments and 
international aid organizations, has sponsored media development as a major component of 
both conflict interventions and democratization programs and, more recently, as a part of 
nation building efforts. It was during the rebuilding of the rump states of ex-Yugoslavia that 
international donors came to see media development as the “silver bullet” for democratization 
efforts to foster freedom of speech, civil society, good governance, and an informed and 
engaged citizenry. Now, more than fifteen years after the end of the Bosnian wars and over a 
decade since the end of the conflict in Kosovo, numerous assessments by government 
sponsors and independent evaluators have reported success in achieving fundamental media 
freedoms in these countries, yet these media sectors have not demonstrated their anticipated 
transformative power – leaving struggling or dysfunctional organizations in the wake of donor 
financial retreat.  
 
This study was conducted to explore the outcomes of media development policies 
implemented as part of democratization programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and 
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Macedonia from 2000-2007. This spans the timeframe when media development emerged as a 
core component of democratization strategies, traveling from Bosnia, to Kosovo, to 
Macedonia before largely tapering out in 2007. It also, conveniently, coincides with the years 
in which I worked in media development. In my analysis of this period, I have specifically 
sought to understand why media policies and institutions – imbued with so many expectations 
both locally and internationally – have faltered. Key questions shaping this research are: Can 
media development policies, derived from Western models and exported by foreign actors, 
function as mandated under vastly different local contexts? How do these policies shape the 
local media sectors they target? How do they interact with local economic and political 
systems, and what is their impact on society? Ultimately, are these strategies democracy 
enhancing?  
 
Much of the literature on media development to date encompasses project assessments, case 
studies, and indexes. On the scholarly level, there are substantive analyses of the potential role 
for media development in democratization and the need for enabling political, legal, and 
institutional reform. Most of these studies identify prerequisites for, and challenges to, the 
development of a democratic media with the expectation that democratic practices evolve 
from institution building and legal frameworks. Where a dearth of scholarly analysis has been 
observed is on the patterns of donor activity and the roles of intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations in post-conflict democratization, as well as on the influence of 
intervening Western powers.
1
  
                                                 
1
 See: Krishna Kumar, Promoting Independent Media: Strategies for Democracy Assistance (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2006); Monroe E. Price and Mark Thompson, eds., Forging Peace: Intervention, Human 
Rights and the Management of Media Space (Bloomington, IN: IU Press, 2002). 
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After a decade of training and the establishment of institutions and legal frameworks of good 
governance, this study asks why the media sectors in these countries are not consolidating 
along the lines of the Western models. That is to say, professional norms are not yet 
institutionalized, and markets remain weak, there is a lack self-regulation, and they exhibit 
distortions – conditions which contribute to a highly politicized news media which further 
reinforce divisions rather than foster democratic transitions. My hypothesis as to why this has 
occurred differs from other scholarly analysis in its concentration on a dynamic that has been 
overlooked by both researchers and practitioners in the field: I argue that media organizations 
and institutions are undermined by donor-driven pressures to commercialize, democratize, 
and professionalize; pressures that become conflicting rather than enabling forces when 
combined with weak economic environments such as those that exist in Southeastern Europe. 
 
The policy models and “tool kits” in use in the region were derived from the historical 
experience of the United States and Western Europe. The expectation was that institution 
building would establish democratic processes and inspire democratic attitudes. Yet those 
institutions, legal frameworks, and media organizations – the exported architecture of a 
democratic system when grafted onto societies with vastly different socio-economic 
conditions, has resulted in chronically weak institutions and professional norms, and in some 
instances distorted outcomes. This research seeks to demonstrate that institution building must 
come with a sufficient level of economic development to ensure basic security and stability to 
society as a whole. Economic security and stability when it is inclusive can help bridge social  
divides and enable a more participatory political system which facilitates the emergence of 
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attitudes, norms, and political and social processes which animate the system. While 
economic development was included in policy prescriptions, it was insufficient to spur 
systemic change and donors did not appreciate the full range of effects of this missing piece 
of the puzzle on transitions. Economic opportunities have remained largely in the hands of the 
elite and corruption has flourished, resulting in destabilizing inequalities. This research will 
demonstrate that future media development policies must focus more specifically on 
economic development as a catalyst for the commercialization and professionalization of the 
media sector as well as for the cultivation of democratic values that structure its role in 
society. 
 
Whether recent media assistance strategies are effective is not only an important question for 
policy makers and scholars, but is of particular weight to recipient countries. The policies and 
challenges discussed here are not isolated to this region, but represent a paradigm which is 
shifting to new conflict zones. Many of the organizations and practitioners who designed 
media development strategies in Southeastern Europe are now engaged in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. American nation building policies are based on the premise that a more peaceful world 
will grow from the global spread of democracy – and from the purported universal values it 
espouses. On the macro-level, sponsors of media assistance believe it is a vehicle for the 
replication of democratic values, as well as for facilitating international relations and global 
civil society. On the micro-level, media assistance is seen as a linchpin of democratization as 
part of state and nation building strategies in transitional and developing societies. It is 
imperative that practitioners and scholars document and analyze the lessons learned from 
these countries so that future foreign policy is more effective and aid is invested more wisely. 
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This serves not only American taxpayers but, even more so, the local populations affected by 
these policies. Foreign aid most importantly must not inadvertently harm the societies it aims 
to assist. Flawed policy, even with the best of intentions, can create disillusionment in the 
democratic project, and in the worst of circumstances can undermine a country’s stability and 
development.      
 
The experiences of and lessons learned in recipient countries can also contribute to more 
effective domestic policy. Over the last decade it has become increasingly difficult for the US 
to implement democratization and media development programs with any credibility. 
Preaching the benefits of democracy as the world watches the American system in crisis 
through the lens US news exports has opened the door to calls of, “Doctor, heal thyself!” A 
more nuanced understanding of how the model we are exporting has evolved historically, and 
of the environmental factors it requires in order to function optimally, can help us better foster 
and maintain a democratic media sphere at home as well as abroad.     
 
Implementer and Scholar: A Dual Perspective 
The subject matter for this dissertation grew out of seven years of work, from 2000 to 2007, 
as the Associate Director for the Media and Conflict Resolution Program at New York 
University’s Center for War, Peace and the News Media. There, I designed media assistance 
programs for journalists and media organizations in countries experiencing ethnic conflict in 
Southeastern Europe and Africa, and oversaw their implementation. The majority of the work 
was based in the countries of ex-Yugoslavia – specifically, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia. The overarching goal was to improve reporting on human rights and diversity 
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issues in order to facilitate a constructive public dialogue on contentious social issues and, 
hopefully, thereby ameliorate conflict. These programs were sponsored by the US government 
as well as a range of philanthropic organizations such as the Open Society and Ford 
Foundations.    
 
During that period, I worked to implement programs with many journalists, editors, and local 
NGO partners, as well as with fellow international practitioners in the field. We all faced 
various programmatic challenges, including frequent disillusionment due to the realization 
that much of the impact of our programs, and of others, seemed transient. At best, the impact 
was difficult or impossible to truly assess in quantifiable terms – and quantifying 
programmatic success was a necessity in order to establish the credibility of donors and an 
organization, and justify continued funding. At worst, the greatest of intentions collapsed as 
soon as donor money ran out or, in the language of the trade, a program was deemed 
“unsustainable” and therefore unable to survive in the local environment. In many cases, 
practitioners and policy makers lamented a “lack of indigenous momentum,” demonstrated by 
weak institutions, foundering professionalization, poor implementation of reform initiatives, 
as well as skewed and often corrupt markets.  
 
Concurrent to my work in the region, I was also pursuing a PhD in communications at 
Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism, which provided an opportunity to 
embark on a scholarly investigation of why so much hard work, sincere effort, and substantial 
funding had yielded disappointing results. As both an implementer and a scholarly observer, I 
experienced my own learning curve while  I witnessed the evolution of donor policies. At the 
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onset, I was optimistic – even idealistic – about the potential of the programs we sponsored. 
Once confronted with complexities in the field and the politics and bureaucracy of the aid 
machine, I began to question the viability of the mandate and the methodology.  
 
After the 9-11 tragedy, when America was at war on various fronts – in the ideological arena 
and on the ground – US society and media showed signs of some of the very characteristics 
we labeled as a threat to democracy in Southeastern Europe – scapegoating, demonizing of 
“the enemy,” and polarized and polemical reporting that reflected a Manichean worldview. As 
American society and media have become increasingly divided into the polarized world of red 
vs. blue, the Tea Party vs. the Occupy movement, social conservatives vs. liberals, my 
questions have become broader ones about what form modern democracy is taking: What role 
are various media organizations playing in sustaining or subverting democratic processes? 
What role is economics playing in shaping the media and political processes? What are we 
exporting? While many of these questions are beyond the scope of this dissertation, they 
inevitably shaped its framework. As someone who holds on to a belief in Democracy and 
trusts in the need for responsible and professional media to support the political process, the 
essential question of media development has become: What should international norms and 
standards be, and what is required to support those institutions and processes wherever they 
are implemented? 
  
Methodology and Delimitations 
This study employed both qualitative and quantitative methods, comprising extensive face-to-
face interviews and a survey instrument conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and 
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Macedonia.
2
 In-depth  interviews were conducted with over 100 individuals from the media 
sector and from donor organizations, including editors, journalists, media analysts, professors 
of journalism and mass communication from regional universities, board members of 
professional associations and NGOs, and program officers from the donor community. A 
survey instrument was used to gather information on the organizational development of 34 
organizations, selected for how active they had been in the media sector, how closely they 
cooperated with international donors, and for the range of organizational changes and survival 
strategies they had demonstrated. The sample was not selected to develop a statistical analysis 
but to provide significant detail on individual organizations for case studies.   
  
What is Media Assistance? 
Media assistance covers a broad range of policies and projects in support of a free and 
independent indigenous media in developing nations. Funding is provided by philanthropic 
organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as by foreign 
governments as a foreign policy tool, and is usually allocated under the rubric of 
democratization or civil society development programs. In Southeastern Europe, for instance, 
the governments of approximately 10 European nations, along with the European 
Commission, the European Union, and well over 14 NGOs have all sponsored media 
programs with varying agendas. The exact number of donors and the amounts they have 
invested are impossible to estimate with any certainty because of a lack of precise data.
3
 
                                                 
2
 Research was also conducted in Serbia and Romania but is not included in this dissertation. 
  
3
 A Stability Pact-funded assessment of media support to the Balkans over a ten-year period concluded that, “An 
analytical approach to these evaluations, strictly speaking, is not possible because of discrepancies regarding the 
geographic region covered, foci of the evaluations, time period covered, and fundamental terminological 
definitions. No reliable statistical information is available on media interventions, either for the region or on a 
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However, a study commissioned by the Stability Pact Media Task Force for Southeastern 
Europe determined that a minimum of 269.2 million euro (nearly $400 million dollars by the 
current exchange rate) was spent from 1996 to 2006 in that region. Another study
4
 on 
worldwide expenditures estimated that, from 1994 to 2004, US-based sources invested 
approximately $600 million in foreign aid to independent news organizations and their 
supporting institutions, equaling over one billion dollars spent when combined with European 
assistance.    
 
On the programmatic level, media assistance projects are largely designed as capacity-
building initiatives to support local independent media. They often include journalism and 
management training, legislative and regulatory reform, establishment of professional and 
advocacy organizations, transformation of state media into public service broadcasters, as 
well as commodity assistance and other specific strategies.
5
 These media development 
activities are separate and distinct from public diplomacy efforts, which are also government 
sponsored and media-related but which directly and transparently support US foreign policy 
goals – an example is the Voice of America radio program. Military information campaigns, 
known as psychological operations or “psyops,” should also not be confused with media 
development. 
                                                                                                                                                        
country-by-country basis. Indeed, a general lack of data on media support exists.”  See: Aaron Rhodes, Ten 
Years of Media Support to the Balkans: An Assessment, Media Task Force (Amsterdam: Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe, 2007) 10. 
  
4
 Ellen Hume, The Media Missionaries: American Support for Journalism Excellence and Press Freedom 
Around the Globe (Miami: Knight Foundation, 2004) 9. Also see: Mark Harvey, Media Matters: Perspectives on 
Advancing Governance and Development from the Global Forum for Media Development (Internews Europe, 
2006) 196. Available at: http://www.internews.org/pubs/gfmd/mediamatters.pdf 
 
5
 Kumar, 31.   
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Media Assistance Objectives 
 
Development strategists assert that “objective” and “pluralistic” media are their policy goals, 
but they are well aware of the power of media to influence “hearts and minds.” Development 
of media sectors has, in some ways, become a panacea in foreign aid circles, seen as the 
antidote to numerous development issues. The World Bank, for instance, claims that freedom 
of the media is a necessity for emerging markets and good governance, while others have 
cited it as an element vital to human development altogether,
6
 further raising the stakes of 
democratization policy interventions.   
 
Donor strategies have developed over the last decade to include a panoply of critical functions 
now expected of the media in support of democratization and state and nation building. The 
media have been tasked with everything from the practical function of supporting free and fair 
elections, to the more sensitive responsibility of promoting post-war reconciliation, to the 
vastly grander mission of helping form new national identities. They are expected to inform 
citizens of critical social and political issues, facilitate reasoned debate, and encourage citizen 
participation; in other words, to form a public sphere where a post-war, fragmented citizenry 
might negotiate the past, present, and future of their society. Media development proponents 
aimed to support specific media organizations in hopes they would form a Fourth Estate to 
provide checks and balances for good governance. Scores have been trained to infuse these 
democratic values and professional ethics into their daily practices and, in turn, to shape the 
institutions they inhabit. The promotion of responsible and professional media has also been 
                                                 
6
 David Hoffman, President, Internews Network; and Chair, Management Committee, Global Forum for Media 
Development. See: Harvey, 20. 
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seen as one way to counterbalance the dominance of nationalistic voices, thereby enabling a 
more tolerant and cooperative civil society.  
 
Despite clear overarching policy goals based on specific Western models, there has been a 
steep learning curve when it comes to implementation, as theoretically perfect planning has 
clashed with local realities. During planning phases, of course, programs seem well-aimed 
and well-adapted to meet local needs, but various studies and assessments of recent initiatives 
have documented specific problems, including a lack of clear mandates, a lack of coordination 
among donors, a lack of appropriate legislation and rule of law, and lingering legacies of the 
previous system which have not been overcome. The lessons learned in each country have led 
to a deeper understanding of the components of the media sector and the necessary enabling 
environment for development. In response, practitioners have developed a tool box of 
strategies to draw on and adapt for varying circumstances, which has given clearer structure 
and mandate to future policies.   However, the underlying expectation that if political, legal, 
and economic institutions are reformed, democracy will follow, has proved to be either overly 
optimistic or simply unrealistic. 
 
Local Perspectives 
Serbian journalist and educator Radmila Dulović of media organization InVision posits that 
many policies in the region, which were simply exported from Western media models or were 
replications of programs implemented elsewhere, were ultimately inappropriate and 
ineffective when transplanted to Southeastern Europe. This was more predictably the case 
with some projects, but there are examples of other projects that were designed or adapted to 
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local conditions by local actors which still could not take hold. Dulović further believes that 
local culture, political history, and economic conditions have all critically shaped the role of 
media in society. In her words, “People thought naively they could cut and paste 
experiences…Western experiences…which you cannot copy exactly because of the [local] 
tradition, the historical background…the media approach from the past, where it was 
completely controlled by the government, completely censored. Another obstacle is the 
economy.”7 Over and above the failings of policy models, interviewees often cited the 
economy and culture as chronic obstacles.  Economic issues and cultural practices are most 
often looked at independently, yet they shape one another.  
 
As I began talking with local media professionals and conducting interviews for this research, 
the pervasive tone of local experts was best summarized in a comment made by Roberto 
Belicanec of the Media Development Center in Macedonia, who said, “I would be very happy 
if here in Macedonia we start to speak about the great ideal of democracy, but first we need to 
have something to eat. And that is a really big problem. It is an everyday survival issue and 
when you have that kind of set up, people don’t care about [democracy] and their attitude is 
[that] everyone is a crook and there is no one who can make anything good of it.”8 If we 
unpack Belicanec’s comment, it hits on three of the core problems this dissertation will 
discuss in relation to the cultivation of an independent media sector: the impact of poverty and 
the resulting lack of economic security on the media development process; the disillusionment 
that comes when policies fail to live up to expectations, or worse when they backfire with 
                                                 
7
 Radmila Dulović-Rastovac, interview by author, December 19, 2006. 
 
8
 Roberto Belicanec, interview by author, November 16, 2006.  
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distorted outcomes; and lastly, how democratic values – the elusive “spirit of democracy” – is 
fostered in the face of such daily challenges. 
 
While a region’s economic ills are in the forefront of development concerns, a rather obvious 
side effect which is not well acknowledged is that, as long as people are in “survival mode,” 
individual interest will trump common good. Without a sense of trust in the system or a stake 
in it, citizens will not necessarily participate in the democratization process. A sense of civic 
responsibility and civil social dialogue, which are both core media development goals, have 
historically emerged in countries experiencing economic growth and a minimum social 
consensus on the legitimacy of the political system, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
Two. For instance, unemployment rates in the countries included in this study ranged from 
20-45% between 2000 and 2006. Many of the programs and institutions exported to these 
post-conflict environments could not and cannot take root without the stability, security, 
independence, and social values that emerge from a healthy economy. The reverberations of 
the economy on other sectors of society, such as the media, are not as well documented or 
discussed. Most of the literature on economic effects is concerned with how it influences 
editorial independence, limits advertising, or how it relates to corruption; but the impact of the 
economy is much more fundamental. Economic instability undermines institution building as 
well as overall democratization efforts, not just the economic viability of news organizations.  
 
The Historical Role of Media in Ex-Yugoslavia 
The media played a significant, and often insidious, role in fueling the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia, which led international donors to make media assistance a priority in 
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democratization programs in the successor states. Specific policy objectives in this region, 
and thus the models shaped for export and implementation, were derived from the dominant 
global media institutions of Western Europe and the United States. The complexity of the 
environment demanded that media interventions and assistance programs were constantly 
adapted to address ever changing needs during the conflict, and then re-tailored later toward 
peace enforcement and state building. Therefore, the region provides important case studies in 
how policies evolved and traveled. Despite the fact that media systems in the countries in this 
study are linked structurally and historically, and have comparable levels of economic 
development and a shared political history,
9
 they exhibit significant dissimilarities because 
each country finds itself in its own uniquely entwined blend of post-conflict reconstruction, 
stabilization, and democratization. It is these variations that have shaped individual media 
strategies and have determined their impact within each context.  
 
The countries in this study are experiencing multiple transitions simultaneously. They are at 
once post-socialist as well as post-conflict; each has had to move from a communist and 
planned market society into a democratic and capitalist one, from a developing nation to a 
developed one. Concurrently, they are negotiating the complexities of globalization, 
modernization, the “information revolution,” and EU integration.  Due to the wars that broke 
up Yugoslavia from 1990-1999, these countries have faced  the additional challenges of 
overcoming the collapse of the previous economic system, and undergoing post-conflict 
reconstruction, national reconciliation, and  new state formation. Their previous media 
institutions were strongly influenced by both the ideological and economic environments. For 
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instance, as Radmila Dulović explained, under communist regimes, the media were state-
controlled and whatever crossed the airwaves was projected by the government as truth.  
You must understand the psychology of the nation – we were all communists. There was 
one Party, one political system. You are for the state or you are the state’s enemy.… In 
this atmosphere you do not need censorship, you have a fantastical awareness of 
patriotism, which puts the values [of the state] first…we were serving society and 
because politics made equal the people and the state, we were the people’s republic and 
anything you said against it, you said against your own people. This was a fantastically 
clever system.
10
  
 
Due to the tight government control and the role of journalism as custodians of the state, in 
Tito’s Yugoslavia there was an educated and well-trained, professional corps of journalists. 
Being a journalist was a respected and sometimes glamorous position that provided access to 
important people and events, and to international travel. While a culture of censorship and 
self-censorship was pervasive in so far as criticizing Tito or the foundational values of the 
state, such as Brotherhood and Unity, journalists could write relatively freely on foreign 
policy, and on social, economic, and cultural issues. According to Hari Štajner of the Media 
Center in Belgrade, while freedom of expression was limited under Tito, there was a 
professional mandate, complete with codes of ethics and underlying values.
11
     
 
During the wars in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, many journalists and media 
organizations lost whatever professional norms they had, and some became direct agents of 
propaganda, hate speech, and incitement to violence. Their alliances with corrupt political, 
military, and profiteering actors served the worst ends. Ironically, because of its power in 
preparing for and enabling the war, the media was endowed with expectations to facilitate 
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reconstruction, reconciliation, and national identity formation following the post-war peace 
processes throughout the region.  
 
The nature of post-conflict environments creates substantial obstacles for democratization 
policies. War undermines the legitimacy of any remaining state institutions by normalizing 
force as a method of power and resource allocation, and by reinforcing ethnic divides.
12
 And, 
as Sampson has observed, democratic development is often defeated by the very institutions – 
parallel institutions and informal networks – that have maintained a society through 
communism and war.
13
 It was clear in ex-Yugoslav societies that for democracy to take root 
in such an environment required more than political reform; a new concept of citizenship had 
to be developed and a new national identity shaped – one that supported social cohesion, and 
a unified understanding of a past and future. It was these objectives that would later prove to 
be some of the most challenging in these countries, where borders, histories, identities, and 
truths continue to be contested.  
 
Chronology of Donor Assistance 
It is in this atmosphere that the donor community and international governing bodies had to 
design, negotiate, and implement their media assistance strategies. Since 1993, governments 
and international organizations from all over the world have been involved in media 
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assistance in the Balkans and made it a central component of reconstruction and 
democratization efforts. A survey of active donors represented a broad range, from:  
[P]rivate foundations (Open Society Institute, Knight Foundation, Westminster 
Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stifting, National Endowment for Democracy); to 
government agencies (USAID, European Commission, Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
from the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Germany, France, 
Finland, United Kingdom; as well as their embassies in the respective countries); to non-
governmental agencies acting on behalf of, or with support of, ministries or agencies (for 
example, Swedish Helsinki Committee, IREX ProMedia, MedienHilfe, Norwegian 
Peoples Aid, Press Now, Deutsche Welle, IWPR).
14
  
 
As previously mentioned, the precise amount spent on media assistance in the region is 
unfortunately impossible to estimate due to a lack of comprehensive data, but the Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe was able to estimate figures based on recorded support from 
participating organizations. As is documented below (see Table 1.1), the majority of this 
support went directly to individual news outlets to foster pluralism, business development, 
and technical assistance, then to the media environment for institution building, and finally 
toward training for professionalization.
15
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Table 1.1 
RECORDED SUPPORT FOR MEDIA IN THE BALKANS, 1996-2006 (IN MILLIONS OF EURO) 
Country Training Direct Support Media Environment Total 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 17.4 42.0 27.7 87.1 
Serbia 5.4 26.4 13.1 44.9 
Kosovo 6.1 45.6 6.9 58.6 
Macedonia 3.4 9.2 11.2 23.8 
Balkans Total 42.9 147.6 78.7 269.2 
 
Source: Aaron Rhodes, Ten Years of Media Support to the Balkans: An Assessment, Media Task Force 
(Amsterdam: the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 2007) 15. 
 
The result of this process has been an evolution in policy strategies based on lessons learned 
by donors, which have moved from short-term intervention strategies toward the view that 
media development is a vital component of stabilization and democratization programs. These 
and other difficult realizations have come from what has often been a complicated, frustrating, 
and expensive process, due largely to the lack of both a coherent development plan and any 
real understanding regarding the interdependence of the processes of nation building, state 
building, reconstruction, economic transition, and democratization.
16
 On top of this, donors 
have proven somewhat risk-adverse, unable or unwilling to commit to long-term development 
strategies and the responsibilities they engender. By and large, this is because sponsoring 
governments and their constituencies demand quick, quantifiable results which give rise to 
programmatic schedules that are usually unrealistic for the media sector.  
 
                                                 
16
 Thomas Carothers believes that policies conflated the nation and state building processes. See: Thomas 
Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2004) 1-6. 
  
19 
 
 
The first assistance packages in the region were created in the early 1990s after the outbreak 
of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, yet various organizations had already been providing 
assistance to media in post-soviet countries. Most were comprised of short-term interventions 
geared to protect and assist “independent,” unbiased (non-nationalistic) reporting during the 
conflict. As early as 1994, the Open Society Institute (OSI) saw the need for coordination 
among donors to ensure effective use of assistance funds, and enlisted the support of 
Norwegian People’s Aid, Press Now, and the Swedish Helsinki Committee. By 1995, the 
BBC, The Soros Foundation, and the British Know-How Fund launched a media center in 
Sarajevo which provided training, access to equipment and resources, a safe place to work, 
and perhaps most importantly, a community of like-minded journalism professionals. This 
type of center eventually evolved into a training model for the region. These projects were 
undertaken to help mitigate the conflict at hand, but were not designed to support long-term 
development.  
 
The mandate of the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA), the agreement which ended the war in 
Bosnia in the fall of 1995, encompassed both the immediate goal of putting a stop to the 
fighting and the more ambitious aim to assist in the construction of a stable democratic 
environment. This was the first time since the military defeats of Germany and Japan  that 
Western powers had set out to craft a new society. Unlike after World War II, when the 
strategy was to create a protectorate, wipe the slate clean, and start politically and 
economically from scratch, this time around there were no unconditional surrenders, the 
levels of economic development were lower, and the architects of the war remained in power 
along with their networks. While western governments and NGOs were active in 
20 
 
 
democratization efforts in Eastern Europe and Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
strategies were different since those countries were not subject to direct political and military 
interventions. Here, the international community donned the role of “democratic 
guardianship,” and set out to guide not only Bosnia-Herzegovina, but other countries of the 
former Yugoslavia, in the direction of Europe. The DPA did not address media development 
per se, only making reference to the right of freedom of speech in its provisions for elections 
and human rights. As a result, the first policy-mandated media assistance programs were 
designed to ensure freedom of speech and pluralism in preparation for the 1996 elections. 
Media activities had a limited mission in this initial conception, focused primarily on 
establishing peace and stability. Yet as months and years passed, expectations of the media 
became more substantial as it was deemed one of the most powerful tools in a classic battle 
for “hearts and minds” being fought in a society deeply divided, both ethnically and 
ideologically.  
 
The preparation for and execution of the 1996 elections exposed many weak points in the 
nascent Bosnian state. Elections were considered the first step in mobilizing the public to 
create new institutions, and it was generally agreed that the DPA could not be fully realized 
until this was achieved. Media were expected to foster the proper environment in which 
elections could take place, yet it was nearly impossible to fulfill this mandate without the 
necessary institutions and legal mechanisms – and more importantly the cultural and public 
consciousness – to guarantee and protect freedom of speech. There were prerequisites for the 
functioning of these basic elements that posed a chicken-and-egg problem for policy makers. 
Policy objectives called for building civil society; but the post-conflict environment was not 
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civil, the political arena and society were ethnically fragmented, and there was no civic 
identity on which to mobilize democratization programs. The weakness of the state and its 
institutions, as well as the absence of rule of law and appropriate legislation, forced 
international governing bodies to initiate significant reform before the tools and building 
blocks for freedom of the press could be put into place. Once the country began more 
formalized reconstruction, full development of the media sector took on greater significance. 
This period marked recognition of the differences in media capacities during peace 
enforcement versus state building. 
 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was one of the primary 
organizations tasked with promoting a stable, peaceful, and democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
A key function of the OSCE was to monitor elections and coordinate media development in 
an effort to facilitate the establishment of "independent, pluralistic and professional media in 
Bosnia as a means to support the overall transition to a free and democratic society."
17
 Some 
of their most important goals included promoting media independence from state and political 
party control, fostering media professionalism, and contributing "to the development of laws 
and standards concerning the media and to encourage compliance by the media."
18
 During this 
early period, from 1996 to 1999, significant efforts were made to create a broadcast regulatory 
authority (The Independent Media Commission), initiate legal reform, and begin the 
transformation of state media into a public service broadcaster. Journalism education, training 
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programs, and media monitoring for inflammatory speech were also undertaken.
19
 Further, 
innumerable projects were geared to promoting ethnic tolerance and reconciliation, many of 
which integrated conflict resolution techniques into media projects. The media were seen as a 
conduit of those values necessary to create a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina: multi-ethnicity, 
pluralism, and democracy. In many ways these efforts were in fact an attempt to forge a 
common identity and future on which to craft the new state, over and above mere democracy 
promotion.   
 
Nation building efforts are arguably most challenging in a post-conflict environment, where 
there is a failed state, institutions are defunct, and there are often parallel or shadow 
institutions with great influence over society – such as criminal networks, paramilitary 
groups, and disenfranchised military. On the community level, ethnic groups find solidarity as 
in Kosovo by the Albanians’ aspiration for independence and their shadow institutions, or in 
Bosnia where extended families and ethnically based social networks helped rebuild homes, 
towns and find the missing.  On the state level, in societies experiencing ethnic conflict it is 
difficult to cultivate a sense of common destiny among warring parties or of having a stake in 
society, and therefore difficult to achieve inclusive politics. Civil society is often dominated 
by a culture of fear and trauma, and an urge for justice. As political theorist Michael Walzer 
observes, “There is no community and no common good without social justice.”20 In 
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multiethnic societies with negotiated peace settlements, where there have been egregious 
human rights abuses and accounts of the war remain contested, a sense of justice has been a 
chronic, unmet need. Further complicating matters, justice in these environments is not one 
dimensional; it is very subjective and can mean different things to different groups. Until 
these societies are able to negotiate a shared narrative of their past conflicts and employ 
mechanisms for a sense of justice, they will not be able to overcome their ethnic divisions or 
mistrust to develop an understanding of common good. And dire economic conditions further 
exacerbate divisions.  
 
The media have been charged with creating a civic national identity which will supersede 
ethnic divisions in these societies. A new concept of citizenship must be developed, not only 
on the state institution level but also on the community level, or the “imagined community” 
level that Benedict Anderson defines. In Anderson’s model, newspapers play a large role, 
constituting a form of “performance art that enacts nationhood and national consciousness.”21 
International donors have generally seen the establishment of national newspapers and public 
service broadcasters as some of their most powerful tools to provide ethnic representation, as 
well as to cultivate a common national voice. Other media interventions in support of nation 
building have included programming which is designed to encourage truth and reconciliation 
dialogues, and which addresses critical social issues common to all ethnic groups.  
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In 1999, a noteworthy shift in donor learning occurred. Between March 24th and June 20th of 
that year, NATO launched a military attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) – 
comprised then of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo – in response to the forced expulsion of 
over 850,000 Albanians from Kosovo by Serbian forces.
22
 Kosovo was eventually occupied 
by Western powers as an international protectorate and this new war had broad impact both 
regionally and internationally. An exodus of Albanian refugees into neighboring Macedonia 
and Montenegro destabilized the region. In Macedonia, the plight of the refugees triggered an 
aggrieved Albanian-Macedonian population to revolt against the ethnically-motivated 
injustices they experienced within Macedonia. In response to the regional crisis, major media 
assistance programs funded by Western governments were designed and implemented in 
Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania to quell ethnic tensions. Direct aid to the FRY was cut off 
during the conflict, but media assistance continued through what was called the “ring around 
Serbia,” wherein a series of FM transmitters were set up to broadcast news and information 
into Serbia as a means of counterbalancing state-run, propagandistic media.  
 
After the conflict, direct support to Yugoslavia resumed to assist those outlets and 
organizations rallying for regime change. Many of the new programs in Kosovo, Macedonia, 
and Yugoslavia were designed and implemented by NGOs and practitioners with experience 
in Bosnia. Also in 1999, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was established as an 
international coalition of 40 partner countries and organizations “to replace the previous, 
reactive crisis intervention policy in South Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term 
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conflict prevention strategy.” This major international effort was in the works before the 
NATO intervention, but it gathered sufficient political backing in the face of new crises. The 
goal was to aid these countries "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human 
rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region." This 
initiative came in response to criticism that much previous aid had been uncoordinated, ad 
hoc, and had resulted in a duplication of efforts. Further, it was undertaken with the 
understanding that if these countries were to one day join the European Union, they would 
require institutional structures and practices on par with European standards.   
 
The Pact’s Secretariat, located in Brussels, was organized into three Working Tables, or 
committees, to focus on specific issue areas including Democracy and Human Rights; 
Economic Reconstruction, Development and Cooperation; and Security.
23
 Media 
development was included in the Stability Pact’s Working Table I, the table for 
democratization and human rights. A task force was established to determine the best way to 
promote adherence to current international media standards for freedom of expression and 
regulation, as well as to assist independent media in the region. The task force described its 
mandate as follows: 
An objective and independent media is a fundamental element of a functioning 
democracy. To this end the idea of Media Charter has been elaborated with the aim of 
promoting freedom of expression, development of objective and independent radio and 
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television broadcasters and, encouragement of professionalism in journalism. The 
Working Table is asked to consider proposals to ensure that the public throughout the 
region is able to receive diverse sources of information and that high professional 
standards are observed by the media. The media must be utilized to promote pluralism of 
ideas, opinions and cultures and to foster a climate of tolerance. Active efforts by the 
media to combat stereotypes and hate speech are necessary. The need to establish new 
institutions or upgrade existing ones in order to train media professionals should be 
considered. Priority must also be given to address the regulatory framework for the 
media in order to guarantee freedom of expression.
24
 
 
Expectations of mass media as a transformative institution expanded and became codified 
within international policy formation at this time. Programs moved from efforts in ad hoc 
news production and training to serving longer-term objectives that targeted the sector as a 
whole, including institution building, legal reform and, most importantly, the normative goals 
of fostering a “climate of tolerance” and pluralism to reinforce democratization efforts.  
In recognition of the complexity of the development task at hand, donors solicited numerous 
program assessments and policy papers based on recent experience in the field.  
Assessments were frequently conducted by outside contractors to provide an unbiased 
evaluation of program objectives, achievements, weaknesses, and failures. They always 
included recommendations to help shape future programs. They are useful documents for 
detailed information on specific initiatives but are occasionally criticized by those in the field 
for being written by outsiders who have insufficient knowledge of the local circumstances to 
provide accurate evaluations. Indexes are another of the tools used by practitioners. The 
Media Sustainability Index (MSI) by the International Research and Exchanges Board 
(IREX), a US based non-profit, conducts country studies through extensive interviews with 
local experts and media professionals. Their MSI “assesses five ‘objectives’ that shape a 
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media system: freedom of speech, professional journalism, plurality of news, business 
management, and supporting institutions.”25 Each country’s progress is rated by how they 
measure up. Other regularly cited indexes on media freedom are those published by the 
Freedom House and Reporters without Borders. While influential in policy and media circles, 
they too have been criticized for lacking cultural neutrality, employing faulty methodology, 
and not taking into account the impact of new digital media in their assessments.
26
 Despite 
their various potential flaws, all of these reports are useful tools for policy makers as they 
provide insights on specific projects and problem areas, as well as measuring general 
benchmarks on a broader scale.   
 
Commissioned papers and reports by USAID and European organization have delved deeper 
into core development concerns. In 1999, a USAID-sponsored report, entitled The Role of 
Media in a Democracy, called for a sectoral analysis to help in designing media strategies 
which consider a “‘web’ of mutually reinforcing activities,”27 an approach other authors have 
referred to as “holistic.” A more in-depth study of that concept was carried out by Monroe 
Price in his work on the “enabling environment.” Based on the premise that media is a “key 
element in contributing to transparent and accountable government,” his study set out to 
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identify the “legal and institutional requirements for free and independent media.”28 To that 
end, the study offers a compendium of media-related laws and institutional structures, as well 
as of variables such as political pluralism, that comprise the necessary components for 
democratization. Although Price points to the relevance of economic factors – including some 
which are specific to media, like taxes and state subsidies – he does not discuss the impact of 
the overall economic environment on values creation and behaviors. While the 
democratization process can be lengthy and not necessarily linear, he writes that all 
institutions and procedures must be in place so that they can operate once consolidation 
begins. He implies that once the institutions and frameworks of good governance are in place, 
democratic practices will follow. He concludes that states in different stages of development 
require different strategies of program implementation, not just a cut-and-paste from other 
systems. In the end, he does not tie each to a specific stage of transition, concluding that, 
“there is not yet a Rosetta Stone that decodes how distinct elements of the enabling 
environment can be related to the stages of a society as it passes, for example, from state 
control to more democratic forms.”29 
 
In general, 2000 marked an awareness among donors of the enabling environment and its 
component parts, which Ellen Hume defines as “the alchemic mix of economic and legal 
reforms, political culture and media policies that transforms autocracy into civil society.” By 
2001, the Stability Pact Task Force had a long list of chronic and stubborn challenges to 
address, including political influence over media, economic dependence of organizations, 
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poor training, weak professional structures, and unfinished legislative frameworks. They 
called on donors to undertake a collaborative and regional approach that would specifically 
target institution building and the reform of state media and legislation. The focus of donors 
shifted accordingly, to formalizing journalism education, implementing legal reform, and 
offering business and management training. In the face of rising economic concerns in 2002, 
the new buzz word was “sustainability.” News outlets and organizations were increasingly 
aware that the economic health of the media landscape was a long-term condition dependent 
upon broader political and economic developments. Yet regionally, in 2003, programs 
continued to target education, with approximately 40% of funding earmarked for professional 
training. Coming in at a close second were content production and technical assistance, which 
accounted for 34% of direct support to media outlets. And, third was institution building, with 
26% of funds going toward associations, media centers, and legal reform.
30
 Starting that year, 
sustainability strategies included business plans and management assistance to help ensure 
that organizations would be locally run and financially independent in the wake of donor 
withdrawal.  That withdrawal was apparent by 2004, when smaller donors had left the region 
and major donors were plotting their final exit strategies.    
 
Donor tactics in the years from 2005 to 2007 focused on bolstering the sustainability of local 
media institutions, implementing university reform to take over educational and training 
capacities,
31
 and the pursuit of ongoing legal reform specifically for public broadcasting and 
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regulatory bodies. While economic problems were recognized, they were targeted primarily 
through more business training and commodity assistance, such as the purchase of equipment. 
Despite the time, effort, and money spent in the region, The Stability Pact’s Media Task Force 
strategy paper for 2005-2007 came to bleak conclusions: 
While there are many media outlets, far fewer are sustainable and genuinely independent. 
The advertising market is small, the spending power of the population is relatively low, 
and the costs for printing newspapers and producing television programs are high. 
Mergers and closures can be expected, yet for the time being the overcrowded market 
impacts on the quality in a variety of ways… many outlets contend with a lack of 
resources, in particular for staff… many outlets depend on donations from the business or 
political elite. The support tends to come with strings attached. Many newspapers and 
smaller electronic media follow the editorial line of their owner or the one who 
pays…Unions are ineffective and contracts regularly absent…Finally, strong competition 
has resulted in what many consider lower standards and a grave lack of respect for 
journalistic ethics.
32
   
 
The underlying edict of this analysis was that ownership of future development needed to 
shift to local actors but also that governments have a responsibility to enable change. The 
Stability Pact report also noted the problem of media outlets relying on donations from 
business or political elite, which has infringed on their independence, compromised standards, 
and opened them up to coercion. This growing concern in the region, termed “tycoonization,” 
will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.  
 
By 2008, donor mandates and funding moved to other crisis zones, leaving it up to recipient 
organizations to make the most of what was left behind. And left behind were numerous 
institutions, well trained journalists, and legal frameworks per European standards; yet 
something was clearly missing. At the heart of weaknesses highlighted by the Stability Pact 
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Task Force were poor economic conditions. While many instructive insights came from the 
identification of phases of development and political openings, and the mapping of the 
enabling environment, what was – and is still – missing is an understanding of the underlying 
impact of the economy on development processes.  
 
Field Research and Outline of Chapters 
The primary focus of this research was to explore the outcomes of media development 
initiatives and their interaction with local political and economic environments. To that end, 
the following chapters explore donor learning as their policies emerged and were adapted to 
different contexts in three countries. The case studies that follow will analyze donor strategies 
and the institutional development of the media markets. Specifically, I will illustrate how, in 
practice, donor initiatives sought to 1) professionalize the sector by training a corps of 
journalists to adhere to professional norms, self-regulate, uphold a civic mandate, and 
establish professional advocacy organizations; and 2) commercialize the sector by 
establishing regulatory bodies and legal frameworks, and supporting pluralistic independent 
media organizations representing civic over elite interests to appeal to mass audiences. 
Together, efforts to professionalize and commercialize were expected to support an overall 
democratization of the sector, where a marketplace of ideas could inspire civic debate and 
consensus, and act as a check on corruption and abuses of power. What donors still fail to 
fully understand is that these are interdependent processes that require particular levels of 
economic stability in order to succeed.  
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Chapter Two discusses donor expectations and the assumptions behind media development 
policies and their resulting outcomes. It argues that the focus on institutional development, 
although it succeeded in legislative reform as well as the mapping and recreating of the 
component parts of a democratic media system, failed to institutionalize necessary 
professional norms and practices. A lack of understanding by donors of the interdependence 
of the concurrent processes of professionalization, commercialization, and economic 
development has undermined their policies. This has led at best to disappointing results, and 
at worst to distorted outcomes. In an effort to explain how and why this happened, the chapter 
explores the historical evolution of the international standards currently being exported, as 
they emerged in the US and UK. Those experiences demonstrate how economic development 
is critical for supporting professional differentiation and consolidation as well as instigating 
changes in editorial hierarchies and civic awareness, and motivating democratic practices and 
values. 
 
Chapter Three is a case study of media development in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). It was 
here that donors began the first reconstruction of a post-war media sector since World War II, 
and thus it became the starting point of donor learning in the region. Many of the 
programmatic strategies and institutions that emerged in Bosnia were later transferred to the 
other two countries in this study. The chapter will argue that today, over fifteen years after the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, the media sector continues to founder professionally 
and economically. While in many ways Bosnia does appear to finally be emerging from post-
war reconstruction, shadows of the ethnic divide which media development was meant to 
address continue to keep the country from truly achieving stable, independent statehood; and 
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major political and economic challenges are additionally impacting the sustainability of media 
organizations and their supporting institutions. The media market is weak and disjointed, and 
is in a virtual crisis for numerous reasons. Many citizens feel that media outlets, like 
politicians, are ethnically divisive, and that they represent the opinions and interests of 
business and political elite. These perceptions continue to undermine the credibility and 
integrity of media organizations and their capacity to support social or political change. 
 
Chapter Four explores the impact of media assistance in Kosovo, in another international 
protectorate scenario. It provides an interesting comparison because many models introduced 
in Bosnia were exported and adapted to Kosovo – some more successfully than others. More 
than a decade after the war there, and over three years since declaring independence, Kosovo 
still suffers from a lack of a long-term development strategy. There is also rising discontent in 
the country over the role of international organizations. This stems from a fundamental 
disconnect between local expectations and the capacities and role of international 
implementing bodies, resulting in questions of accountability. The weak and oversaturated 
media market is not regulating itself due both to an infiltration of significant advertising 
monies paid by international organizations, and to the artificial sustenance of non-transparent 
sources of income. While donors have committed far more time and funding than anticipated, 
the structures they leave behind are fragile. Urgency for commercialization to support 
sustainability, without sufficient economic development and investment or strong institutions, 
may lead to the unraveling of many international initiatives.  
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Chapter Five offers further contrast by presenting the situation in Macedonia, where media 
development began late and largely in response to the spillover of the crisis in neighboring 
Kosovo, yet it evolved as a tool to address Macedonia’s internal political and ethnic strife. 
Levels of international intervention and subsequent investment were significantly less than in 
the other two countries. Consequently, rather than disillusionment with international 
involvement, several of the media professionals interviewed there expressed concern that only 
international assistance can provide the money and power to alter the status quo in 
Macedonia. They voiced a need for foreign leadership to strengthen regulatory and self-
regulatory bodies and to put pressure on their government to respect its own laws. Media-
related organizations in Macedonia, like those in the other countries in this study, are 
struggling to maintain a professional mandate in a frail economy fraught with high 
unemployment, and where “tycoonization” has usurped the sector. Political influence over 
economic and editorial independence has eroded any credibility that media is representing the 
public interest and has undermined the capacities of professional organizations. Foreign 
investment in the media sector was initially looked to as a means of setting standards and 
regulating the corrupt market, but Macedonian organizations continue to feel highly 
dependent on donors, not only financially but also for leverage within their own environment, 
which does not bode well for sustainability.  
 
The development community has learned an enormous amount about media assistance since 
the early interventions in ex-Yugoslavia. The media sector has been mapped and it is now 
viewed as part of an interconnected system. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia 
have some of the best media laws in Europe because of donor sponsored legislative reform; 
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further, thousands of journalists have received training, professional organizations have been 
established, and  newsrooms have been reorganized and updated with the latest technology. 
Yet the chronic issues noted by the Stability Pact point to problems with professionalization 
and economic pressures. While economic development has indeed been an area of 
considerable focus by the donor community, many policies have faltered because their 
success has depended so vitally upon complementary reforms in the legal, financial, and 
political sectors. Policies have targeted all the requisite institutions and legal frameworks, but 
not the processes – such as commercialization, professionalization, and economic 
development – that actually drive the system. This inter-reliance is central to a key problem in 
democratization strategies: Which development processes are essential in such efforts, and 
how can reforms be synchronized in various sectors so that the broader political, legal, and 
economic systems – and hence the media system – can function properly?  
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CHAPTER TWO  
That Alchemic Mix: The Role of Economic Development  
in Professionalizing and Commercializing Media Sectors 
 
“…the problem of the press is confused because the critics and the apologists expect the press…to make up for 
all that was not foreseen in the theory of democracy..." 
Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (1922) 
 
For the first time since World War II, a broad range of international allies and bodies have 
attempted to construct democratic societies out of post-conflict occupations or quasi-
protectorates, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo, and rump states, such as the 
Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia. The media development strategies of 
reformers have been guided by goals and objectives that specifically support democratic 
consolidation, with the media playing a vital role. Fifteen years after such programs were 
implemented in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, their media markets are weak, 
professionalism is low, and in some cases there have been distorted and unexpected outcomes. 
In the words of a media professional from Bosnia, “We have had so many trainings of 
journalists, you would expect there to be 200,000 Christiane Amanpours. But what 
happened?”33 What happened is, media system models that evolved out of the specific 
historical conditions of the West have not functioned as expected or mandated when 
transplanted elsewhere.  
 
Donors and practitioners initially believed that institutions, once established, would function 
in a specific way, and coupled with assistance to professionalize and commercialize the media 
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sector, would create or at least jump-start systems similar to those in the US and Europe in 
relatively short time – preferably under ten years, at which point donor budgets and patience 
are usually exhausted. Scholars refer to this dominant global media model as the “liberal” 
model, based on the US and UK systems. Policies were largely normative, and sought to 
create institutions and practices as they should function in a democracy, without fully 
considering how far from the ideal most media systems in the West truly are. The first donor 
programs sought to professionalize the media sector through training and technical support; 
the limited impact of those programs instigated a broader more holistic approach, in which the 
media sector was mapped and a foundation of institutional and legal frameworks were 
established. As the sector continued to struggle, donors identified new obstacles and new 
policy solutions. The next area of focus was the market, and developing business models for 
sustainability; then policy makers identified corruption as the latest in the long string of 
obstacles to democratization. The “new” curative was investigative reporting, which would 
expose the criminals, mobilize civic action, and foster good governance. Donor strategies 
began to look like hit-or-miss quests for some alchemic mix.    
 
Policy makers and donors have correctly identified vital individual parts of the democratic 
media system over the years, but what they have overlooked is the dynamic interaction among 
them. Enormous strides were made through reforms that have established some of the most 
modern laws and well-structured institutions in Europe, yet by the time donors exited, the 
systems they left behind were weak and hollow. What was missing at each juncture were the 
standards, practices, and underlying values – on a professional as well as on a broader social 
level – that animate the laws, the institutions, and hence the media sector. Donors believed 
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those values and practices would emerge organically from institution building and legal 
reform, but this did not happen on the scale they imagined it would.  
 
This chapter will argue that policy makers and donors did not fully appreciate or understand 
the dynamic effect of economic growth and stability on democratic development. For the 
system to function as anticipated in their model, a basic level of economic development is 
necessary to support processes of professionalization and commercialization within the media 
market, which in turn enable the emergence of professional values, the institutionalization of 
standards, and a regulated rational market, as well as give the sector its civic mandate and 
independence. By examining the model that is being exported in the context of its own 
historical evolution, we can better understand underlying assumptions, institutions, socio-
economic and political processes, and why its application in different arenas has been so 
problematic. Those unique historical circumstances are difficult if not impossible to replicate, 
after all. Implementers, especially Americans, do not always see the difficulties that 
accompany such replication of “their” model, since they tend to have an idealized, even 
mythic, picture of their own system, despite the fact that much of what they are attempting to 
export no longer exists in their own societies.   
 
Donor Expectations and Operating Assumptions 
There are certain conceptual assumptions about media capacities which underlie most 
democratization initiatives, and thus drive expectations. The Center for International Media 
Assistance (CIMA), established in 2006 with a grant from the National Endowment for 
Democracy, lists a broad range of the roles media can and should play in a democratic 
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political system: “Independent media are an inextricable element of democratic society. 
Citizens rely upon information from the media to make informed decisions and hold their 
leaders accountable. Free media act as a catalyst for political reform, contribute to 
consolidation of democracy, and facilitate the unfettered exchange of ideas necessary for the 
development of civil society.”34 Ultimately, the expectation is that media development can 
create these conditions in transitional societies and that, with targeted support, local 
independent media will assume the role of watchdog over the political system.
35
 The 
foundation for these assumptions is the longstanding concept of the media as Fourth Estate. 
This idea views journalism as an institution independent from the state with a social 
responsibility to represent the public interest by acting as a check on political power through 
factual and accurate reporting.  
 
Recent scholarship in democratization further develops and defines the role of media in this 
process. If we use democracy experts Larry Diamond’s or Robert Dahl’s definition of 
democracy – polyarchy – free media is one of seven primary institutions.36 The media is vital 
to facilitate the two primary dimensions of democracy: competition/contestation and 
participation. Democratic political processes occur in the public sphere – that space between 
government and the individual where the institutions and organizations of civil society, 
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including the media, come together to negotiate identities, norms, and values, and to form 
public opinion.
37
 For this system to work, certain institutions and feedback mechanisms must 
be extant and functioning.  
 
On a policy level, donors have crafted their programs to support “professional,” “sustainable” 
and “independent” media. If we unpack those terms; professional means a mass media that 
adheres to Western ideals of truth-seeking through an open marketplace of ideas and balanced 
sourcing of information, independent means striving for an editorial line free from political 
and business influences, and sustainable means that ultimately the news media is expected to 
be financially stable yet maintain a public service mandate. To achieve these goals, 
development programs have focused largely on professionalizing the media sector while 
supporting the emergence of a pluralistic and commercialized media market. And as regional 
needs have evolved along with donor capacities and understanding, new programs have been 
rolled out every 2-3 years to target weak areas. In over a decade, legal and regulatory reform 
was promoted, journalism and management training was provided, financial and technical 
assistance was offered to news outlets, professional organizations and educational institutions 
were established, and the transformation of state broadcasters into public service or private 
broadcasters was facilitated.  
 
Donors developed their strategies not only through discussion with local partners but also in 
response to a range of reports and indexes that tracked local conditions. Assessments by 
outside evaluators gave donors important feedback on specific programs. Yearly indexes on 
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press freedom from Reporters without Borders, Freedom House, and IREX (the Media 
Sustainability Index) helped gauge each country’s achievements and challenges. And, as 
discussed in Chapter One, donors actively adjusted their programs in an attempt to make them 
more effective based on these various findings. One of the most influential of these analyses 
was entitled “The Enabling Environment,” by legal scholar Monroe Price, and it identified the 
necessary legislative and regulatory frameworks for consolidation of the media sector. Then, 
in a subsequent report, Mapping Media Assistance, Price defined all the players (donors, 
foundations, implementers) and institutions, and their roles. In an effort to account for the 
uniqueness of each situation, Price linked media development opportunities to four stages of 
democratic transitions. These stages, however, as the author admitted, were delineated by 
political openings rather than economic capacities. Ad hoc media assistance gave way to an 
understanding of the media sector as part of a larger system, but requiring a specific legal and 
political environment of its own.  
 
In evaluating media assistance strategies, some scholars such as Price assert that all pieces of 
the system should be in place (specifically, the institutions and legal frameworks) so that they 
can facilitate democratic development, even if ultimate consolidation is a lengthy, potentially 
non-linear, and complex process. Others such as Polish lawyer and media scholar Karol 
Jakubowicz argue further that democracy must be consolidated before a democratic media 
system can be achieved. Above and beyond political and economic transitions, he writes, 
there must be a change in culture and conscience that empowers media and leads to 
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“collective professionalization.”38 The catalysts for change in culture and conscience, he 
implies, as well as for collective professionalization, are the democratic practices and values 
that would ostensibly emerge after democratic consolidation.   
 
If Jakubowicz is correct, many media development policies are doomed from the start, or are 
in for long, perilous journeys toward their goal. He offers a list of prerequisites that looks very 
much like a donor’s “wish list” for development. They include: 1) the existence of civil 
society, 2) an established role for public opinion in public life, 3) a willingness to de-politicize 
important areas of social life, 4) some accepted notion of the public interest, 5) trust and 
acceptance of public broadcasting regulation to serve public interest, 6) the emergence of 
journalistic professionalism based on a notion of public service, and 7) a free market and 
economic growth.
39
 Donors, however, have funded media assistance programs meant to foster 
each of these prerequisites, based on a belief that a democratic media will in fact play a role in 
developing them. The problem with Jakubowicz’s theory is that democratic practices and 
values are necessary to attain his prerequisites for consolidation in the first place. They may 
be stronger after consolidation, but they must emerge earlier for transitions to be successful. 
 
Over the span of 15 years, donors along with international experts from various fields mapped 
a model media sector and put all the necessary institutions in place. Yet donors found that 
when they built institutions and implemented reforms, they often ended up attaining vastly 
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different outcomes than what they expected. Following is a list of some core policy 
assumptions and the associated disappointments and distortions that emerged. These 
permutations on the model will be discussed at more length in the individual country case 
studies in the following chapters.  
1. Pluralism will create a marketplace of ideas.  
Donors have financed the establishment of independent news organizations as well as 
supported numerous local outlets to ensure a diverse sector. Donor funding, coupled 
with an influx of non-transparent income from business and political interests, has led 
to artificially-sustained and oversaturated markets and the phenomenon known as 
hyper-competition. Pluralism, in sheer numbers rather than voices, has been achieved; 
but markets cannot regulate themselves, resulting in sectors that are dominated by 
tabloids and special interests rather than informed debate.  
2. Legislative reform will create rule of law.  
New laws have been and are being written, but are not well understood, publicized, or 
properly implemented. Donors have sponsored programs to fix this problem through 
public service campaigns and the training of journalists and legal professionals, but 
implementation is still weak. In Bosnia, for instance, a study found that 57% of FOIA 
(Freedom of Information Act) requests are ignored.
40
    
3. Journalism education and training will create a cadre of professional journalists with 
a public service mandate.  
Much media education is non-standardized and ad hoc, or simply out of the financial 
reach of many working journalists. Those who are well trained find they cannot 
practice the journalism they have learned because the structure and culture of 
newsrooms are dominated by business and political interests.  
4. Journalism associations will establish professional standards and a self-regulating 
community.  
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Despite numerous efforts to institutionalize codes of ethics, most newsrooms do not 
enforce them because editors and owners often see no benefit in doing so. 
Institutionally, many professional associations lack local credibility; they are seen as 
foreign imports. In addition, journalists often cannot afford the dues for professional 
associations and publishers rarely pay them.    
5. Market research and management training will enable sustainable commercial news 
organizations.   
Market research has indeed helped broadcast outlets, but the advertising markets are 
small and impact is limited. Accurate circulation figures for newspapers are nearly 
non-existent. There is also a range of poor business practices, such as price dumping, 
that need to be regulated. The bottom line is that all the training and research in the 
world will not change market conditions. 
6. Training in specific styles of journalism, such as investigative journalism, will 
facilitate the watchdog function of the media.
41
  
The reality is that most news organizations do not have the time, financial capacities, 
or even the patience to support investigative journalism and other long-format styles 
of reporting; so most of these activities are funded by outside sources. More 
importantly, journalists must have access to resources, such as through a FOIA, within 
a culture that respects freedom of information and demands accountability. The 
political feedback loop must also function, which means the citizenry trusts media 
reports and the system is responsive to pressure from the citizenry. An extreme 
distortion of this is seen in vigilante journalism in Kosovo, where news organizations 
investigated alleged war criminals without an understanding of privacy, due process, 
or respect for professional norms.  
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7. Public Service Broadcasting will help create a civic identity through representation of 
an inclusive national voice.  
It took over ten years to establish laws on the Public Broadcasting System in Bosnia, 
all of which were finally imposed by the High Representative because ethnically-
divided political elite could not reach an agreement. Macedonia’s public broadcaster is 
also ethnically divided, financially dependent upon government funding, and thus 
subject to political influence.  
 
An enormous amount of time, money, and expertise have been invested in media development 
in the region, with very mixed results. It is as if all the international organizations and donors 
pooled their resources to build a race car; it was designed by top engineers and “should” have 
worked ideally, but when they tried to start it up, it wouldn’t run – so everyone pushed and 
pushed to get it started but still it would not go, and no one realized there was no fuel in the 
car. Everyday professional norms and practices, trust in the system, a sense of civic 
responsibility – all aspects of a democratic culture that give a system life (the fuel in the car, if 
you will) – were absent or were too weak to drive consolidation. The core question, then, is 
how to develop and institutionalize those norms and practices that will change the culture of 
journalism and lead to the professionalization and commercialization required for media 
organizations to assume their prescribed role in democratic processes? Observation of how 
this process took place in other countries offers answers.  
 
Media Development in Post-Soviet Countries  
After the fall of the Soviet Union the US, the EU as well as a range of many of the same 
NGOs involved in Southeastern Europe, provided democratization assistance to Russia and 
post-soviet Eastern Europe. Media development was included in these programs but had yet 
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to take on the significance it would later in Post-Dayton Bosnia.  The overarching goals, 
however, were similar – to help transition state run media into a market based media sector 
balanced between commercial and public service outlets poised to assume a role in the 
emerging democratic processes – but the approaches were tailored in each country to the 
different contexts.  Since donors were acting more as advisors in Russia and Eastern Europe 
rather than occupiers or guardians, they had less leverage and sought more to shape rather 
than orchestrate the transition. Although the approaches were less imperial, they could also be 
coercive.  The EU accession process, membership in NATO and the Council of Europe as 
well as support from international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank 
provided policy carrots and sticks motivating the necessary institutional, economic and legal 
reform required to align their systems with European standards.  
 
Politically, economically and culturally there were similar challenges to those in Southeastern 
Europe. Post-Soviet countries also had to transition from a command to a market economy 
and make the ideological shift from communism to democracy.  Culturally, journalism in 
many East European countries - especially Poland, Hungary and Romania - played a 
significant role in their early nation-building by educating people on their language, history 
and literature.  Due to the more literary and elite orientation of the press, advocacy journalism 
was seen as serving the public interest  and journalists deemed it their responsibility to 
educate readers and interpret  events rather than just inform.  Since new democratic 
institutions and legal frameworks were supposed to overwrite the legacies of the previous 
system, media assistance came in similar forms such as training, technical consulting, and the 
establishment of media or press centers.  There are also parallels with some of the distortions.  
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Many of the media markets have been plagued by hyper-competition, tabloidization, 
tycoonization, and high levels of political parallelism and freedom of speech in some 
instances has also been interpreted as a right to say anything without regard for professional 
standards or responsibility.  The causes for these distortions are political as well as economic.   
 
The tycoonization of the media sectors, the capturing of the market by vested interests leading 
to dependence and instrumentalization, are side effects of developments in the broader 
political realm which Sociologist David Stark calls from “plan to clan.” In his study on 
privatization processes in Hungary, he observed that the economic transitions and 
privatization processes as designed by donors and international organizations, also took a 
“blank slate” approach which ignored their distinct historical experiences and cultural 
traditions.
42
 He calls their policies “designer” or “cook book capitalism,” where a major 
permutation was the replication rather than the eradication of previous power structures and 
behaviors.  He believes change during the transitions from communism to capitalism was 
often “involutionary” rather than evolutionary, and people tended to revert to old behaviors 
and attitudes when adapting to new conditions. Moreover, because change is negotiated and 
constructed with the social and political capital of the past regime, it is often limited by the 
remaining networks, norms and attitudes. Therefore, change ends up being path dependent 
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when by design it should emerge along the line of the new model.   In essence, you can 
change the institutions and the rules quickly, but not so easily the non-formalized norms.
43
   
 
Similarly, Jakubowicz observed that East European elites, were often Janus faced – one side 
embracing western reform rhetoric while the other side was employing whatever aspects of 
the previous system were useful for consolidating power and maintaining the status quo. He 
believes this tactic created a media system “based, in different proportions, on social 
responsibility, paternal, development communication and authoritarian press theories, infused 
with different versions of nationalist discourse.”44 Democratization efforts in Russia and 
Eastern Europe supported institutional and legal reform as well as market development but 
because the reforms were top-down, superficial and recreated the elite power structures those 
changes did not necessarily foster democratic attitudes in the political realm or create the 
conditions for media to act as a “fourth-estate.”  
 
Since the late 1990s economic ills on the national as well  as global level have lead to social 
instability and disillusionment with the democratic project which has in many cases instigated 
a shift to the right politically.  In countries governed by soft-authoritarian policies, state 
paternalism and clientalist networks democratic reforms are often thwarted by special 
interests which prevent normative shifts based on liberalization.  Economists Daron 
Acemoglu and James Robinson in the their recent book “Why Nations Fail” term such 
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political and economic structures as extractive since they concentrate power in the hands of an 
elite few, creating a vicious circle of rent-seeking behavior .  
 
In their model, prosperity and pluralism cannot not be engineered, but rather are the outcome 
of “critical junctures” where incentives for pluralism are strong enough to create political 
openings. They believe institutions and political systems either invite or resist change, and 
similarly to Stark, that those events which trigger change will be shaped by political, 
institutional or even communications infrastructures and hence change may be path 
dependent.  Acemoglu and Robinson recognize media as powerful tools for exposing abuses 
of power and rallying support for political reforms but concede that they can only operate at 
the margins. It is ultimately citizens who must demand and enact change. Foreign aid, to that 
end, Acemoglu and Robinson write, should be used to create and empower more inclusive 
pluralistic structures for durable liberal reform.  
 
 Although they see the success or failure of nations as the result of their political choices, 
many of the catalysts they identify for political openings, are economic shifts. European and 
American experiences detailed later in this chapter will show that inclusive economic and 
political institutions are necessary in order to create the proper environment for independent 
media to flourish which in turn oversee and protect the system from abuse.  US media did not 
become independent institutions, as Paul Starr and others point out, until they became profit 
making institutions, within a political framework marked by a weak state and strong liberal 
constitutionalism which provided media autonomy from the state and a market which enabled 
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its commercial independence.
45
 For Diamond,  it is the self-enforcing acceptance of restraint 
on political power which is a prerequisite for the normative shift necessary for media 
independence and a watchdog role in society and hence a pivotal aspect of democratic 
consolidation   
 
Media transitions in Russia, Poland and Hungary are illustrative of these complexities. Russia 
was still a superpower, even after the abdication of Soviet rule, with a well educated and 
trained workforce shaped by strong cultural traditions.  It also had a large and potentially 
profitable media market.   Because of Russia’s status, donors for the most part left Russians to 
manage their own legal, economic and institutional reform. Media assistance came from 
various donors and was largely invested in training and technical consulting. By 2003 the 
Russia media sector had received over 44 million from USAID alone which was divided 
between two media development NGOs with different territories and approaches:  Internews 
and The Russian-American Press and Information Center (RAPIC).  Internews, the primary 
contractor for the broadcast sector, kept their focus narrow and worked predominantly with 
smaller regional broadcasters, most of which were run by young managers eager for change.
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The tone of the collaboration was apolitical and the goal two-fold: to make the reporting 
professional and the stations more profitable. They distinctly sought Russian solutions over 
American models.  
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The strategy for print was quite different. The Russian-American Press and Information 
Center (RAPIC) had a more ideological bent, emphasizing press freedom, civil society, access 
to information and setting of journalistic standards, more than business development.
47
 Their 
reach was broader and they often were challenged by older generation managers and editors 
with less interest in change and innovation.  A USAID assessment in 2003 criticized RAPIC’s 
tactics for not focusing enough on financial independence and for internal management 
problems.
48
 USAID shortly thereafter decided to shift their funding strategy in support of 
more commercial models. It was during this same period that donors in Bosnia were 
concerned about “sustainability” and began backing more business and market oriented 
programs. 
 
The Russian media sector went through a series of phases.  As in most of the post-communist 
countries, they experienced an initial opening with a rapid increase of new outlets and market 
growth.  Emerging oligarchs formed a so called “media-industrial- complex” and waged 
“media-wars,” during which these new media barons jockeyed for political influence and 
access to yet to be privatized state property.  A financial crisis in 1998 turned the situation 
around as advertising revenues dropped 70-90%. High inflation along with a rise in the prices 
of commodities including newsprint resulted in a further constriction of the market.  In 
response, some oligarchs abandoned their media platforms while others held on but had to 
shift their priorities to earning profits rather than political favors in order to keep the 
businesses afloat.  Russian media scholar Elena Vartanova summarized the developments:  
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“The transition of the Russian economy from a planned, state-controlled, and highly 
ideologized system to a market system was followed by economic depression, the loss of 
social unity, disappointment in politics and economic reforms, and a moral crisis in society.”49 
She wrote further, “[t]he decline of journalisms’s moral standing occurred under conditions of 
economic crisis, new social stratification, and impoverishment of the majority of Russians in 
the late 1990s…”50 In the midst of this crisis in 1999 Putin assumed power and quickly 
exerted his control over the media sector. One of his key policies was the establishment of a 
ministry for print and broadcast media to oversee reforms.  Over the next decade, the 
government continued to tighten its control over the media.   
 
By 2010 IREX’s MSI ranked Russia as unsustainable and concluded that the quality of 
journalism was declining, investigative journalism was all but dead and that there was little 
market for independent journalism.
51
  During the 2011 election season, stations aligned with 
the government began producing pro-government documentaries in response to anti-
government protests. These documentaries instigated a revolt by independent minded 
journalists and a boycott of NTV (one of Russia’s leading stations) by activists. Although 
very little changed editorially in the dominant stations after the protests, journalists and 
citizens were becoming more vocal with their discontent.  Blogs and social networks were 
also developing as sites for organizing political opposition and protests.   
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Russia is an example of a highly development country which has modernized along the lines 
of many western societies with modern technology and education but one which has failed to 
liberalize.  Western influences were accepted and employed more in relation to market 
development and capitalism rather than in the social and political realm, resulting in weak 
democratization and liberalization.
52
 Economically Russia has a form of hyper-capitalism 
supported by a statist, conservative and extractive political environment which is highly 
integrated with the economic elites. This has inhibited social reform, the development of a 
politically engaged civil society, and the emergence of journalism into an autonomous 
profession 
 
In Post-Soviet Eastern Europe the primary motivation for reform was admittance to the EU 
and the international financial system. Donors favored training and exchanges as means of 
“resocializing easterners according to western standards.”53 Despite the significant reforms 
and membership in the EU, both Hungary and Poland have experienced periods of democratic 
regression. Their media sectors also show signs of media capture, hyper-competition and 
rampant commercialization unchecked by weak institutions and legal reform. 
 
 Hungary followed a similar pattern to Russian where an initial liberalization stalled during a 
serious economic downturn between 2006-2008 and was followed by a subsequent shift to the 
right politically. The Hungarian government, for instance, in 2010 established a new media 
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council and media authority, both lead by the ruling party, requiring journalists to register 
with the authorities.  Later in 2010 the Hungarian Parliament passed another law to regulate 
all media – broadcast, print, and online. The guidelines were not clearly defined and the 
violations come with heavy penalties which would constrain freedom of speech and increase 
self-censorship out of raw fear of vague laws. These institutional and regulatory reforms 
violate European standards and laws as outlined by the Council of Europe, Article 10 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and other European Union policies. The OSCE 
voiced concerns that "The changes put into place a new legal, institutional and regulatory 
framework for media regulation and supervision that can be easily misused for political 
purposes and that could contradict the principle of the separation of powers and of the checks 
and balances typical of liberal democracies. Public-service media are especially at risk of 
direct political control."
54
  The situation worsened in early 2012 when the Hungarian right-
wing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán revamped the constitution to increase his power, reduced 
the power of the constitutional court, made advances on the independence of the national bank 
and even removed the term republic from the official name of the country.
55
  
 
Poland is yet another example of a country where all the institutional structures are in line 
with western standards but the informal mechanisms, political clientalism and economic 
instability are subverting them.  Historically, Poland’s mass press developed late, was elite 
dominated, and exhibited a high degree of political parallelism. Under communism Poland, 
                                                 
54
 OSCE Press Release, “Hungarian Media Legislation Severely Contradicts International Standards of Media 
Freedom,” Vienna, September 7, 2010, http:www.osce.org/fom/72229 (accessed May 24, 2012). 
 
55
 Clemens Hoges, “Nosedive in Budapest: The Political Origins of Hungary’s Economic Crisis,” Spiegal Online 
International, 1/17/2012,  http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nosedive-in-budapest-the-political-origins-
of-hungary-s-economic-crisis-a-809434.html (accessed May 24, 2012). 
55 
 
 
similar to Hungary, was one of the more liberal regimes. They had some clandestine access to 
western television and radio, and a limited independent press operated under the protection of 
the Catholic Church. Despite state censorship, many Polish journalists did have a strong sense 
of identity and professional mission as dissidents and to protect Polish culture from 
communist domination. During the transition, Poland received significant assistance from 
western donors and along with the EU accession process they were able to quickly reform 
their political and legal frameworks to European standards. Despite joining the EU in 2004, 
Poland is still confronting the effects of its transition - economic “shock therapy,” the current 
EU crisis and the resulting social and economic dislocations. 
 
 In 2005 Poles fed up with 20% unemployment, government corruption and recurring 
economic struggles voted two center-right parties into power. The stronger of the two, The 
Law and Justice Party, is a conservative, nationalist and populist party then run by the twin 
brothers Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski.  Under the Kaczynskis, media came under tight 
government control and political observers have labeled this a period of de-democratization.  
Although commercial media may have gained greater economic independence, the tradition 
of advocacy journalism and levels of political parallelism remained high.  Cooperation with 
donors and investment from Western media conglomerates, which many had hoped would 
raise standards and establish western editorial practices, has not proven true. Instead 
investment from leading European media has contributed to strong commercialization as well 
as tabloidization.  Polish lawyer and media scholar Karl Jakubowicz describes the media 
institutions as “hollow” and laments that the “mimetic” transformation strategies have not 
yielded the expected results. He grants that such political and economic transitions will take 
56 
 
 
years, possibly generations, and are not necessarily linear, but he is concerned that the legal 
and political frameworks may not survive the time it will take for democratic consolidation to 
take place.
56
    
 
In Russia, despite training and collaboration with the west, those hailed standards of the 
liberal model are not well institutionalized, in part due to the embedded cultural norms and 
historical traditions but also destabilizing economic crises which have emboldened 
authoritarian politicians. In post-Soviet Eastern Europe admittance to the EU may have 
created ideal laws and institutions on paper, but in practice development has not had the 
expected modernizing effect since the political and economic institutions remain extractive, 
largely benefitting minority interests.  In addition, those foreign companies which have been 
investing in media outlets in Eastern Europe have not brought their management and 
journalistic practices. Instead they have allowed local managers to run the business as they see 
fit.  The corporate leaders say they do not wish to interfere in national affairs, but critics argue 
that as long as there are profits, corporate owners are not worried about upholding journalistic 
standards.  The result has been low levels of self-regulation, weak professional association 
and high levels of commercialization and homogenization. In the words of Jakubowicz, 
“Without the supporting environment of democratic political culture, democratic institutions 
remain empty, and the implementation of democratic norms as well as their proper operation 
and performance is missing. (Gross 2004) Moreover, such empty institutions often turn into a 
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Potemkin village: they satisfy merely formal criteria while their essence is misinterpreted and 
misused in the interest of political and economic elites.”57  
 
 
The Western Media Model 
The international standard for journalism, and the dominant media model shaping policies and 
expectations as well as Jakubowicz’s prerequisites, is the liberal model. It is characterized by 
journalism that is both professionalized and commercialized. Reporting is therefore 
“objective” or politically balanced, and is marked by independence of media from business 
interests, social groups, or political parties. News organizations are business oriented and 
profit driven, yet generally maintain ethical standards. Other critical factors are a respect for 
the rule of law and legislation that protects the growth of pluralistic markets as well as 
freedom of the press.   
 
In both the American and European cases, professionalization of the media was the outcome 
of very specific socio-economic and historical conditions. Before the late 1800s, the US had a 
highly partisan press. At first glance there are similarities between US journalism of the 1850s 
and Southeastern European journalism today – for instance, the reliance on government 
contracts for advertising; the use of stringers who write for many papers and hold various 
jobs, some with political connections; and the tight affiliation of editors with political 
parties.
58
 Yet it would be a mistake to assume that there is a standard trajectory of 
development and therefore that conditions in Southeast Europe now are inevitable signs of a 
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nascent democracy that will evolve over time along a path similar to ours. A very specific and 
unique set of political, social, and economic forces shaped each system, and will shape 
different ends. 
  
It was during the 1890s that a major shift occurred in American journalism, “from 
representing political loyalties to civic responsibilities.”59 A catalyst for this change was the 
Progressive movement, led by the growing middle class. According to sociologist Michael 
Schudson, significant changes in voting practices turned political participation from a truly 
gala affair – where ballots were often either bought, pre-printed with the candidates of choice, 
or came with libations – into a private and individual duty shielded from political coercion, at 
least in the voting booth. New progressive attitudes fueled citizen outrage over levels of 
political corruption, brought about a decline in the power of political parties and a wave of 
political reforms, and supported the emergence of the press as a watchdog institution liberated 
from political affiliations.  
 
The press was able to make this ideological shift not only due to changes in the political 
sphere but also partly due to changes in the economic landscape. Wire services fed new mass 
markets with politically-neutral information for consumption by diverse national audiences, as 
opposed to previously politically-aligned news for target audiences. Standards of objectivity, 
however, came from more than changes in the market. As Schudson points out, partisanship 
was still probably the most lucrative form of journalism, but journalists had begun to develop 
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a professional culture with distinct norms and standards, and an allegiance to their profession 
and their readers rather than to business or political interests.
60
  
 
Commercialization was a parallel and complementary historical process that included the 
development of a mass circulation press and a strong advertising market, which provided 
financial stability for business development and independence from political interference. The 
development of mass circulation press was important not only because it offered a broad 
market for advertising but also because of its capacity to facilitate communication from elites 
to the masses. This is a very different context than is found in Southeastern Europe, where 
circulation is generally limited to elite readers, engendering a more horizontal, elite-to-elite 
communication model.
61
  
  
Under the growing market conditions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, US newspapers 
could afford to hire full-time reporters, which increased journalists’ job security and status, 
and hence improved standards. This newfound autonomy and professional mandate 
contributed, by some accounts, to muckraking – or reporting on scandals – as a means to root 
out corruption.
62
 Journalists began playing an important role in setting the news agenda which  
motivated them to utilize the legal system for protection of citizen’s rights as well as their 
own. These new values and standards were then seen by media owners as the foundation of 
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credibility that earned them audience loyalty and, ultimately, profits. This process, through 
which owners realized that quality news reporting could strengthen their businesses, linked 
commercialization and professionalization in a mutually supporting way.  
 
The financial stability of news organizations also supported important management and 
structural changes. Owners transferred responsibility for running newsrooms to editors, 
allowing a more distinct separation between the business and editorial sides of the press. It 
was also during this time that professional schools, press associations, and codes of ethics 
were established. And, by 1923, the first national code of ethics was established by the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors. 
 
 The strength of economic conditions during these tandem processes of commercialization 
and professionalization further strengthened the mass circulation press and mitigated the 
negative effects of commercial pressures. These processes were complex, not necessarily as 
straightforward as their presentation here, and took decades or more to evolve. What this 
oversimplification demonstrates, however, is the dynamic among these interdependent 
processes and how they impacted each other, enabling both institutional changes as well as 
the attitudes and practices that shaped the system. But this was truly an evolution, as opposed 
to a revolution or a strategy of social engineering.  
 
61 
 
 
In the American press, the next formative period spanned from 1945 to 1980. Modernization 
theory
63
 elevated media to the status of an institution required for social progress. According 
to modernization theorists, economic development would create specific variables in a society 
– such as education and mass media – that would allow it to modernize and democratize. 
Economic growth during this period further strengthened markets as well as the middle class. 
Newspapers were largely family-owned, profitable monopolies and the broadcast market was 
limited to three national broadcasters, which were tightly regulated. Politically, there were 
high levels of ideological consensus, civic awareness, and unity after the Cold War, as well as 
trust in political leaders, all of which coalesced to create conditions for journalism to emerge 
as a social institution. Journalists had the independence and a sense of professionalism to set 
themselves above the political fray as “objective” guardians of civic interest. Various 
professions, including journalism, continued to consolidate as each took on responsibilities to 
uphold ethical standards, enforce a public service mandate, and balance forces in capitalist 
markets.
64
  
 
After World War II, with the publication of Four Theories of the Press, scholars defined the 
role of media in different ideological systems for the first time.
65
 While this book has been 
widely criticized for being too strongly biased toward the liberal philosophical tradition, it did 
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have significant influence at the time. According to the authors, the libertarian theory is the 
one adopted in most democratic societies, wherein freedom of the press acts as a check on 
state power, and  truth is derived through an open marketplace of ideas. Yet it is actually the 
social responsibility model, an outgrowth of that libertarian model, which has shaped modern 
media development policies. This paradigm emerged in the US, to balance the extreme 
commercial-centered media model and the libertarian stance of limited government regulation 
and sponsorship.
66
 It calls on the media to accept its responsibility to advance civic interests. 
Freedom of expression, in the libertarian theory, is an inalienable natural right; in the social 
responsibility theory, it is “balanced against the private rights of others and against vital social 
interests.”67   
 
The North and Central European experience echoes certain elements of the North American 
experience, yet provides some insights into a system where contradictory forces were able to 
coalesce on the path to professionalization. For instance, the early development of a market 
economy and the emergence of a middle class were similarly critical factors; however, in 
Europe, while the strength of the economy did allow an independent press to emerge, 
historical social divisions based on religion and ethnicity created space for special interest 
papers to thrive as well. In this alternate model, professional and advocacy press coexisted.
68
 
Hallin and Mancini point out that, despite a number of contradictory forces inherent in this 
media model, it operates with a high level of professionalism. For instance, politicized media 
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is balanced by strong unions and other professional associations in support of self-regulation. 
In addition, there is also substantial state regulation of the media as a social institution, which 
is tempered by respect for rule of law and effective legislation to protect press freedoms. 
Public service broadcasters are an example of one of the most important social institutions 
which the state supports financially and protects legally.  
 
In these models, journalism was able to consolidate as a profession through a process called 
differentiation, by which groups organize themselves horizontally and are bound by a 
common identity, set of values, code of ethics, and sense of autonomy.
69
 As professions 
differentiate, their roles in society become solidified, and thereby alter underlying power 
structures. In the case of the media, this process increases autonomy from other social, 
political, or economic groups. In the examples of the US and Europe, this was facilitated by 
the economic independence that resulted from growing national economies. Sociologist 
Jeffrey Alexander sees the level of media autonomy in a society as a sign of its modernity. He 
identifies three forces which push media to differentiate, and hence modernize toward the 
liberal model: (1) growth of professional norms and self regulation, (2) universalism in 
national civil cultures, and (3) demands for “more universalistic” information instead of 
advocacy journalism that supports entrenched groups.
70
  
 
If Alexander has accurately identified the pre-requisite forces that enable the liberal model, 
then a deficiency of these forces has posed significant challenges to media assistance in 
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Southeastern Europe and has prevented the profession, and hence the sector, from 
consolidating. Economic development plays a large role in fostering all three of these forces: 
professional values cannot emerge without a basic level of economic stability and 
independence, social consensus is impossible in a society experiencing economic and physical 
insecurity, and advocacy journalism appeals through stereotypes to entrenched groups and 
therefore reinforces divisions. Economist Graciana Del Castillo, an advocate for effective, 
dynamic, and socially inclusive economic development in post-conflict societies, wrote in a 
recent book, “welfare improving projects between unfriendly nations have often served as 
confidence-building measures and have contributed to better security and improved 
relations.”71 When economic development brings stability and security, it can neutralize 
divisions and contribute to greater social consensus. Yet economic development is not a 
panacea, and when it comes without appropriate regulations and checks and balances it can 
undermine democratization. Amy Chua warns in her study of ethnically-divided societies that 
economic growth in democratizing countries can in fact lead to instability if it predominantly 
benefits an ethnic minority and prompts an impoverished majority to fight for political 
rights.
72
 
 
Economic Development and Values Creation 
The relationship between economic development and the emergence of values is a sensitive 
topic in the social sciences and has divided theorists for decades, if not centuries. 
Modernization theory, with its early origins in the ideas of Karl Marx and Adam Smith, holds 
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that socio-economic development leads to shifts in underlying values that impact culture and 
therefore political institutions. This theory was challenged during the Cold War when 
assistance from the United States to support industrialization and economic growth in the 
developing world ended up strengthening authoritarian regimes rather than democratic 
governance. Hence, economic development in and of itself does not necessarily lead to 
democratization. Another school of thought from the 1950s and 1960s, referred to as 
preconditionalism, stressed the need for certain structural requirements for democracy to 
emerge. Such requirements included socio-economic development, levels of social consensus, 
as well as the existence of specific cultural practices and beliefs.
73
 This mode of thinking was 
later discredited as too deterministic and elitist; its parameters rendered much of the globe 
apparently unfit for democracy.  Political changes in the 1970s spurred what is called the 
“third wave of democratization,” shifting the focus from structural preconditions to the 
universal potential for unique paths to democratization predicated upon political openings and 
specific stages of transformation. Institution building, rather than mere economic 
development, was believed to hold the key for cultural change and democratization. 
 
A new theoretical challenge came with the fall of the Iron Curtain, and many subsequent 
transitions from communist societies to democratic ones, and from command to market 
economies. Latin American models were not appropriate in these new contexts and the 
distinctive nature of the various transitions defied attempts to keep them on specific reform 
pathways. The implosion of the former Yugoslavia and turbulent transitions in Southeastern 
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Europe added further complexities. These transitions were demonstrating that there was no 
linear progression toward democratization and that democracies came in many different 
varieties – so called qualified or illiberal democracies – some of which could even regress.74 
 
Political scientists Linz and Stepan write that democratic consolidation requires more than 
markets and elections, it requires the cultivation of specific attitudes and habits. The question, 
then, is how to cultivate them in a developing society? Consolidation, in their model, also 
requires five interconnected and mutually-reinforcing conditions: civil society, autonomous 
political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy, and institutionalized economic society. 
However, as is seen in the countries in this study, those five conditions will only function with 
the proper underlying attitudes and habits. Linz and Stepan’s model illustrates the problem of 
the sequencing of reforms. They believe that simultaneous reforms in institution building and 
economic development are impossible because certain reforms are necessary before a market 
can emerge, regulate, and grow. This is true, but even when all the necessary institutions and 
laws are in place, there is no guarantee that they will play their part in market development, 
professionalization, and commercialization unless they are animated with democratic 
attitudes.  
 
Critics and those less sanguine about contemporary transition processes have described 
democracy as a Western phenomenon, or even a “wayward historical development”75 – one 
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that is unique in each environment and cannot be replicated elsewhere. In discussing the 
exportation of democracy and the relationship between institutions and values, historian 
Jacques Barzun wrote, “the parts of the machinery are not detachable; the organism is in fact 
indescribable, and what keeps it going, the ‘habits of the heart,’ as Tocqueville called them, 
are unique and undefinable. In short, we cannot by any conceivable means ‘show them how to 
do it.’” 76 Current nation-building efforts demonstrate that politicians continue to try to “show 
them how to do it,” and donors continue to finance them. Philanthropist George Soros, 
through his Open Society Foundation, has invested nearly $500 million annually since 1984 
toward fostering democratic societies, including support for independent media and freedom 
of information.
77
   
 
Despite all the institution building of recent democratization efforts, in The Media 
Missionaries Ellen Hume notes that, “most of the difficulties in media development stemmed 
from a region’s failure to develop that requisite democratic culture.”78 The pendulum has 
swung once again and recent scholarship is reconfiguring the former preconditionalist and 
modernization arguments. One such effort is The World Values Survey conducted by 
Inglehart and Welzel, a grand revisioning of modernization theory. They collected survey data 
from 81 societies, comprising 85% of the world’s population, between 1981 and 2001. Their 
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conclusion was that: “Economic prosperity is strongly linked with the emergence and survival 
of democratic institutions, but it operates primarily through its tendency to give rise to self-
expression values.”79 According to this theory, economic development leads to greater access 
to education and information, which builds human capital and creates opportunities. These 
new resources and opportunities give rise to “self-expression values” that lead people to seek 
to safeguard the civil and political liberties that constitute democracy. Societies then design 
institutional structures to protect their interests and freedoms. Inglehart and Welzel found that 
these self-expression values are the catalyst of democratic culture, which in turn shapes and 
animates institutions.   
 
Interestingly, the countries of ex-Yugoslavia have very mixed rankings in the World Values 
Survey. Croatia and Slovenia, for instance, had some of the highest ratings in Eastern Europe 
for self-expression values.
80
 Slovenia experienced less conflict than the other former 
republics, and both Slovenia and Croatia have greater economic prosperity and are socially 
more cohesive. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia have some post-industrialist qualities, such 
as access to education and information, but continuing economic instability and social 
divisions keep their levels of secular-rational and self-expression values low.   
 
Media assistance to post-conflict countries is an external intervention, even when sanctioned 
by the political elite. In practice, this means that reform is largely imposed from outside; so 
the question of fostering local support and democratic values is paramount to success. In 
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countries going through transitions that are domestically inspired, the focus on phases has 
greater relevance since reform is usually instigated by internal value shifts. In Bosnia and 
Kosovo, transitions were “pacted” – peace was negotiated by the architects of the conflict 
along with international forces. In such cases, reform is dependent upon aligning the interests 
of local politicians with those of international governing bodies and the needs of society, all 
of which are frequently at odds. Post-conflict environments lack a unified public sphere and 
there are numerous obstacles to fostering greater cohesion: the social fabric is torn and 
fragmented, there is a general lack of trust and cooperation, the state often lacks legitimacy, 
and there is either a weak or complete absence of civic allegiance. Enduring survival needs 
inhibit the emergence of self-expression values and the mass belief needed to fuel political 
legitimacy and transformation.   
 
As Carothers observed in Aiding Democracy Abroad, aid providers eventually realized that 
replicating institutions was futile unless they found a way to “confront the underlying interests 
and power relations in the sectors in which they wish to help bring about change.”81 
Democratic attitudes emerged in the American and European models, not exclusively from  
institution building but also from shifts in power brought about by economic growth and 
changes in the marketplace. For instance, political parties lost power as the middle class 
gained it and began demanding accountability; economic stability enabled professions to 
consolidate with a social mandate and professional standards; and revenues from mass 
markets allowed newspapers to adopt editorial independence, balanced reporting, and a role in 
civil society. Political openings and sequencing of reform are important for development, but 
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the necessary attitudes and values emerge from the spaces in between, from the interaction 
between institutional and legal frameworks and economic growth. 
 
The Dynamics of Economic Development 
Economic development has been perhaps the weakest of all the development processes in 
these recent examples, yet is the one that underpins the success of all others. How and when 
to develop a market economy – and its impact on democratization, and nation- and state-
building processes – is contested, and gets to the heart of the intractable problems facing 
media development in these countries.
82
 In the American and European experiences, 
economic development contributed to an altering of the power structures in society, and to 
modernization and norm creation; but these historical processes have been difficult to 
replicate in transitional countries. As far back as 1959, American political scientist Seymour 
Martin Lipset believed that stable democracy was predicated on social and economic progress 
in tandem, leading to programs for political reform that supported economic development. 
Others, such as economist Jagdish Bhagwati, argue that countries should develop markets first 
and then democratize later. Economic development, in his view, is a precondition to 
democratization because the business of creating a stable economy can undermine the 
political viability of those who enact often unpopular policies.
83
  
 
Bhagwati may go too far in advocating the development of markets first, in advance of 
democratization, since this strategy has in some instances only solidified authoritarian leaders 
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and institutionalized inequalities. In fact, the greatest benefactor to Eastern European 
transitions, global financier and philanthropist George Soros, has come to fear that neo-
liberal-style capitalism may be among the biggest threats to democracy, allowing market 
values to suffocate liberal ideals.
84
 On the other end of the spectrum, the implementation of 
democratizing initiatives first may create the institutional and legal frameworks for a viable 
state, but these alone will not generate democratic attitudes and behaviors. A more systemic 
and process-oriented approach that recognizes the mutually supporting nature of economic 
development and institution building can alter underlying power relationships required for 
democratic change. Economic growth, when protected and regulated through democratic 
mechanisms, contributes to modernization, greater social equality, institutional independence, 
and demands for civil liberties. Amyrta Sen has observed that democracy is a demanding 
system, not just a mechanical one.
85
 It is a system in which the need for economic and social 
security is interconnected with political and civil rights. Those rights include access to media 
to facilitate social and political dialogue, which helps support the political process and the 
emergence of democratic practices and attitudes.   
 
Experiences in Southeastern Europe have shown that democratization programs really must 
be synchronized with economic development. I argue, and I believe the case studies presented 
here demonstrate, that donor organizations undermined their own efforts by focusing on 
democratic reforms and institution building without fully appreciating that their success was 
predicated on levels of economic development that would support systemic change. It does 
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not come down to how much money is spent by the World Bank or the IMF on economic 
restructuring, but to how effective economic development policies are. Growth or 
development must be sufficient to reach a threshold where society feels the impact in the form 
of lowered unemployment, rising real wages, as well as greater equality and stability. In the 
following chapters, I will show that chronic poverty, economic inequality, a lack of 
opportunity, and resulting social and economic insecurity have not only weakened civic 
engagement but have actually further entrenched social divisions and instability. The result is 
institutions and organizations with no base of economic support, which are left in survival 
mode, living on the brink of bankruptcy, both financially and professionally. 
Commercialization dominates these weak markets, creating permutations of the model, 
particularly in the media sector.  
 
Donors did understand the necessity for economic reforms, and in fact implemented 
substantial programs to facilitate transitions to market economies, but in the end their efforts 
were insufficient to achieve levels of growth that would promote social stability and 
adequately fuel transitions. For economic reform to be meaningful on the societal level, the 
formal economy cannot be subverted by the informal economy, and there must be job 
openings and money for investment in a broad range of businesses – not just those owned by 
elites. Citizens need a particular level of economic security to buy into reforms and participate 
in the political processes, which in turn gives credibility and vibrancy to institutions and the 
legal system. Donors in these countries had too limited a mandate, and lacked adequate 
funding and political will for effective economic reform.  
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An economic overview of the situation, not even taking into consideration the social 
ramifications, is bleak. Each of the countries in this study suffers from high unemployment, 
large grey markets, low foreign direct investment, and sizeable current account deficits. In 
Bosnia, despite substantial investment by the World Bank and the IMF in the first years after 
the war, conditions for long-term growth have not been achieved. The majority of early aid 
went toward infrastructure, which is to be expected in a post-conflict situation; yet an overall 
lack of internal development and investment in the private sector left the country with low 
growth, at 5% per year after 2000, along with unemployment averaging 29-45% and a grey 
economy estimated to account for 1/3 of GDP. Public expenditures alone demand up to 60% 
of GDP, a condition attributed to the complexity of the political system created by the Dayton 
Accords.
86
 In Macedonia, the economy has seen shrinking growth, estimated at just 3 or 4%, 
due to internal ethnic strife and the global economic ills, and the country has a 35% official 
unemployment rate and a grey market accounting for over 1/5 of GDP.
87
 Kosovo is still 
heavily dependent on foreign aid, estimated to be 50% of GDP. It is also the poorest country 
in Europe, with a per capita GDP of $2,300, unemployment around 40%, an average growth 
rate of just 4%, and a 2009 account deficit at negative 18.837%.
88
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Timothy Balding, Director General of the World Association of Newspapers, believes the 
policy approach has been backwards and has called for new assessments to identify the 
economic barriers to development of the media in emerging democracies:  
My first contention is that, historically, media assistance programmes have largely 
focused on the wrong end of the wide spectrum of potential areas of intervention. Until a 
few years ago, and in many cases even more recently and still today, they have aimed 
almost exclusively at media content in developing and transitional nations, in other words 
in trying to improve the ethical and journalistic quality of news and information 
enterprises. As often as not, they have completely neglected the industrial, business and 
market issues and this has, necessarily, led to a failure to have any impact on the 
development of the independent press.
89  
 
I agree with Balding that donors have focused too much on content and not enough on market 
issues; but to address those issues we must break down strategies and define the scope of the 
problem. My argument goes farther than Balding’s and I hope to demonstrate that donors 
understood the scope of the problem too narrowly and should have addressed underlying 
market conditions. When they did eventually target “industrial, business and market issues,” 
donors’ approaches were based in more training and institution building. An independent 
press requires editorial independence, which is enabled and protected by the strength of the 
market and business practices as well as the structure of the newsroom and the industry. 
Reforming the media market is outside the purview of media development, and no amount of 
training can fix economic problems.   
 
Though the World Bank has supported media development projects and related research 
because there is a belief that freedom of the media is critical for market development, their 
focus has been on how media can assist markets to develop but not necessarily on how to 
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develop markets that enable independent media. The question of whether a free press supports 
economic development, or economic development supports a free press, is often presented as 
a chicken and egg question, but the two are mutually supporting.  James Wolfensohn, 
President of the World Bank in 1999, wrote about the importance of a free press for economic 
development and pointed out that a free press supports good governance by putting a spotlight 
on corruption, enfranchising a range of citizens from the rich to the poor, and building public 
consensus for change. Furthermore, according to Wolfensohn, “studies have shown a strong 
positive correlation between voice and accountability and measures such as per capita income, 
infant mortality and adult literacy.”90 Wolfensohn, however, makes an argument similar to 
that of Welzel and Inglehart that societies with greater income and education tend to be more 
civically engaged and hence demand accountability. That dynamic creates the space in civil 
society and within the profession for independent media to assume the role of watchdog, as a 
mechanism to hold those in power to account, and as credible arbiter of public discourse. For 
media to play their expected role, structures that ensure the free flow of transparent 
information need to be in place to facilitate market development, but there has to be enough 
economic development to reach a threshold high enough support independent organizations, 
afford dissemination of information through the system, and create a market for that 
information.  
 
In his book Exporting Press Freedom, Craig LaMay also faults the donor focus on training 
over economic development. According to LaMay, commercialization in many media 
                                                 
90
 James D. Wolfensohn, “Voices for the Poor,” Washington Post, November 10, 1999, 
http://chora.virtualave.net/voicesofthepoor.htm (accessed October 28, 2011).  
 
76 
 
 
development areas has not led to independence, and the donor fix of using management 
training to achieve sustainability is insufficient to combat pressures.
91
 He attributes corrupted 
editorial policies and a lack of sustainability in many media development initiatives to a lack 
of revenue sources, weak civil society, and too great an influence of governments. Ultimately, 
however, he views the problem as part and parcel of a larger crisis in global democracy – a 
subject worthy of another dissertation. 
 
In the face of such grim statistics and enduring social rifts, critics have been reassessing 
economic policies. Monroe Price has questioned whether there is sufficient understanding of 
the “potential relationship between media development and economic growth,” and in post-
conflict environments he recommends focusing media projects toward enhancement of 
stability and economic development in advance of democratic reform.
92
 Economist Graciana 
Del Castillo has been highly critical of the World Bank and the UN for not grasping the 
unique economic needs of post-conflict societies, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo. She 
argues that economic development in post-conflict societies must begin as soon as possible 
since it is essential for building political and social stability, particularly in countries facing 
reconstruction and national reconciliation. Economic growth then must not only reach specific 
levels, it also must be structured in such as way which benefits society as a whole and not just 
one ethnic group to the detriment of another, if it is to  contribute to a security and stability 
that can promote civic over ethnic interests.  
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The significance of economic development in fostering democracy and hence Tocqueville’s 
“habits of the heart” was learned during the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after the 
devastation of WWII, yet those lessons do not seem to have informed more recent policy 
prescriptives. The economic miracle, or Wirtschaftswunder, that occurred in Germany, along 
with an overall economic recovery in Western Europe through the 1950’s, gave people faith 
in the new democratic system.
93
 Inglehart and Welzel put it this way: “The key factor needed 
to transform this authoritarian culture into a democratic culture was a prolonged period of 
economic prosperity that generated a sense of existential security and human autonomy.”94  
 
The situation in Japan was similar to that in Germany. There, “during the latter stages of the 
occupation period, when US and Japanese economic policies and the economic stimulus 
provided by the Korean War produced accelerated economic recovery, most Japanese were 
rewarded for their adherence to constitutional democracy.”95 While the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia had a different socio-economic starting point than either Germany or 
Japan, the need for rapid economic stability to support reconstruction is similar. To 
paraphrase Jacques Barzun, industrial development has historically been liberating, by giving 
people hope and a means to develop the ideas and habits that make democracy work.
96
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Distortions and Skewed Outcomes 
The lack of synchronization between state building, democratization strategies, and economic 
development has created distortions which have negatively impacted the outcomes of many 
assistance projects. A range of factors have contributed to the distortions, including a lack of 
trust and accountability within the political system, faulty rule of law, and media markets 
which are beset by tycoonization and hyper-competition. For instance, on the surface, media 
markets in the countries in this study appear to be pluralistic – but these markets are not 
regulating quantity or rewarding quality as would be expected. To borrow from the criteria of 
IREX’s MSI, there is a plurality of affordable public and private news sources, citizens have 
unrestricted access to domestic and international media, independent news agencies gather 
and distribute news for print and broadcast media, and state and public media represent 
different linguistic communities. However, these markets are dominated by the twin problems 
of tycoonization and hyper-competition which subvert the quality and diversity of content, 
editorial autonomy, and transparency of ownership.    
 
“Tycoonization,” the collusion and creative ownership relationships between political parties, 
big business, and media holdings, is a region-wide phenomenon that is holding development 
captive to the interests of elites. This problem has emerged largely in post-socialist countries 
as a result of the privatization process, through which local elites were able to amass wealth 
by buying up previously state-owned assets. Corruption has flourished in the post-conflict 
environment of these countries, marked by protracted legal reform, weak rule of law and 
regulation, political turmoil, and criminal networks. Tycoons frequently prop up their 
struggling media holdings with profits from their other businesses. This has been seen as a 
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good investment strategy, not because media outlets are valued as social institutions or even 
as viable businesses, but because they are viewed by tycoons as tools to help enhance their 
political careers, other businesses, or simply to influence politics.  
 
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi has developed a model of post-communist media evolution that she 
calls “Oligarchization,” in which media move from overt censorship under communism, to 
self-censorship under Glasnost  (a period of liberalization), to media anarchy during 
deregulation, when new media proliferate before legal reform is complete. At this juncture, 
media follow one of two paths; Mungiu-Pippidi theorizes that in an environment where 
politics are competitive, media will become more pluralistic, but if politics are less 
competitive and dominated by oligarchs, then media will be “captured.” She defines this as a 
“situation in which the media has not succeeded in becoming autonomous to manifest a will 
of its own and to exercise its main function, notably of informing people, but has persisted in 
an intermediate state, whereas various groups, not just the government, use it for other 
purposes.”97 She finds a strong correlation between low freedom of the media scores and high 
levels of corruption when she compared Freedom House’s Index on Freedom of the media 
with its data from its Nations in Transit project. In her model, media capture is most likely in 
societies with systemic corruption, where the state is still dominated by vested interests (“state 
capture” frequently leads to “media capture” or vice versa), there is concentrated, non-
transparent ownership of media outlets, strong ties between media and political elites, and 
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local elites control the media. Chapter Five, on Macedonia, will present a situation which 
closely follows this model. 
 
Tycoonization is similar to a problem that Hallin and Mancini identify as “clientelism” in 
their Mediterranean Model. They define clientalism as “a pattern of social organization in 
which access to resources is controlled by patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for 
deference and various kinds of support.”98 This manifests itself in the media sector in various 
ways – for instance a heavily politicized media, judicial system, and bureaucracy; frequent 
trading of law suits between media owners and politicians; a generally weaker rule of law 
than in the liberal model; and a condition in which information is often seen as a private 
resource. Within political culture, Hallin and Mancini note that clientelism leads to a cynicism 
of “public interest transcending particular interests” and they credit this as a factor that is 
inhibiting the development of journalistic professionalism in Southern Europe.
99
 The point is 
illustrated by the example of Greece , where “industrialists with interests in shipping, travel, 
construction, telecommunication, and oil industries dominate media ownership, and a long 
tradition of using media as a means of pressure on politicians continues. As 
Papathanassopoulos (2000) notes, ‘give me a ministry or I will start a newspaper’ is a 
traditional political threat in Greece.”100  
 
Extreme competition for severely limited resources in an environment of weak rule of law has 
created the phenomenon of hyper-competition. In normal competitive markets, the market 
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should consolidate as competition increases. Healthy market growth should lead to an 
increase in financial commitments to news production – to improve quality and diversity, to 
gain audience loyalty, and hence increase advertising and profits. Such stable, diverse markets 
pose an obstacle to those peddling influence and ultimately improve the quality of news 
content. Appropriate regulation and anti-monopoly legislation further protect the press from 
abuses. This only works, however, when there is enough profit to be won in the marketplace 
to support such commitments. The notion that the more pluralistic the media, the more 
balanced and democratic the flow of information, has been a guiding principle of the donor 
community. Recent studies show, though, that in emerging media markets, core assumptions 
of the capacity for market forces to promote transparency and improve quality through 
competition are failing.  
 
As Anne Hollifield observed in her study on hyper-competition, markets are not consolidating 
and competition exceeds market rationality because, “the externality value of media 
ownership creates incentives to stay in the news business even when the business is not 
profitable. In many nations, ownership of commercial media is used to pursue business and 
political goals external to the media business itself. Market concentration has not emerged, 
and hyper-competition in the media industry continues.”101 Hollifield says further that this 
situation is at its most extreme in countries experiencing political or economic instability 
because the power of the externality value of the media is lasting. A downward spiral ensues 
when competition increases in a market with limited resources to the point where profits 
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disappear, opening up organizations and journalists to corruption. Salaries and quality both 
drop, resulting in a rise of sensationalistic or politically-aligned reporting at the expense of 
public interest or informative journalism. Journalism is co-opted by commercial pressures and 
can no longer fulfill a social mandate.  
 
Weak media markets undermine professionalization; journalists rarely earn living wages, 
often work without contracts, and have multiple jobs. Consequently, journalism holds an 
uncelebrated status and many reporters are women, since they will tolerate the low wages and 
difficult work environment in return for flexible hours that allow them to attend to family 
needs. Others use jobs in journalism as stepping stones to higher paying public relations 
positions. Under these conditions, in which journalism is seen as merely a job and not as a 
profession, the sector cannot differentiate. Furthermore, institutionalized and formal self-
regulatory mechanisms, such as press councils, professional organizations, and codes of 
ethics, are often absent or lacking any real influence. Journalists often cannot afford to pay the 
requisite fees, or they refuse to pay them, claiming these organizations are ineffective or 
corrupt. And editors rarely support these organizations since their allegiance is not with 
journalists but with owners and special interests.  
 
Versions of hyper-competition and tycoonization exist in developed democracies, even those 
of the liberal tradition. Robert McChesney’s book, Rich Media Poor Democracy, for instance, 
documents how neoliberalism has contributed to hyper-commercialism and the dominance of 
corporate interests over the American media. Rupert Murdoch, among the media world’s 
current most reviled tycoons, is behind the politically conservative Fox News as well as the 
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British News of The World scandal. Clearly, established democracies such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom need to reform their own media systems, which are not living 
up to their own standards of professionalism or democratic ideals.  
 
The problem in Southeastern Europe is one of degree, as well as of donor objectives. These 
problems are systemic and they are eroding rather than enhancing the democratic processes 
and attitudes that donors are trying to advance. The markets are so small and so competitive 
that impact is magnified. Hyper-competition is preventing a stable commercialization process 
and undermining professionalization; this hyper-competition is at once a side effect as well as 
an enabler of tycoonization of the media, by weakening the media to the point where they are 
co-opted and instrumentalized by political and business interests.    
 
In Southeastern Europe, tycoons who have co-opted the media may feel they have gained 
power, but in many ways it is illusory, because the conversations they are having are largely 
with themselves. Often, the media they support aren’t making a profit and aren’t terribly 
influential, because citizens recognize their bias and opt out. In such circumstances, media are 
robbed of their agency as is the public. James Carey, in a discussion about Walter Lippmann’s 
book Public Opinion, describes an analogous situation in the US when the state, interest 
groups, and the media competed and colluded for influence:  
Elites and journalists, in other words, mutually manipulated one another to mutually 
shared ends. The Public stood toward this game as an increasingly bored and alienated 
and, above all, cynical spectator, learning to distrust appearances mounted by both elites 
and journalists and, most damagingly, to distrust all language, to look at language as a 
mere instrument of interest and obfuscation. In this context, journalism could no longer 
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link political impulses with political action; it could produce publicity, scandal and 
drama, but it could not produce politics.
102
  
 
Without effective politics and institutions there can be neither trust in the system nor any 
expectation that a culture of participation will emerge. This becomes a vicious cycle in which 
accountability is discarded. According to polls conducted for the 2005 UNDP Early Warning 
Report for Macedonia, less than 25% of respondents believed “that the media in Macedonia 
report objectively and accurately on political issues.”103 In Kosovo, there has been a 
significant decline both in approval ratings of political figures and trust in institutions. Voter 
turnout, for instance, reached a high of 90% in 2000104 but fell to less than 50% in 2010, when 
20% said that they will not vote if new elections are held.105  In addition, just over two-thirds 
of those polled for a UNDP Early Warning Report ranked “unemployment and poverty” as 
the circumstances that most threaten the stability of Kosovo. 
 
While voter turnout and trust in the media are also declining in the US and worldwide, 
ultimately it is that trust which is the glue of democracy. As Michael Schudson has written, 
the US political system depends on such trust – trust that representatives within our 
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institutions and government will work in our collective public interest.
106
 Without respect for 
the media or trust in the system, the feedback mechanism that is vital for democracy cannot 
function. In the US, that feedback mechanism has recently been flooded with cries of distrust 
in government institutions and the media that has led to a level of public protest not seen since 
the 1960s; many say it is a loss of trust specifically that has re-opened this social space to 
populism. Another phenomenon of this reawakened protest has been the parallel rise of 
citizen journalism and social media reportage in the US, injecting new life into a media 
landscape that has arguably become divisive. How the sector establishment integrates or 
competes with this popular and increasingly respected form of journalism will mold at least 
the short-term future of US media markets. 
 
In Bosnia, this feedback mechanism is rarely operational. Examples in that case study will 
show that investigative journalism has not had significant impact because citizens rarely react 
to allegations of corruption; they find it unsurprising and generally do not expect politicians to 
act in their interest. Politicians in turn frequently operate with a lack of transparency because 
they know they will not be held to account. In Bosnia, as in Kosovo, because of the dominant 
political role of international governing bodies, politicians often feel more accountable to 
international administrators than they do to their own communities.  
 
Despite all the development dollars marked for training, journalism remains heavily 
advocacy-oriented in these countries because of continued political and business influences, 
and to a lesser extent historical traditions. Universalism in national civic culture, identified by 
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Alexander as a modernizing force, has proved a near impossibility due to the political and 
ethnic divides that still polarize and dominate these societies.  Inflammatory speech has 
reemerged in the Bosnian media sector, which continues to reflect ethnic priorities. During a 
farewell speech in June 2007, former UN High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling 
warned that rising nationalist rhetoric was fomenting a political crisis and that “such behavior 
not only holds the country back, it is playing with fire and could jeopardize the stability that 
has been built up over the last 12 years, if it continues.”107 As Snyder and Ballentine have 
warned, complete media freedom in transitional societies that lack democratic practices can 
actually provide an unconstrained space for nationalistic voices.
108
  
 
“Vigilante journalism” in Kosovo is a prime example of how freedom of speech without 
requisite professional standards and rule of law leads to distortions. Rationalized by a need for 
justice, coupled with frustration with incompetent courts, police, and international 
mechanisms, news organizations published detailed personal information on alleged war 
criminals without respect for due process or professional norms and standards. This resulted 
in violence against those identified, who had neither been formally indicted nor convicted of 
any crimes. A maelstrom of international debate ensued, regarding how to address the 
situation and what professional and systemic constraints allow freedom of speech to work as a 
democratic mechanism. Kosovar media defended their actions under the cloak of freedom of 
speech, and many journalist organizations in fact supported them. Most international bodies 
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viewed this vigilante-ism as a corruption of the precepts of freedom of speech, though, and 
felt it needed to be punished and rectified.  
 
This type of reporting emerged again in Kosovo in 2007 and 2011 and is an example of how, 
when one part of a political system fails, other institutions or parts of that system move in to 
take on the function of that failed part, but usually act in their own interest and based on their 
own norms. In a bizarre twist in 2011, the EU’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) 
issued indictments against five members of the staff at the Pristina
109
-based Infopress 
newspaper for a nearly two-week-long “hate campaign” against a fellow journalist, BIRN 
Kosovo director Jeta Xharra. According to a news report, “The newspaper alleged without 
substantiation that Ms. Xharra had committed treason and the paper appeared to encourage 
vigilante action against Ms. Xharra. It issued an implicit death threat in a newspaper article 
stating: “Jeta has herself chosen not to live a long life.”110  
 
What crime of treason did Xharra commit to anger fellow journalists so? She reported on 
problems of freedom of speech in Kosovo, including a segment on how her camera team had 
been chased at gun point from the municipality of Skenderaj for trying to report on local 
government issues. While Xharra was doing what good journalists do, she purposely or 
inadvertently violated local political boundaries. The problem stems from the fact that 
Infopress has strong ties to Kosovo’s Ruling PDK party, which coincidently is a large 
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advertiser with the paper, and the mayor of Skenderaj, who is also implicated in this scandal, 
happens to be a PDK party member.  
 
Although the incident took place in 2009 with significant international attention, the judiciary 
did not act until 2011. In a statement, Xharra decried the two-year delay of justice, saying it 
gave the offending media outfit the impression they “could act disgracefully and dangerously 
with impunity,” and that the “young state’s fabric – specifically its capacity to uphold 
freedom of speech – was allowed to corrode.”111 This case highlights many of the intricacies 
of media politics in Kosovo, where politicians have close ties to news outlets, reporting 
territories are protected, and officials in the judiciary often fear reprisal for upholding the law. 
Clearly, consolidation of the media sector cannot occur without a commitment to the rule of 
law and trust in legal frameworks. 
 
In Southeastern Europe, one of the most serious issues relating to accountability is the 
relationship between internationally-funded organizations and local communities. Many of 
these organizations are now locally-registered NGOs in the process of developing a local 
identity, after having been either established or heavily funded by international donors. They 
are confronting strong local perceptions that there has been a lack of fiscal and programmatic 
accountability, resulting in easy money for local managers or directors. This has led to 
resentment and suspicions of money laundering, often referred to as the international 
“washing machine.” These beliefs on the part of the public make it that much harder for such 
organizations to gain local credibility, and hence to function as mandated.  
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Another point of contention at the local level is that international actors do not always practice 
what they preach, and many of their policies and institutions are not as democratic as they 
could, or should, be. Monroe Price, for instance, has gone so far as to question the origin of 
the legal authority exercised during the early media intervention in Bosnia and whether it was 
in line with international standards. Anna Di Lellio, former Temporary Media Commissioner 
in Kosovo, wrote the following about her experiences: 
 Though the rhetorical stress of the international administration was always on building 
self-sustaining institutions and local ownership, very little or no trust at all was given to 
Kosovo residents. They were implicitly judged as incompetent to hold executive 
positions…while I was never allowed to staff the TMC office with local media analysts, I 
had to rely extensively on contacts outside the office to decipher the media discourse, 
understand political processes, and test the eventual impact of executive decisions. It was 
indispensable work, but did not contribute to building a locally owned institution.112  
 
There is also an underlying flaw, or worse hypocrisy, in media development projects in the 
countries in this study. Media assistance is viewed locally by some critics as reflecting an 
ideology – an imposed and competing one at that. There are still journalists and editors who 
subscribe to the socialist role of journalism, which assigns a civic duty to journalists to 
personally and professionally advocate a political course for the country. Mixed into these 
competing ideologies are the conflicting political agendas of donors, who purport to build 
“independent” media but also to “use” them for promoting democracy and reconciliation. 
Donor money, in effect, acts as a carrot that leads to particular agendas becoming 
institutionalized.  
 
                                                 
112
 Anna Di Lellio, “Empire Lite as a Swamp,” Transitions XLV, no. 1 (2005): 61-78. 
 
90 
 
 
While media assistance is very much a political undertaking, most development practitioners 
are loath to view their work as a form of social engineering. They believe that label is more 
appropriately reserved for less hallowed ideological missions; and democratization is often 
considered a “just intervention,”113 a moral imperative for international stability. Yet in the 
worst case scenarios, that ideal end has justified undemocratic means and yielded 
undemocratic outcomes. As Price observes, “It is virtually assumed that shaping media is a 
necessary part of controlling and building a democratic state. Indeed, one of the paradoxes of 
the post-conflict media restructuring is contained in this policy. Control (and often 
censorship) is considered a prerequisite for a successful transition from war and authority to 
democracy and stability.”114 In the countries in this study, this particular irony has contributed 
to high levels of resentment. These are societies where the media have been used habitually as 
a tool of indoctrination or propaganda, and where their use for the purposes of creating a new 
narrative may be viewed as more of the same coercive social engineering.  
 
Beyond the liberal model and all of the expectations it brings, there are other viable, if less 
“ideal” media systems. The Mediterranean countries of Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal 
have media systems that are closer socially and economically to their Balkan neighbors in this 
study. They face potentially destabilizing social divisions, a history of advocacy press, weaker 
professionalization, and a commercial press that also developed late and lacks the level of 
independence and self-sustainability seen in North America and Northern Europe. While all 
four of these countries are democratic and are members of the European Union, their media 
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systems fall behind the international standard and are therefore less influential in shaping 
media policy internationally. However, they could offer alternate and potentially more 
effective remedies for media development in many places. For instance, state subsidies and 
even state ownership of media outlets, as a means of ensuring diversity in the press, is 
common, particularly in France and Italy. Price and others have suggested similar policy goals 
be added to assistance programs but those views have been largely ignored due to concern by 
the US over government interference.   
 
In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, state ownership and subsidies have largely been 
eliminated by privatization laws meant to further align the sector with liberal practices. 
However, faulty privatization processes allowed special interests to gain control of many 
smaller local media outlets and donor support has taken the place of subsidies, both of which 
undermine policies designed to spur independence. Although donors have encouraged 
editorial independence of media organizations, this has resulted in a form of financial 
dependency which has in turn challenged sustainability. Recognition of this by donors has 
heavily influenced their programmatic shifts.  
 
Similarly, the transformation of state broadcasters into public service broadcasters has been an 
ongoing battle on the international as well as national levels. On the international level, US 
and European donors have regularly had territorial and ideological disputes over the structure, 
financing, and role of public broadcasters. On the national level, rather than representing an 
inclusive national voice, public broadcasters tend to represent ethnic communities and are 
frequently exposed to coercive political pressures. For example, in Bosnia the public 
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broadcaster is divided along ethnic lines; in Macedonia it is heavily influenced by the ruling 
party, and the programming is divided linguistically and content-wise along ethnic linesl and 
in Kosovo, despite multi-ethnic and multi-lingual programming, it is widely rejected by the 
Serbian community. In the end, a stronger economic basis is needed for a more independent 
media sphere to emerge, either through greater development or transparent forms of subsidies 
with limited government intervention.   
 
Conclusions 
Donors have learned many lessons as they have struggled to assess local needs and political 
openings, and match them to their organizational mandates and capacities. The shift from ad 
hoc programs to a systemic or holistic approach, in which the media system was mapped, was 
a step in the right direction; this led to the establishment of institutional and legal structures to 
meet EU and international standards as well as a deeper understanding of the intertwining of 
institutional and legal reform. Donors have also learned to adjust their expectations and their 
timelines. The limited results and critical evaluations have shown that “tool boxes” and 
models should be used sparingly and that more ethnographic approaches should be tried. They 
have also learned the hard way that real change requires longer term commitments and that 
training, in and of itself, will not mold attitudes and behaviors. There is more that needs to be 
learned, however, on a fundamental level.   
 
Policy makers have focused too much and placed too much faith in structures and sequencing 
of reforms without a full appreciation of the dynamics among them. In describing 
democratization processes, Linz and Stepan wrote: “Democracy is more than a regime; it is an 
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interacting system. No single arena in such a system can function properly without some 
support from another arena, or often from all of the remaining arenas…furthermore, each 
arena in the democratic system has an impact on other arenas.”115 Institutions and legal 
frameworks are critical and some sequencing is of course necessary – for instance, there 
cannot be investigative journalism without freedom of information – but democratization is 
about more than institutions, and development is not linear. It is economic growth that fuels 
and shapes democratic reform and hence the media system. If economic development comes 
first, without the supporting institutions and legal frameworks, it often benefits the elites who 
then have little incentive to later democratize. On the other hand, if institutions come first, 
they are frequently weak and ineffective. Economic development, when it benefits society as 
a whole, can shift power structures, bridge social divides, help create norms, and shape 
emerging attitudes. 
 
For media development to succeed, future policies must address the dynamics of the 
interdependent and concurrent processes of commercialization, professionalization, and 
economic development. Without adequate economic development in the countries in this 
study, journalism as a profession has not been able to differentiate and consolidate to balance 
the forces of commercialization. Strategies to boost commercialization in the absence of either 
a growing economic base, strong laws, or professionalized journalism to keep it in check has 
contributed to tycoonization, yielding hyper-competitive markets that render these media 
sectors unable to play their expected role in the democratization process. As Alexander points 
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out, media must fully differentiate in order to fulfill the function of replicating social values 
and norms, but even then they cannot create those norms.  
 
In the liberal model, as we have seen, economic independence and the strength of mass 
markets have shielded editors in consolidated democracies from political influence and fiscal 
blackmail. In these dual transition examples, commercialization without a secure and 
professionalized media sector have prevented newsrooms from crafting editorial hierarchies, 
leaving editors feeling forced to side with publishers and other financial interests at the 
expense of the integrity of journalism and journalists. While donors have recognized the 
superficial elements of this problem, their curative programs have targeted the symptoms 
without confronting the root cause. Newsrooms have been reorganized, management and 
journalism trainings have been conducted, and advertising strategies have been implemented 
– to limited effect. In some cases blame is put on the legacy of the former system, and while 
that may be a factor in some cases, the structure and culture of the sector are shaped as much 
or more by economic influences as they are by ideology. 
 
The bigger question that must be answered is how we can expect recipient countries to live up 
to standards we often fail to meet at home, and accept the creation of media systems based on 
models which are arguably in decline or collapse in our own societies? In the worst of cases, 
outcomes in the countries in this study represent wasted money and have resulted in 
unintended consequences in the local environment. Some distortions, such as dependency and 
skewed markets, undermine development and can have negative long-term consequences. The 
most significant side effect is a potential democratic deficit, including disillusionment with 
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and a lack of trust in budding democratic systems. Policy makers would do well to revisit the 
experiences of their own past, the historical evolution of their own media as well as the post-
war experiences of Germany and Japan. Lessons there can help identify potential solutions to 
problems within our own system and lead us to more coherent and effective policies abroad.      
 
Going forward, more local ownership of media assistance that allows each country to craft its 
own system is vital. In the end, this will be the outcome anyway, as the US specifically and 
Europe generally have limited timelines for support. As funding, interest, and patience wane, 
these countries will have to pick up the pieces and work within whatever environment they 
inherit. Hopefully, institutions and training developed by donors have created a base for 
democratic media sectors in the future, but only time will tell. Ultimately, the uniqueness of 
each country’s own process – their own “habits of the heart” – will determine what role these 
media systems will play in each cultural context.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
A Silver Bullet or a Blank Cartridge: Media Assistance 
 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Disabling Economic Environment 
 
"A politically controlled media helped to start the war. A free and open media will help keep the peace." 
From the Annex to the Madrid Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council  
December 16, 1998 
 
The postwar reconstruction of Bosnia is the story of media development that evolved from a 
short-term tactic of conflict intervention to a core component of democracy assistance. This 
was the first time since World War II that an alliance of countries and international 
organizations came together in an attempt to reconstruct and democratize a country. Billions 
were invested and teams of international experts and organizations consulted on how to steer 
this dual transition country onto the path to democracy.
116
 Media reform was expected to act 
as a catalyst in this process. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) facilitated numerous donor strategies to help establish “independent, pluralistic and 
professional media in Bosnia as a means to support the overall transition to a free society.”117 
Yet recent analyses in publications from Newsweek to the journal Foreign Affairs have 
labeled Bosnia a failing state due to economic stagnation and institutionalized political 
rivalries.
118
 Instead of facilitating civic debate, many media outlets have reflected and 
encouraged these divides, causing Reporters Without Borders to downgrade Bosnia from its 
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standing of 21st out of 173 countries in 2006 to 39th just three years later. Allegations of 
inflammatory speech, politically biased reporting, corruption, and collusion with business 
interests all point to failed professionalization and commercialization of the media sector.  
 
While the convoluted political structures of postwar Bosnia have contributed to this outcome, 
a lack of economic development has played a larger role in hindering the overall transition 
and specifically the capacity to transcend ethnic divisions. With both growth and aid on the 
wane, Bosnia ranked last out of all the countries in Southeastern Europe in the 2010 
Economic Freedom report, which cited the country’s inefficient and difficult entrepreneurial 
environment as reason for this ranking.
119
 Insufficient economic reform has crippled reform in 
general, leaving institutions and processes without a foundation for development. The case of 
Bosnia provides important lessons for democratization policies elsewhere since those 
organizations and foreign governments that were active in Bosnia later employed their 
acquired experience in media assistance to shape programmatic strategies for subsequent 
missions in Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia – as well as outside the region in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  
 
After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, which formally ended the wars in Bosnia in 
1995, the international community – comprised of the United Nations as well as a range of 
European and American government agencies and NGOs – entered into the complex 
environment of an ethnically-fueled war in the wake of a failed communist state. The initial 
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post-conflict environment required peace-building along with frequent peace enforcement; 
both of which had to be negotiated among the leaders of the three warring groups and the 
international diplomatic bodies responsible for implementing the peace agreement. Only once 
a particular level of stability and security had been achieved could the long term processes of 
state and nation building and democratization begin. Media reform ultimately played a role in 
all of these various efforts, yet in the early phases, these separate processes were for the most 
part conflated, rendering many strategies unsynchronized with developments within the sector 
and with reforms in other sectors.     
 
Donors focused predominantly on the architecture of democratization, establishing legal 
frameworks and institutions. As part of that strategy they set out to build a pluralistic media 
environment, expecting independent media to help create the necessary attitudes and values 
for reconstruction and transition. However, those democratic values and attitudes did not 
emerge from institutions, legal frameworks, and media alone. As outlined in Chapter Two, 
economic development plays a vital role in establishing a society with security, stability, and 
a stake in state building, and generates shifts in power structures and the emergence of the 
democratic attitudes and behaviors which in turn animate the system. On the other hand, a 
lack of sufficient economic development undermines attempts to professionalize and 
commercialize the media sector. Weak and oversaturated markets in Bosnia prevented the 
growth of media as profitable pluralistic business and the expected associated rise of editorial 
independence and the institutionalization of professional values.   
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Although economic development was a primary objective of the international community in 
postwar Bosnia and the country was the recipient of one of the largest per capita assistance 
projects by the World Bank (among other international organizations), such development did 
not follow. Donors sought to enable a transition to a market economy through sustainable 
economic development comprising the reduction of poverty as well as eliminating forms of 
economic exclusions such as discriminatory labor practices or unequal access to loans or 
investment. However, according to a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Donor 
Mapping report from 2007, economic development was plagued by many of the same 
problems as the media sector, such as poor cooperation among donors, a lack of long-term 
strategy, and insufficient data to inform policy.
120
  
 
Azra Hadžiahmetović, professor of economics at Sarajevo University, concurs with this 
assessment, and believes this is largely due to the complexities of the ethnically-based power-
sharing structures created under Dayton. She describes Bosnia as over-institutionalized; a 
system without a system: “Indeed, despite its apparent excess of institutions, Bosnia suffers 
from a notable absence of any institutionalized economic body that might mediate between 
the state and the market.”121 In her assessment, the Entities (Republika Srpska (RS) and the 
Federation) were given too much autonomy economically, and the state too little, and then 
there is little cooperation between the Entities’ individual economic institutions and then with 
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those on the state level. The resulting fragmentation and lack of coordination has had serious 
consequences. Unemployment is still at a pernicious 29-45%, GDP in 2005 was only 60% of 
prewar rates, lending to private industry is low and interest rates are higher than the European 
average, the grey economy accounts for nearly one third of GDP, the balance of trade deficit 
in 2009 was 29% of GDP, and Bosnia receives 10 times less investment than its neighbor 
Croatia.  
 
Overview of Media Assistance Strategies in Bosnia 
This chapter will first offer a chronological overview of the evolution of media assistance in 
Bosnia to demonstrate how and why it became a key component of democratization policies. 
Then, the chapter will present the outcomes of these policies on professionalization, 
commercialization, and institution building within the media sector. This chapter seeks to 
demonstrate that, despite donors’ best efforts, the success of many projects in Bosnia was 
contingent upon levels of economic development that were never achieved. The impact of the 
economic situation on the media sector was either not recognized at the time or was deemed 
to be outside the scope of the media assistance mandate. 
 
In order to understand the dynamic of the media sector in Bosnia and the region, it is 
important to take a step back to assess the nature of the media in Yugoslavia and the impact 
the war had on the sector. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia spent 45 years under 
communist rule, during which the media space was largely controlled by one political party 
and one ideology. Some of the toughest legacies to address from this previous system have 
been the lack of commercial experience, lack of democratic legal and regulatory structures, 
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and state ownership and political control over municipal broadcast outlets, printing presses, 
and distribution channels. An even more complex issue is the lack of a tradition of public 
opinion and responsive government institutions. Under communism, the state and its 
institutions were frequently circumvented or exploited for personal gain, rather than utilized 
to meet civic ends. This has led some practitioners to conclude that, even with economic and 
structural reform, the political culture required for the media to function as a Fourth Estate 
was not inherent in Bosnia.  
 
During the war, the structure of the media in the region changed dramatically. The formerly 
integrated Bosnian media quickly split along ethnic lines as the influence of electronic and 
print outlets shifted. Before the war, in all of Yugoslavia, there were 27 daily newspapers, 17 
major news magazines, hundreds of local papers, 202 radio stations, one news agency, and 9 
television stations.
122
 By 1995 in Bosnia alone, total print media had dropped to 145 news 
publications (including local papers), while broadcast media, the primary vehicle for 
propaganda, had ballooned to 92 radio stations, 29 television stations, and six news 
agencies.
123
  By 1996, a year after the war ended, there were over 400 estimated electronic 
media outlets in the country.
124
 As many seasoned journalists had emigrated, served in the 
army, or had been killed, a new crop of young and inexperienced journalists did much of the 
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local reporting, with no formal training. A resulting lack of professional standards and 
virulent nationalism prompted interventions from international organizations. The Open 
Society Institute, for example, established the Soros Media Center to provide equipment and 
training to independent journalists, to counter wartime propaganda. The non-nationalistic 
Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje and the news agency SAFAX (Sarajevo Fax) received donations 
from the international press as well as from various European non-governmental 
organizations.    
 
The Dayton Peace Accords did not directly address media development. The agreement made 
reference to the right to freedom of speech only in its provisions for elections and human 
rights, but later political and legal reforms to safeguard freedom of speech were laid out in 
Annex Four. Since the media had such a powerful influence during the war, policy analysts 
believed the media should in turn be able to support the reconstruction and reconciliation 
processes for a new Bosnian state and society. Initially, since there was no clear mandate for 
media development, programs emerged loosely as donors responded to the evolving situation 
and adapted their approaches.  
 
The United States government, through USAID alone, spent $38 million between 1996 and 
1999 on media related programs in the country.
125
 Estimates that include European funding 
total a minimum of just under $131 billion  for media assistance in the decade from 1996 to 
2006, yet many organizations and government agencies have not reported their numbers, 
which means the actual figure is significantly higher. The overall range of actors involved was 
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broad, and by 1997 there were reportedly “17 foreign governments, 18 UN agencies, 27 
intergovernmental organizations, and about 200 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)”126 
assisting reconstruction in Bosnia. While only a small segment of them were directly involved 
in media development per se, many humanitarian NGOs and international agencies conducted 
small media-related trainings to advance their causes. Media assistance became a “silver 
bullet” for everything from disseminating reconstruction information and news to quelling 
ethnic tensions.  
 
The 1996 elections, the first after the war, constituted a major test of the peace agreement and 
of the capacities of international governing bodies. The OSCE was in charge not only of 
monitoring the elections but also of overseeing political debates and election coverage. The 
Provisional Election Commission (PEC), under the auspices of the OSCE, established The 
Media Experts Commission (MEC). Its mandate was to create an open yet responsible media 
space by enforcing the PEC election rules, guaranteeing freedom of speech in the media and 
balanced coverage of the political party platforms. Short-term financial assistance went to 
local non-nationalistic media as well as toward financing the creation of new independent 
outlets and media monitoring to check standards and practices. With little time to prepare for 
the elections, it was impossible to transform state broadcasters per European standards, so a 
more expedient solution was implemented.  The showpiece of the Office of the High 
Representative’s media strategy was a $10 million-dollar television project,127 the Open 
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Broadcast Network, locally referred to as "TV-Bildt," named for then-High Representative 
Carl Bildt. It was envisioned as an independent commercial television network that would 
function as a balanced source of news and information for the elections, and for which the 
international community would be able to fully monitor content. In the long run, it was 
expected to act as a model network that would set standards in the Bosnian media industry.  
 
The reality of TV-Bildt was far from these lofty hopes. The network was assembled in haste 
with a conspicuous amount of financing, resulting in a fair amount of waste that caused 
resentment among local journalists who believed the money could have been better spent on 
other projects. Management was “top down” and poorly coordinated since it was administered 
by the Office of the High Representative and run by various international specialists.
128
 
Although the station was equipped with the latest technology, had hired many of the top 
journalists in the country, and was comprised of a small network of stations from both 
entities, it gained little credibility. Its programming was generally considered unimpressive, 
though technically slick and with an international format, and tended to cover topics deemed 
important to the international community but not to the local community.
129
 Despite the 
urgency and importance of the project, it only went on the air one week before the elections 
and therefore never had the chance to play its anticipated role. Instead of becoming a model 
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for commercial broadcasting, it became a symbol of misguided internationally-sponsored 
projects.  
 
That first post-Dayton election provided many hard lessons for the international community. 
Unfortunately, due to the volatility of the political environment and weak  oversight, the 
political debate remained inflammatory and journalists very often found that their rights were 
violated and their freedom of movement constrained. A common feature of all three ethnic 
enclaves was the continued dominance of often nationalistic state- or entity-controlled 
electronic media. There was chronic over editorializing, prone to "inflammatory 
generalizations like 'Serb fascist hordes' to describe persons from Republika Srpska."
130
 Of 
those polled in September 1996 by Dani, 46.6% said television was their main source of 
information, while newspapers came in at just 7.54%.
131
 At the time, newspapers were very 
expensive relative to average income; and in the Republika Srpska (RS) the situation was 
even more pronounced since there were fewer sources of news. The result was disastrous – 
votes fell exactly as they had in the 1990 election that preceded the outbreak of violence. Not 
only was the timing and coordination of media projects off base, numerous voting and media 
violations only served to solidify the post-conflict status quo. 
 
The election results instigated reforms upon reforms. On May 14, 1997, the Peace 
Implementation Council signed a declaration in Sintra, Portugal that codified the development 
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of an independent media as a policy objective. It broadened the scope of media policy and 
significantly increased enforcement mechanisms. In an effort to control inflammatory 
broadcasts, the OHR was given the “extraordinary power”132 to “curtail or suspend any media 
network or program whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of the spirit or 
letter of the Peace Agreement.”133 Such undemocratic policies were deemed necessary by 
international actors in a post-conflict environment, to protect the peace and create stability for 
a future transition. This seeming hypocrisy seriously impaired the credibility of the governing 
authorities and many media outlets saw these actions as interference rather than improvement. 
A following meeting in Bonn, in December of 1997, called for the establishment of an 
independent media council to regulate the media sector and enforce the newly established 
media protocols.  
 
Despite the best of efforts, policies in Bosnia were more reactive than proactive. In the 
absence of any regulatory bodies or self-regulatory mechanisms, donors funded copious 
training seminars as a means of professionalizing the sector. In both an effort to improve 
coordination and a reflection of spheres of influence that had emerged due to ideological 
divisions among donors toward media development, the US and the Europeans concentrated 
their efforts in different areas. European donors focused on transforming the state broadcaster 
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into a public service broadcaster, while the US supported independent commercial media and 
market development via direct assistance to favored outlets. Policy analysts mapped the media 
sector within an “enabling environment,” which launched the state building phase of 
institutional and legal reform.
134
  
 
Donors set out to foster the proper environment for a thriving independent media. Primary 
areas of focus were reform of the legal and regulatory environment and transformation of the 
state broadcasters. The OHR and OSCE, responding to the call for a dedicated regulatory 
body, teamed up to create the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in 1998, which was 
merged in 2001 with the Telecommunications Authority to become the Communications 
Regulatory Authority (CRA).
135
 Funding was provided by the US Department of State and the 
European Union and its mandate was “to issue licenses to all electronic media, to regulate the 
frequency spectrum, to implement a code of conduct for radio and TV, to determine license 
fees, and to establish a mechanism to protect the work of the media."
136
 The broad objectives 
of the IMC were to liberate the media from direct political influence and to help them adjust 
to Western European standards of journalism. The first hurdle was to bring order to the 
anarchic “Wild West” broadcast environment that had 280 broadcasters operating on 750 
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transmitters.
137
 By 2000, through a long-term licensing competition, the CRA was able to 
reduce the number of legally operating stations by about 30%. This was achieved by requiring 
stations to exhibit balanced programming, “sufficient finances, management skills, adequate 
technical standards, and some semblance of audience research.”138  
 
Legal reform was an enormous task, also led by the OSCE and the OHR, and included 
reforms to the Permanent Election Law, Equitable Access Guidelines, the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Press Code, and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Press Council Code of 
Implementation. Two of the most important reforms were the decriminalization of libel and 
defamation,
139
 as well as the establishment of a Freedom of Information Act. Journalists faced 
many threats, which restricted their movement and reporting. And they, along with many 
news outlets, were frequently charged with libel as a quick way to silence or bankrupt them. 
Without a Freedom of Information Act journalists did not have access to the information they 
needed to do any serious investigative reporting. Donors learned the hard way that no matter 
how good the laws were on paper, in order for them to be used, they had to be understood. 
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Therefore, the OSCE introduced The Media Law initiative, a project to educate lawyers, the 
judiciary, and media outlets on current media laws and how to use them.  
 
But it was not enough to reform Bosnian institutions; the donor community learned that they 
had to reform their approaches as well. While many noble efforts were put forth, aid was 
riddled with problems, including a lack of coordination that led to much duplication, 
unsynchronized policies, and inconsistent funding. A complex yet chronic problem was that 
much media assistance was not appropriately synchronized with reform in other sectors, 
specifically economic reforms, privatization, and business development.
140
 In addition, project 
funding from donors was typically granted for one to three years, in order to address a specific 
issue. After that period, donors frequently ended funding in favor of supporting a newly 
identified problem area. The peril in this cycle was that it could take three years just to launch 
a significant project; pulling funding after three to five years could kill a program just as it 
started to become effective.  
 
In some cases, IGOs and NGOs put the promotion of their own projects, programmatic 
“territory,” and reputations before the overall welfare of reconstruction. As a result, many 
local NGOs replicated the divisions and petty competitions seen in the larger IGO 
community. In a continuing effort to address donor issues, the OHR was given a more 
significant role in coordinating international support to independent media projects, including 
regular media roundtables in Sarajevo with all major donors. A detailed database of existing 
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and proposed projects was set up to create an effective instrument for avoiding overlap 
between donors and agencies, and to promote cooperation among them.
141
 Efforts were 
earnest but the results were weak, and a 2001 report by the Soros Foundation quipped that “no 
other place in the world knew of more coordinating bodies with less coordination than B-H 
[Bosnia].”142 International assistance was too frequently transitory, imbalanced, and 
conditional, making for an unstable environment for development. 
 
By 2000, most of the smaller donors began pulling out of the Bosnian media sector as its 
needs shifted from short-term interventions to more complex long-term development. 
Training fatigue, frustration with poor professional standards, and the oversaturated market 
gave momentum to establishment of the IMC as a broadcast regulatory body as well as to 
establishment of the Press Council and The Association of BH Journalists/ BH Novinari, a 
journalist association, as self regulatory bodies. During the period between 2000 and 2003, 
the institutional structures and legislative procedures required for democratic development of 
the media sector were put in place. By 2003, there was a programmatic shift toward business 
development, civil society strengthening, and the media’s role in supporting good governance. 
This included fostering domestic content production, especially investigative journalism in 
selected local outlets, along with support for the institutionalization of training centers, 
university reform, professional associations, and media related NGOs. Then, after 2004, very 
little funding entered the sector for new programs. Those major donors still investing in media 
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assistance put their efforts into developing sustainability strategies and business models with 
their core grantees as the final phase of their exit strategies.  
 
Ecology: The Media Development Tool Box and a Disabling Enabling Environment  
Despite the ad-hoc nature of media assistance in Bosnia, a rough template for media 
development did emerge to inform future interventions. The broad goals of building a 
pluralistic and sustainable independent media sector to support good governance, civil 
society, rule of law, and a marketplace of ideas were core concepts. To that end, the media 
environment was mapped, critical institutions and legislation were identified, and a tool box 
of strategies was developed. In practice, policies were designed for a two-pronged approach to 
commercialize and professionalize the sector. Training and institutional reform were meant to 
raise professional norms to Western standards, and financial and technical support to create a 
balanced market of sustainable, independent news sources and a public service broadcaster. 
Although ostensibly all the necessary structures are in place, the sector is not functioning as 
expected and many primary media outlets represent ethnic interests over civic responsibility 
in an oversaturated and weak media market that depends upon surreptitious financing from 
political and business interests.  
 
Much of the current analysis blames the situation in Bosnia on the complex political 
structures of the Dayton Accords and subsequent international oversight, or on the legacies of 
the war and the communist system. An area of critical importance that has not received 
adequate consideration is the role of economic development in democratic transitions. As 
discussed in previous chapters, commercialization and professionalization have been most 
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successful in creating media that support democratic practices in countries with particular 
levels of economic growth. The following section will explore the evolution of specific 
institutions and organizations and discuss their strengths, weaknesses, and distortions that 
have arisen. A lack of economic development has undermined institutional development, 
preventing the emergence of professional values, democratic practices, and market regulation.  
 
Professionalization and Supporting Institutions 
The primary catalysts for professionalization were educational institutions, professional 
organizations, and regulatory agencies. Per donor policy objectives, universities and training 
centers would teach required skills as well as the role of independent media in a democratic 
society; professional associations would promote self-regulation through the 
institutionalization of codes of ethics and advocate for journalists’ rights; and regulatory 
agencies would bring order to and enforce standards in the broadcast arena. Together, these 
institutions would, it was thought, give the profession the identity, mandate, and agency it 
needed to act as a Fourth Estate.   
 
Training 
The Mediacentar Sarajevo 
Of the three largest postwar training initiatives – Media Plan Institute, Internews BiH, and 
The Mediacentar Sarajevo (MC) – only the Mediacentar is still operational and its scope of 
activities has shifted dramatically. These parallel educational organizations were initially 
established by donors as short-term programs intended to fill the gap until University reform 
could be undertaken. They were critical to the sector; journalists participated in sponsored 
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trainings and trainers spent additional time in selected outlets working with the entire 
organization to improve management, marketing, and business practices. The Mediacentar 
was sponsored by the BBC, the Soros Foundation, and the British Know-How fund in 1995, 
while the war was still raging. Between 1996 and 2003, they trained 13 cohorts of broadcast 
journalists from all over the country and region. In 2003, the BBC training program ended and 
other donors, including Soros, were phasing out. From 2003 to 2006, the Mediacentar 
implemented programs on behalf of USAID and received direct grants for technical 
assistance. With donor support on the wane and fees out of the reach of most individuals and 
institutions, the organization was forced to diversify its programs beyond training in order to 
survive.  
 
In an effort to develop a sustainability strategy, the Mediacentar registered itself as a for-profit 
LLC in 2000. In 2002, the organization purchased its own building, and again expanded its 
real-estate holdings in 2004 through use of its own profits, a bank loan, and donor support. 
The purchase of real estate with the aim to generate income by renting out space is a tactic 
employed by several media related organizations in Bosnia and in the region, and profits are 
used to support their greater professional mandate. According to financial analysis in their 
ten-year report in 2005, Mediacentar profits had decreased but their sales revenues, property 
value, and donations had continued to rise, enabling them to maintain operations.
143
  
 
Economic realities, as is often the case, motivated significant innovation in Bosnia, offering 
many new services to the media community yet fewer training programs. A new business plan 
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for the Mediacentar in 2006 targeted five profit centers: 1) iDoc, an information 
documentation center; 2) Center for Media Training, offering education in print, broadcast, 
and online journalism; 3) Center for Media Policy, which conducts research on and 
monitoring of the BiH media sector; 4) Center for Strategic Communication, offering training 
in public relations and communications consulting services in partnership with the Center for 
Strategy and Communications in London; and 5) Production Center, one of the country’s 
leading independent production houses. The organization also offers publishing services, 
space and equipment rental, and use of the Mediacentar Café Club for event hosting – which 
brings in additional revenue under a separate license. This type of innovation is critical to the 
survival of any organization and the Mediacentar has been a model for other organizations in 
the region facing similar challenges. While the market may not support greater training 
initiatives, the unanswered question is whether training needs can even be met under current 
market conditions. 
 
Media Plan Institute 
Media Plan Institute (MPI) was among the first locally-established NGOs and played a 
significant role in providing hands-on training for journalists, as well as providing research on 
the developing media scene in Bosnia. However, it was not able to innovate or find a 
sustainable business model and was forced to slowly shut down its programs as donor funding 
ran dry. The organization was started during the war as an informal news service, Sarajevo 
Fax (SAFAX), sending reports to friends and colleagues in France before expanding into a 
media monitoring role and offering analysis of the media sector to international organizations 
that were operating in the country. In 1998, the MPI established a school of journalism for 
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short-term trainings in partnership with the High College of Journalism in Lille, France. Two 
years later, the program was renamed the Media Plan High College of Journalism and a year-
long certificate program for future journalists was added. A primary goal for the future of the 
College was to align the curriculum with the Bologna process so that their certificate would 
be internationally recognized. Students were required to be bi- or multilingual and have 
already received a BA, or be in the final phases of completing their undergraduate studies, to 
be accepted. The student body hailed from all over the region and donors provided full 
funding for all students, not just those from Sarajevo. Over 140 students in 7 cohorts were 
trained. The curriculum was 80% practical and 20% theoretical, and the daily routine 
mimicked that of real newsrooms, teaching students through practice of the craft – something 
still lacking in the university system.  
 
In an ongoing effort to diversify and survive, MPI launched an online magazine in 2000, in 
cooperation with their news service SAFAX, to cover media issues in Southeastern Europe. A 
spin-off organization was also created, the Association Media Initiatives (AMI). AMI, the 
goal of which was to “support the development of professional journalism in a post-conflict 
environment,” focused on educating minorities, particularly Roma. The Media Plan Institute 
earned a great deal of respect locally and regionally for its public interest programs, and 
cooperated internationally with various educational and media institutions. Unfortunately, in 
2005, the College was unable to take a new class of students due to a lack of funding and the 
inability of students to pay fees on their own. By 2008, MPI had yet to find a financial 
strategy that could keep them operational and by 2012 their website appears to have been 
taken down. 
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Internews 
Internews is another example of an organization that reinvented itself numerous times. It 
began as a USAID-sponsored broadcast training program in 1996, and then moved into local 
production before registering as a local NGO by 1999. In 2000, Internews secured grants to 
launch a journalism training program at the University of Sarajevo to balance its heavily 
theoretical curriculum. Over five years they trained nearly 1,500 students but, like MPI, the 
training they offered was too expensive for students to pay individually and the University did 
not have the budget to continue the program.  
 
Although five universities in Bosnia have journalism departments, journalism education needs 
were not being met according to sources for this study. International governing bodies as well 
as local decision makers in Bosnia believed that the university system must be the primary 
venue for journalism education and therefore fully embraced the Bologna Process. The 
Bologna Process, meant to harmonize the country’s university system with new European 
standards, began in 2004 but was protracted and fraught with problems. According to a 2006 
report, Bosnia was last among 45 nations to implement the reforms and its education 
remained over-politicized and underfunded.
144
 Reforms were mired in legal battles over the 
passing of relevant laws, political struggles over language and cultural rights, and prevailing 
suspicions that professorships and diplomas are often awarded based on connections or bribes 
rather than merit.  
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According to journalism Professor Besim Spahić of the University of Sarajevo, “on paper all 
the reforms have taken place. In practice: nothing. There is no accountability, no connection 
between faculty, unions, and media outlets; no cooperation, no community.”145 In the Bologna 
system professors are not supposed to have more than 30 students in a class, but Spahić had 
over 300, with no assistant. There were nearly 1,200 journalism students in Sarajevo alone in 
2006, far more than the University could accommodate, and many more than could find 
opportunities in the media sector upon graduation. In addition, many journalism professors, 
having received their education during the previous system, had to learn a new curriculum 
that is quite different from the more theoretical and historical approach they were accustomed 
to teaching. A larger and related problem was that most had never even worked in a 
newsroom; as the range of educational opportunities in Bosnia withered, so too it seems, did 
the quality.  
 
Regulation and Self-Regulation 
Regulatory agencies, coupled with industry and member associations, are some of the 
strongest mechanisms for professionalizing the media and enhancing the sustainability of the 
sector as a whole. When strong, they provide a venue for establishing professional identity 
and standards, promoting self-regulation through the institutionalization of codes of ethics and 
providing a mechanism to organize for professional advocacy. From 2001 to 2006, 
international donors invested heavily in establishing and developing these organizations, 
which have borne the brunt of the country’s fragmented political and social environment and 
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weak economy. Despite heavy investment, media professionals and survey respondents for 
this study still saw professionalization as a serious concern for their organizations.  
 
Journalists’ Associations 
BH Novinari 
One of the most significant developments in the country’s advocacy sector was the 
establishment of BH Novinari/ The Association of BH Journalists in 2004, the goal of which 
was to create a platform of professional interests that would supersede ethnic politics. It 
united three distinct associations: the Independent Union of Professional Journalists of BiH, 
from Sarajevo; the Association of Journalists (APEL), from Mostar; and the Independent 
Association of Journalists of the Republic of Srpska, from Banja Luka. It took four years of 
negotiation to merge the three associations any by 2007 BH Novinari  had 600 members. It 
represents the interests of print, broadcast, and online media journalists from all over the 
country.  
 
The mission of BH Novinari is to become the leading media association for protection of 
journalists’ rights as well as for the promotion of professional standards and democratization 
of the media sector. To meet these goals it worked on the development of the Press Code, 
lobbied to have the VAT rescinded on newspapers, and it runs a Media Help Line that 
provides free legal assistance to journalists. BH Novinari also conducts research, does media 
monitoring, and organizes trainings and other special events. The association closely 
cooperates with other local media organizations, such as the Communications Regulatory 
Authority (CRA/RAK), the Press Council, the Mediacentar, and the Media Ombudsman. One 
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of their most important projects was a working group on employment rights for journalists, 
funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Academic Foundation, which aimed to pass a 
collective agreement on labor rights for media professionals at the state level. One of the 
biggest obstacles to professionalization has been the fact that many journalists work without 
contracts and, while pay rates have rose at some outlets over the years, at other less affluent 
outlets, pay levels are actually declined.
146
 Coupled with extremely long work days and a lack 
of benefits, the prospect of more security in related fields, such as public relations, means 
journalism faces a high attrition rate.
147
 This results in high turnover and an industry drain – a 
reality which can be attributed to the fact that laws or agreements at the state or entity levels 
are not effectively regulating employment practices.
148
 
 
Unfortunately, BH Novinari suffered a major setback in 2006 with the discovery that an 
employee had been mishandling funds from a benefit plan that was offered to journalists 
working without contracts. In an effort to rescue the institution, USAID and Press Now 
provided guidance and financial support to create a strategic plan for the near term and a 
business plan for the longer term. At that time, BH Novinari was entirely donor dependent, as 
only 10% of its funding came from the collection of membership dues. Their plan was to 
increase that amount by 30% each year, and they estimated they could reach sustainability by 
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meeting 70% of their budget with revenue from dues.
149
 But, the allegation of fiscal 
impropriety mentioned above seriously compromised the reputation of the Union, impacting 
dues collection as well as their legitimacy. Still, in 2007, BH Novinari announced the 
establishment of a “Solidarity Fund” to assist journalist members in the case of job loss, 
illness, or any other similar threat; and they adopted a 3-year business plan that aimed to 
reduce donor dependence by 60%. While they continue to require donor support, the 
organization has managed to remain true to its mission, recently organizing a series of public 
debates that examine the role of the media and worked closely with the Council of Europe to 
monitor election coverage in 2010.
150
 
 
Regulatory Agencies 
The regulatory environment in Bosnia consists of two core organizations; the 
Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA), an FCC-style organization for regulating the 
broadcast environment, and The Press Council, which promotes self-regulation within the 
print media. Both were firsts in the region and have been used as models for other countries, 
yielding important lessons in institution building for the donor community.  
 
 
 
The Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) 
                                                 
149
 Borka Rudić, interview by author, September 7, 2006.  
 
150
 BH Novinari, “Events,” http://english.bhnovinari.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=category& 
id=63&Itemid=241&lang=en (accessed January 4, 2012). 
 
121 
 
 
The CRA is frequently hailed as one of the greatest media development success stories in 
Bosnia. Originally formed in 1998 by the Office of the High Representative and the OSCE, as 
the Independent Media Commission (IMC), it was "a regulatory body authorized to issue 
licenses to all electronic media, to regulate the frequency spectrum, to implement a code of 
conduct for radio and TV, to determine license fees, and to establish a mechanism to protect 
the work of the media."
151
 Today, one of the CRA’s primary missions is to support a market-
oriented and competitive communications sector for the country. Since 2001 it has been 
locally run, and since 2005 the CRA Council is entirely Bosnian. It is also one of the only 
organizations that is financially self-sustainable from licensing fees. 
 
A primary challenge of the CRA has been maintaining independence from political influence. 
In 2002 the Council of Ministers attempted repeatedly to reduce the operating budget of the 
CRA by 25%, despite amendments proposed by the Ministry of the Treasury. Intervention by 
the OHR was necessary to protect the independence of the Agency. Again, in 2004, the 
Council of Ministers interfered with the financial stability of the CRA by proposing its staff 
convert their salaries to civil service scales, opening them up to government regulation. Then 
in 2005, the CRA faced pressure from the Council of Ministers once more when it 
recommended that 1.1 million KM be transferred from a surplus in the Agency’s operating 
budget to support a deficit in BHT and BH Radio 1 satellite channels. The CRA is in a 
constant struggle to resist various forms of political and economic coercion.     
 
The Press Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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The Press Council was the first self-regulatory body in Southeastern Europe and struggled for 
a long time to carve a niche for itself in the Bosnia media sector. It was established in 2000 by 
the British Press Council, with additional core support from the OSCE, IREX, and the CRA. 
The conceptual framework of the Press Council was modeled after the British system and has 
two primary functions geared toward solving chronic problems in the Bosnian media sector. 
The first is to increase professional standards through self-regulation, via the adoption of and 
adherence to the Bosnian Press Code, written by the journalists unions. The second is to act as 
a complaint mediator, resolving disputes between citizens and the press when allegations of 
unprofessional reporting are made. In the past, when libel was still a criminal offense, 
politicians and businesses frequently used the courts to threaten media organizations who did 
not report favorably about them. The Council provides a more efficient and fiscally 
responsible means for resolving grievances. Disputes are to be addressed by “right to reply, 
publishing of retraction, apology or denial.”152 Unlike the CRA, the Press Council has no 
legal capacity to levy fines or sanction print media in violation of the Press Code. 
Unfortunately, outreach to media organizations and the public was insufficient at first, leading 
to a general misunderstanding of the Council’s purpose. Outreach efforts since 2006 have 
corrected this misperception, but arguably should have been implemented from the outset. 
 
Since its inception, the organization has struggled to develop a focused mandate, structural 
coherence, a clear identity, local legitimacy, and most importantly economic viability. In 
2005, publishers complained that although the Council had merit, it was too often ignored and 
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was unable to enforce the Press Code. Jozo Pavkovic, editor-in-chief of Vecernji List, 
commented, “today, nobody cares about the law, so you can imagine how much they care 
about the Press Council.”153 The Council also experienced a rapid succession of turnover in 
leadership in its first few years, keeping the organization in a constant state of flux; in the first 
six years, it had three directors and three chairmen. The Executive Director, Ljiljana Zurovac, 
reorganized the Council in 2006 to bring it in line with European standards and better 
integrate it into the Bosnian press sector. Zurovac believed the organization’s difficulties  
stemmed, at least in part, from a failure to engage publishers from the onset in the 
development of the Council.
 154
 In addition, due to international leadership in the early stages, 
the Council was unable to efficiently assess or react to local needs and was hence viewed 
more as a foreign project than as a valuable domestic institution.  
 
The previous Director of the Press Council, Nerman Durmo, believed the two biggest 
challenges were the lack of a clear mandate and financing. The donors “wanted publishers but 
there was no publishers association so we had to talk with each one individually. No one 
wanted to cede control. The Press Council was supposed to be a self-regulator, the profession 
giving advice to the profession, not a regulator as in some kind of censorship, but they did not 
accept it. Those that did want to help did not have the money, and those that had the money 
understood it as a form of control, which was not true.”  Durmo was frustrated with 
“international experts” who told him that the newspapers should finance 50% of the 
organization; he agreed this would solve the funding problem but it was impossible to force 
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publishers to cooperate. The donors, he explained, “thought if they helped some media or the 
Press Council for 2 to 3 years, they could create the conditions for them to continue 
themselves. It was optimistic, really, they would need at least ten years. And even then they 
would need to be really organized and have a good strategy of how and who to give support 
to.”155   
 
Even after the reorganization, the Council was still considered feeble by media professionals 
because it had no means of sanctioning breaches of the Code and citizens did not appreciate 
that it was a mechanism for them to demand accountability from the press. In September 
2005, for instance, the Communications Regulatory Agency hosted a seminar, “Promotion of 
Quality Journalism in Sarajevo” in which it was concluded that self-regulation was too weak 
and that a form of co-regulation should be considered. Participants voiced a need for 
professional and advocacy organizations in Bosnia to take more coercive action. BH Novinari 
was called on to be more proactive regarding breaches of the Press Code, and the Press 
Council to publicize them. The CRA recommended a similar regulatory model for print 
journalism as well. Efforts to get media outlets and professional associations to promote and 
uphold self regulation through codes of ethics had largely failed. The perceived need by those 
in the sector for overt regulation of the print media opens up a Pandora’s Box of concerns 
over censorship and self censorship.  
 
The Press Council’s Strategic Plan 2006-2008 stated, “the number of complaints to the Press 
Council has decreased over the past years for several reasons. It appears that the public is 
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somewhat indifferent, that is does not expect a complaint to the Press Council to help much or 
prefers to go to the court for financial compensation. There is little awareness of the need, 
functions and effectiveness of the Press Council.”156 In an effort to build its credibility and 
relevance, a settlement has been made with the courts requiring that all complaints be vetted 
first by the Council. Only the most severe infractions are then directed to the courtroom. 
Increased cooperation with BH Novinari, CRA, and the Media Ombudsman has raised 
awareness of the Council’s capacities.  
 
The Council has also engaged in educational outreach, organizing conferences and 
roundtables and establishing a regular “School of Media Ethics” seminar – this five-day 
intensive introduces students to a wide range of topics, including the application of ethics in 
journalism and how to recognize breaches to the Press Code. Most local journalism curricula 
do not include ethics, so the Council offers a key democratizing component with this seminar 
series, which has been supported from its inception by the German Embassy.  
 
The 2005 IREX Media Sustainability Index for Bosnia noted that “there are not enough 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working to actively protect and promote free 
speech.”157 On the contrary, there were sufficient organizations in the sector, but they were 
too weak to perform their function. The legal structures that support free speech have been 
similarly weak and, despite consistently higher MSI ratings for free speech in Bosnia through 
                                                 
156
  Press Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, …Strategic Plan 2006-2008, 4. 
157
Media Sustainability Index (MSI) 2005: Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and 
Eurasia (Washington, DC: IREX, 2005) 25. 
 
126 
 
 
2010 – when the legislative framework was called “more stable as time passes”158 and much 
progress was thought to have been made in its implementation – by 2011, Bosnia’s free 
speech rating dropped nearly half a point and legislation was said to “lack strong 
mechanisms.”159  The media sector still has not professionalized enough to have established a 
common professional identity and a set of professional norms, and is running to catch up with 
the realities of new media that have emerged on top of already poorly regulated established 
outlets. Web-based content, for one, has revealed weaknesses in Bosnia’s hate speech laws.160 
Nearly two decades after initial interventions, the elements required to foster professional 
values and differentiate the profession – adequate training and educational opportunities, 
contracts and benefits, competitive salaries, advocacy organizations and unions, and an 
effective legal framework – are out of balance, lacking altogether, or too weak to be effective.   
 
Commercialization and the Media Market 
Donor policies in Bosnia were based on the belief that commercialization of the media sector 
would support a marketplace of ideas. Core strategies included financial and technical 
assistance to “independent news outlets” as well as the transformation of state broadcasters 
into a public service broadcaster. Subsidies and capital infusions for equipment purchases, 
market research, infrastructure improvement, as well as subscriptions for news wire and photo 
services bolstered business capacities and overall sustainability. Management training and 
newsroom restructuring to ensure solid separation of the business and editorial side of 
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organizations were expected to create the necessary independence from outside political and 
economic interests. These approaches were designed to reform various layers of the sector 
over the short and long term. It was also believed that requisite democratic norms would 
emerge from the interplay of the development of institutions and the market. While donors 
identified the core institutions of a democratic media sector as well as the need of the sector to 
professionalize and commercialize, what they did not understand was that success was 
predicated on the emergence of a very specific dynamic among them. 
 
Efforts to commercialize the media sector by supporting pluralism and independent news 
outlets – both from local and international initiatives – were in many ways too successful and 
resulted in a saturated and fragmented market unable to regulate itself. Despite the success of 
the CRA, the Bosnian broadcast and print markets continue to be exceptionally 
overdeveloped; in 2011,
 
there were 143 radio stations, 44 television stations, 86 weekly and 
monthly publications (a number that has nearly doubled in 3 years), and eleven daily 
newspapers
161
 – for a population of 3 million.162 Many outlets have small to negligible 
audiences, too small to be supported by advertising or newsstand sales (subscriptions do not 
really exist) but they survive in some cases through grants, donations or from proceeds from 
other business interests of the owners. The assumption that broadcast regulation together with 
market forces would naturally adjust and consolidate the sector has not proven true.  
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In Bosnia, protracted legal reform, weak rule of law, and political turmoil have allowed 
tycoons to amass wealth by buying up assets previously owned by the state, from industries to 
media. Corruption has flourished and these tycoons have been able to prop up their struggling 
media holdings with profits from other businesses. In fact, this seemed like a good investment 
strategy since media were not valued as news sources but as tools to enhance and sell their 
other businesses and to influence politics. This market distortion has been attributed to the 
phenomenon of hypercompetition, as many small local stations are artificially supported from 
local businesses, cantonal (local and municipal) governments, or politicians.
163
 This practice 
further fragments and weakens the market, resulting in an oversaturation that leaves some of 
the best outlets struggling to survive.  
 
A lack of transparency in media ownership has impeded the privatization process in Bosnia as 
well as the ability to attract foreign investment. The privatization of cantonal media was slow 
and opaque. The Bosnian Law on Communications and the Law on Competition prohibit the 
concentration of ownership of the media, but due to problems of implementation, these laws 
are still not fully institutionalized. Overall, there has been little international interest in 
investing in Bosnian media because of the bureaucratic barriers, legal complexities, and 
crowded yet poor market. Weak institutions and a weaker market have only enabled 
entrenched political and business interests to keep a veiled hold on the sector.   
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The Broadcast Sector 
The broadcast sector specifically faces many economic and regulatory challenges. Although 
advertising revenues increased from approximately 14 million euro in 2000 to approximately 
100 million euro in 2005, Bosnia had the smallest advertising market in Europe after Albania 
at that time.
164
 Nearly 50% of all advertising revenues went to Federal TV, the public 
broadcaster, leaving just pennies for remaining stations – a situation that fueled resentment 
and controversy. Compounding the problem was unfair competition due to a failure of 
international cross-border regulation. Cable operators from Croatia and Serbia were 
broadcasting illegally into the country, crippling the domestic market to an even greater 
extent. According to Samra Lučkin Director of BORAM, a public relations firm and radio 
network,  market research done by Mareco using “people meters” showed domestic 
broadcasting in complete collapse and illegal cable appropriating 37% of the market in 
2006.
165
 That same research also indicated an approximate 66% drop in overall domestic 
ratings. At the time this research was conducted, Lučkin worried that domestic stations and 
networks, such as ATV Banja Luka and Mreža Plus, would be the first victims of this 
breakdown. However, both outlets have managed to survive, even in the face of tough 
economic times, and Mreža Plus has held on to relatively the same market share for almost a 
decade. 
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Mreža Plus 
Mreža Plus was established in 2001 as a network of five former television stations of the 
Open Broadcast Network (OBN), with international assistance for infrastructure and program 
purchasing. In 2002, Mreža Plus covered 85% of the country, held a 14% audience share, and 
approximately 25% of the advertising market.
166
 Mreža was seen as an important quality 
driven commercial enterprise – a way to support an alternative to public broadcasting for 
national news and domestic programming. It was self-sustaining by 2005, yet by 2006 its 
hard-won success was already being eroded. But, Mreža has subsisted over the years on 
“commercial programming – from Desperate Housewives to Formula 1 races,”167 and the 
company recently positioned itself for growth with the signing of a 5-year contract for 
satellite distribution with Israeli aerospace company Spacecom.
168
 
  
Public Broadcasters 
The establishment of a public broadcasting system formed from the pre-war state broadcasters 
was a protracted and complex process. Donors envisioned a public broadcaster that would 
function as a national information source and thereby support the emergence of a Bosnian 
civic identity. The law establishing the system was forced through Parliament in the form of a 
Decision from the High Representative after years of political squabbles on the national and 
international levels. It is comprised of three broadcasters: the Bosnia and Herzegovina Public 
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Broadcasting Service (BHRT), representing the country; the Public Broadcasting Service of 
the Federation of BiH (RTFBiH), representing the Federation; and the Public Broadcasting 
Service of Republika Srpska (RTRS), representing the Republika Srpska. The 2005 law 
regulated the structure and financing of the state-level public broadcasting service and 
required that each entity (the Federation and RS) pass their own laws harmonizing their 
entity-level stations with the national BHRT.  
 
These laws were written to provide maximum editorial independence as well as institutional 
autonomy. The three stations are funded through the collection of a subscription fee, 
sponsorship, and limited advertising revenues.
169
 However, collection of the monthly 
subscription fee was only just above 50% in 2007, even after a new system was implemented 
linking it to fixed-line telephone bills, and the 2011 MSI describes fee collection as still 
“inadequate.” One of the primary reasons for this is that these fees have been used as a 
political weapon by nationalist groups, which advocate boycotting them to protest editorial 
decisions. RTFBiH and BHRT have also had serious problems with debt, resulting in millions 
of Bosnian convertible marks (KM) in unpaid salaries and benefits to employees.
170
 To 
further politicize matters, ethnic Croats in the Parliament blocked implementation of 
legislation and demanded a separate Croatian-language channel. If their wishes had been 
granted, the country would have had a public broadcast system totally divided on ethnic lines.  
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The public broadcasting system in Bosnia has in many ways replicated the institutionalization 
of ethnic divisions. Economic pressures that are often a façade for political pressures have 
shaped the structure and content of the stations to reflect their political base. After over a 
decade of donor assistance and guidance from BBC consultants, the OSCE issued this 
warning in the Spring of 2008 about the state of the public broadcaster in Bosnia: “public 
broadcaster BHT1 was under political and financial attack, the work of the Communications 
Regulatory Agency was being hindered because the lawfully appointed director had been 
blocked from taking office, the public broadcasting system law in the Federation had been 
legally challenged, and there were cases of physical and verbal attacks against journalists.” 
 
In such an environment the need for independent commercial media is even more important, 
yet those commercial media are harmed by some of the public broadcasting practices. In an 
interview for a report on ground-level perspectives on democracy promotion, Nataša 
Tešanović, Manager of ATV in Banja Luka, described the repercussions of public 
broadcasting policies coupled with the financial vacuum left by donors: “We now have a 
terrible situation. You have a public media, especially in RS, which is supported by the 
government and very connected to the government, and receiving money, taking your people 
(journalists), influencing firms not to advertise with you. It’s a very difficult situation. 
Without some kind of return of donors I don’t know how we’ll do. We’ll be forced to 
decrease operations to a great extent, which will then reflect on the quality of programs, on 
the quality of the people who are doing investigative research; or [it will] fully change the 
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mission and become some local entertainment channel, but then what’s the point?”171 This 
comment reveals another paradox of Bosnian media – some, such as Tešanović, want donors 
to come back and force solutions when systems fail, yet others explicitly blame this failure on 
those donors.  
 
The Print Sector 
The print sector is not faring much better than the broadcast sector, but its success or failure is 
harder to quantify since circulation and distribution are non-transparent, and the distribution 
system is still state run, inefficient, and antiquated. Distributors do not keep track of sales or 
returns and publishers often provide twice the anticipated number in an attempt to claim full 
distribution. Circulation rates are still not audited despite years of attempts, and estimates are 
low. Well-entrenched and vested interests are keeping the system from modernizing. There 
are two schools of thought on why penetration is so limited; some blame the national level of 
poverty and believe people have to choose between purchasing a newspaper or eggs, and 
others argue that in a country with over 1 million cell phones, it may simply be a qualitative 
choice – the print news may not be worth the price.    
 
Nezavisne Novine 
The leading daily from the Republika Srpska, Nezavisne Novine is another example of a 
success story that unraveled amid the fragmentation of the Bosnian media space. In 2002 and 
2003, it cooperated with IREX on a major overhaul of the newspaper in an effort to give it a 
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national voice as opposed to a nationalist one. The outlet is an example of one that maximized 
donor assistance: they started their own radio station (Radio Nes), purchased a printing press, 
reorganized the newsroom, and restructured management. By 2003, nearly one third of their 
sales were in the Federation, and it appeared they were well on their way to achieving what 
had been unimaginable a few years earlier – a national newspaper based in the Serb-
dominated Republika Srpska. Statistics from 2006 indicate, however, that their market share 
dropped to just 9%.
172
 While they have faced stiff competition from the many other papers in 
Bosnia, as well as from those published in Serbia and Croatia, the editorial line of Nezavisne 
Novine has also shifted politically. Since 2006, it has more overtly supported RS Prime 
Minister Milorad Dodik, whose politics are increasingly divisive.
173
   
 
According to Rosemary Armao, of The Center for Investigative Reporting (CIN) based in 
Sarajevo, cooperation between CIN and Nezavinse Novine was once critical to achieve cross-
entity reporting. Many Muslims were reluctant to report from the RS and RS papers did not 
want to run stories about the Federation. Nezavisne was different, gave them the support they 
needed, and ran their stories – until 2006. Armao explained, “We were doing a lot of things 
that did not make the policies and personalities in the RS look golden. Our stories then did not 
get played. At first we got excuses, ah, they are too long, we already did this, we already 
covered this, and then it became really clear once they bought the competing newspaper. We 
had nowhere else to go, so we started using some of the magazines, but they just do not have 
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the reach of Nezavisne. And it’s heartbreaking because that is a paper that got a lot of 
development money.”174  
 
Distortions 
Policy efforts to create the proper enabling environment for a democratic media sector in 
Bosnia were widely disabled or distorted by insufficient economic development. Poverty and 
poor labor practices, and a lack of legislative initiative, have prevented journalism from 
establishing a professional and democratic mandate. Supporting institutions and laws continue 
to lack credibility and leverage. Economic and political instability have slowed reform, 
creating an opening for tycoonization and the corruption of market forces. With the majority 
of the political and economic power in the hands of a few elites, the media frequently reflect 
their competing interests, turning the public from audience to spectator. Following are some 
examples of such distortions.  
 
Poor employment conditions for media workers in Bosnia hinder professionalization and are a 
symptom of the overall economic environment. Labor rights studies from 2002 and 2007 have 
demonstrated that many journalists work without contracts, receive irregular salary payments, 
lack social security and health benefits, and often work longer than is legally allowed.
175
 Job 
insecurity leads not only to low morale but also to self-censorship and censorship. As another 
study carried out in 2007 reported, “the more precarious and insecure the position of 
journalists as workers, the less chance that they will withstand pressures and defend ethical 
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codes, freedom of information, the right of the public to be informed and other prerequisites 
for the media and journalists to fulfill the role ascribed to them in democratic societies.”176 
According to journalism professor Leija Turčilo, journalists shy away from investigative 
reporting because of the high risk and low rewards, both in salary and in public response.
177
   
 
The problem is not insufficient legislation; in fact, the constitution incorporates five 
international human rights protocols and the entities each have general labor laws on the 
books. The problem is implementation, or rather a lack thereof. Many of the laws are too 
broad and open ended, and hence are often ignored. Managers are well aware of the 
ineffectiveness of both the labor laws and related institutions, and therefore bend instead to 
the budget constraints of publishers and the economic pressures of advertisers and the market. 
In general, journalists have a very superficial understanding of their rights and thus are not 
always confident to stand up for themselves, especially if they fear for their jobs. If they do 
want to take action, their options are limited – the courts are seen as inefficient, costly, and 
rarely likely to yield satisfactory rulings, and journalists surveyed for this research voiced 
fairly low opinions of the capacity of trade unions and professional associations to advocate 
on their behalf.   
 
Poor labor conditions coupled with the relationship media owners and editors have with 
political and economic elite means media is not necessarily seen as a profession that has a role 
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to play in society but rather as a mechanism for individual power and advancement. Editors 
and publishers can benefit personally from advertising monies, or by selling shares in their 
organizations; and some receive job offers to become advisors to politicians and, in 
extraordinary cases, have been made ambassadors by the politicians they have supported.    
 
In an interview with journalist Lidija Pisker about the role of the media in Bosnia, she said, 
“they all try to manipulate rather than inform.” She believes the biggest challenge to the 
media is: 
 …to stay objective. When you read articles you know who he (the journalist) is going to 
vote for, is drinking coffee with everyday, and which team he is rooting for. You can 
divide journalists into categories. No one really cares about the facts. They only care 
about blaming someone they do not like. But this is also because journalists are not paid 
enough in Bosnia. I know many journalists who do not have their salaries on time or at 
all, and they are very low. So you lose motivation and you do not care about checking the 
information you get or about publishing lies. I don’t believe anything I read now.178 
 
According to Senad Pećanin, former Editor-in-Chief of Dani, a leading weekly in the 
Federation, the power of the press is not in its ability to inform or even shape public opinion, 
but in its relationship with elites. When he started his career in 1987 the economic situation 
was good, the youth press was very open, and circulation, in his estimate, ranged from 
80,000-100,000 for the leading papers.
179
 Before the war, he explained, elites were 
untouchable, but after the war, major demographic changes moved Bosnia from a “communal 
to a criminal culture.” Between 1995 and 2000, pressure on the press was largely political; 
now it comes from “tycoons.” Pećanin said he faces many moral and professional dilemmas 
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everyday and must make compromises to survive. He shared that he was once offered a bribe 
by the Federal and Cantonal Tourism Union not to publish a story Dani did on the practice of 
the Union to employ friends and relatives. He also claims to have been punished by one of the 
largest advertisers in Bosnia, a tobacco company, for refusing a bribe. Dani uncovered that 
the tobacco company was collaborating with a secret branch of the SDA (Muslim Party of 
Democratic Action) to bring small weapons into the country, and that they not only paid for 
the arms but also circumvented import regulations. The company allegedly offered him 
300,000KM not to publish.      
 
A Value Added Tax of 17% was implemented in Bosnia in early 2006, and had a considerable 
impact on the print media and publishing industry. Financial pressure from this tax forced 
print outlets to tighten their belts and Pećanin had to reduce the page count of Dani and lower 
wages in order to offset the increased expenses. In this kind of climate, only the financially 
strongest can survive, but unfortunately those with the biggest coffers are not necessarily 
those with the highest standards of journalism or the most transparent business practices. The 
result may be the shrinking of a bloated market, but perhaps at the expense of quality outlets. 
 
Investigative journalism programs illustrate some of the difficulties both in unsynchronized 
reforms and with grafting a model of journalism onto a culture with very different historical 
experiences. Investigative reporting projects have been funded in an effort to empower 
journalists in their watchdog capacity. The goals have been many: to promote transparency 
and good governance, to test the political system and new legislation, and to inform and 
motivate citizens to demand accountability as well as to clean up the corruption and political 
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abuses that are holding back development. Magazines such as Dani and Slobodna Bosna 
practiced forms of investigative reporting for years and were very popular. Donors such as 
IREX and USAID were earnest supporters of investigative journalism in Bosnia, believing 
that additional support could provide local outlets with the time, budgets, and editorial 
capacities to produce credible, fair, and factual stories up to American or European standards. 
Dani in particular received substantial financial and technical support. Early projects ran into 
difficulties because they were not synchronized with necessary political and legal reforms. 
Once the Freedom of Information Act was implemented and libel and slander were 
decriminalized, donors could back investigative programs knowing that journalists had the 
necessary resources.  
 
One such project is the Center for Investigative Reporting (Centar za Istrazivacko 
Novinarstvo), or CIN, funded by USAID in 2003 as part of a Civic Society Strengthening 
initiative.
180
 New York University (NYU) and its partner The Journalism Development  
Group (JDG) designed and implemented the project. At the time, I was a project manager at 
NYU responsible for administering the grant and overseeing JDG’s local implementation. The 
Center is a local NGO comprised of ten reporters from all over the country who are dedicated 
to producing investigative stories. As a team, they research and report on topics critical to the 
health of the country, ranging from corruption to university reform to food contamination. 
Their stories and documentaries are published or aired respectively through the mainstream 
Bosnian media, normally reaching an audience of over one million. The long-term objective is 
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not only to produce outstanding investigative reporting but also to train a pool of skilled 
reporters and editors as well as establish a credible, sustainable organization that can continue 
this kind of work.  
 
CIN seeks to act as a model by upholding standards of professionalism; their mission is “to 
educate, inform, empower and enrich the people of Bosnia, regardless of ethnicity and class, 
in every district and canton, city and village.”181 They hope to counter a prevailing attitude 
among many journalists that they are more commentators and political agents than defenders 
of civic interests. Yet, there were many challenges in establishing CIN. From the outset their 
mandate was questioned, since the funding was principally from USAID – and is therefore 
essentially US money. There was some suspicion that CIN were either CIA spies or 
propagandists for US policy. On top of that, reporters would sometimes roll their eyes at all 
the discussion of lofty ideals of journalism.     
 
The stories themselves were also a hard sell in the beginning because the format was so 
different from what editors and readers in Bosnia were used to. Reporters and editors 
complained that the stories were too long and were not chronological, and therefore would not 
appeal to the average reader. Some pointed out that investigative journalism is a rarified form 
of journalism even in so-called advanced democracies. As Marija Šajkaš commented,  
Although I work for a magazine that promotes in-depth media coverage, I have a hard 
time understanding the international obsession with investigative journalism. For many 
years, both in Bosnia and Serbia, international media development organizations were 
aggressively promoting investigative reporting as the only “right” way to do journalism, 
and the only way that could match Western standards. They were doing so equally hard 
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in big cities and small towns, often in media whose primary audience was maybe rural, or 
semi-literate. Of course it didn’t work! Even in the US, investigative media is for – elites. 
For people with a certain level of education and ability, time, and desire to read complex 
texts. Look at New York City. There is one investigative daily, one weekly, one main-
stream and a couple of obscure radio stations and no TV channels that produce 
investigative pieces on a regular basis; and this is a city of 8 million people that is often 
considered to be the capital of the world.
182
 
 
Establishing professional norms and standards has taken a lot of effort, but according to CIN 
editors, it has paid off. The founders of the Center wrote their own code of ethics and have 
revised it over time. And journalists have taken the rules seriously.
183
 However, in practice, 
getting quality reporting has been a challenge. Rosemary Armao, one of the international 
editors, explained that in the US the worst thing you can say to a journalist is that their story 
will not run, but in the early days of the Center, when work came in that was substandard and 
they threatened not to run the piece, the response they got was indifference. To many Bosnian 
journalists it did not matter whether they were published; it was the paycheck that mattered. 
That attitude is more an effect of the economic situation than it is a cultural issue. Armao said 
it took years before stories began to stand out and get recognition, and that’s when the 
journalists really began to believe in the power of that type of reporting and that their work 
could have impact.     
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A number of things had to occur to reach that point. Journalists’ reporting had to gain local 
acceptance and get broad distribution, citizens had to react to stories, and politicians had to 
respond. The feedback loop needed to work, and it was tested often since there is no tradition 
of government transparency in Bosnia. Doing investigative reporting challenged the culture, 
the new laws, and the political system. For one of their early stories, Armao explained that 
CIN  
…wanted to get a list of companies which were not paying into the pension fund, which 
– you know – is required by law. So in other words, companies which were disobeying 
federal law. The result is they are bankrupting pensioners, which is a bad thing; but we 
could not get the names of those companies, of delinquent companies. It took months of 
FOIA-ing and interviewing people and we don’t even know now if we got a complete 
record. We got the most complete record that existed at the time. And we wrote a story 
about that, and the inherent question is why would the government not want to reveal the 
names of companies which were not obeying the government?!
184
 
 
Politicians have also been notoriously arrogant in the face of criticism or questioning. Armao 
gave the example of a party official who was asked why his party was running a man for 
office who was under investigation for stealing public funds. His response was that he should 
not be bothered with such trifling matters since the amount in question was a mere $500. 
Bosnian journalists were not surprised or angered by his response; as Armao pointed out, 
investigative journalism works off of a particular type of ire, which has been hard to arouse in 
Bosnia. Consequently, politicians have often been antagonistic toward journalists. CIN has 
had to work very hard with their journalists on how to interview public officials, and have 
helped them understand that even if their role is adversarial, it must be respectful. Politicians 
in turn have learned over the years that they do in fact have a responsibility to speak with 
journalists and that they are (generally) accountable for their actions.   
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CIN’s first story to rattle the public was one on food safety, titled “Danger on Your Plate.” A 
series of ten articles investigated food importation, inspection, food safety, legislation, and 
food testing. As part of their research, CIN had food samples from various restaurants and 
markets in three cities tested. The results showed that more than 50% of the samples harbored 
dangerous levels of bacteria, including E. coli, staphylococcus, yeast, and mold. The timing 
could not have been better, as the CIN series coincided with a couple outbreaks of food borne 
illness. The stories ran in 7 dailies, three web portals, and led to TV interviews and a short 
documentary. The audience response was enormous and politicians came under attack for 
faulty food inspection policies. CIN received kudos from the public as well as from their 
peers.
185
     
 
In 2006, CIN became a full Bosnian NGO with all local management, although international 
oversight continued on a limited basis. Shortly thereafter, a USAID external assessment 
deemed the model “unsustainable,” despite CIN’s attempt to leverage evidence of its impact. 
This led to USAID ceasing core funding, but thanks to the tireless efforts of local and 
international editors, CIN has managed to win additional grants to keep the center operating 
for the near future. Traditional revenue streams such as advertising or sale of stories are too 
minimal at this point to cover CIN’s operating costs, so they remain donor dependent.  In 
addition, most donors really only want to pay program costs and will only fund modest if any 
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administrative or basic operating costs, which leaves big gaps in the budget. Donor fatigue, 
even for corruption-related projects is high, and CIN is striving to devise an alternative 
business model and new funding strategies.  
 
In spite of concerns over its sustainability and impact, CIN has won numerous international 
awards for its investigative work, including Best Investigative Story Published Online by a 
Small News Organization in 2007, from The Online News Association (ONA),
186
 for the 
series on food safety; as well as the Global Shining Light for a regional project on energy 
brokers, presented by the Global Network of Investigative Journalists. After working with 
CIN for a number of years, Armao feels it is a successful model worth replicating. Their 
editors produce stories that reflect specific standards and their journalists write with ledes, 
middles, and kickers. CIN stories run in major dailies in Bosnia and have received praise from 
editors at the leading papers Oslobodjene and Večernji List. CIN has carved a niche for itself 
in the Bosnian media sector and in the region, but sadly, its long-term viability is still in 
question.  
 
Frustration with the role of the international community has reached a critical level in Bosnia, 
especially in the Republika Srpska, which damages the credibility and effectiveness of 
international assistance. When discussing the challenges of transitioning international projects 
into local institutions, the “international washing machine” is often mentioned. When 
investigative journalist Lidija Pisker told people she worked on an international project, they 
often derided her by saying, “it is just money laundering. You spend three weeks on one small 
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story. You are lazy.”187 There is a perception in Bosnia that many people who work on 
internationally-sponsored programs are overpaid for doing less work than other Bosnians. 
While there have been cases of misappropriation of funds, they are the exception rather than 
the rule.  
 
The more important issue is that donor money and the opportunities it brings have skewed 
market forces and impacted Bosnian society. Allocation of funding is determined largely by 
government or NGO policy interests. Organizations try to match their mandates to align with 
what they perceive as the interests of available funding sources, and still design their 
programs based on their own assessments of local needs and in consultation with local 
partners. Out of a need to survive, these local organizations have often ultimately tailored 
their focus under the influence of donors.  
 
Once local implementers in Bosnia recognized the transient nature of projects funded by the 
international community, incentives also became skewed, and under certain circumstances 
some people participated more for the income than for the outcome. A social class has 
emerged for those who have worked for international organizations and agencies, due to their 
higher paychecks, advanced language skills, and networking capacity. And, there is a 
financial resentment toward international workers who receive salaries commensurate with 
what they would earn in their home countries – significantly more than their Bosnian 
colleagues. Further complicating matters, the Crisis Group reports that resentment against the 
international community in the RS is due largely to the view that international actors are pro-
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Bosniak (and therefore anti-Serb);
188
 as domestic political tensions continue to rise and “Serbs 
and Bosniaks are creating two opposed historical narratives, undermining allegiance to a 
common state,”189 the international community works in an ever uncertain climate in Bosnia. 
 
The hypocrisy of donors’ use of undemocratic means to reach anticipated democratic ends – 
despite their attempts to justify them – has frequently called the credibility of political 
oversight bodies into question. From the OHR’s “extraordinary powers,” to “experts” who 
have lacked relevant experience and regional knowledge yet have been sent to train locals, to 
the oft-cited airs of superiority shown by internationals, all have created resentment within the 
local community. In the words of veteran journalist Marija Šajkaš: 
In 1999, I came to Bosnia from Serbia, which was at that time still dominated by 
Milošević’s war propaganda. The war in Bosnia was over, the International Community 
was working very hard on peace-building, and I remember having high hopes of working 
in an unrestricted media space. I honestly believed that the presence of the international 
community would guarantee all freedoms including freedom of the press. Soon 
afterward, however, this idealized picture began to crumble, and we witnessed 
international organizations interfering in the policies of local media organizations. 
Foreign experts were preaching about “democratization of local media,” and “freedom of 
speech,” sometimes resembling missionaries with the task of bringing the light to local 
savages – whereas at the same time they were imposing and policing media content, 
writing media laws, and in some instances even cutting programming.
190
  
 
In preparation for the 1999 Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo, a billboard was plastered all 
around the city, showing an adult hand reaching to take a child’s hand with the text, 
“Welcome to BiH!” (see Image 3.1). Since the Stability Pact was meant to be a Marshall 
Plan-like endeavor in the Balkans, the adult hand ostensibly symbolized the West – the 
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Europeans and the Americans – and the child’s hand represented Bosnia. This was seen as 
incredibly condescending by Bosnians and in response, Dani satirized the billboard on its 
cover, showing an adult hand reaching toward an adult fist that is giving the proverbial 
“finger.” (see Image 3.2). The impossibly high expectations set at that 1999 summit, coupled 
with prevailing attitudes, have resulted in frustration and disillusionment.      
Image 3.1 
“WELCOME TO BIH!” BILLBOARD 
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Image 3.2 
DANI COVER 
 
 
Conclusion 
The problems of professionalizing and commercializing the Bosnian media sector were 
summarized well by Tarik Jusić of the Sarajevo Mediacentar, who said that, “In general the 
quality of the journalism in Bosnia cannot said to be at a satisfactory level… The imperative 
of commercialization of the media becomes the driving force of the rapid expansion of 
sensationalism and tabloid press, to the detriment of serious journalism.”191 And the trouble is 
that it is not just the media who are not trusted, but the whole political system, which gets to 
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the heart of the challenge of democratization. An astute observation was made by Dan De 
Luce, formerly of the Office of the High Representative, who described Bosnia as a country 
without public opinion. Naturally, people do have opinions – and strong ones – but what De 
Luce was referring to is the lack of a unified public sphere, a place where public opinion is 
formed and commitment to a common social project forged. Many Bosnians do not believe 
their opinion is reflected in policy or in social institutions, or that they can affect change, and 
many have therefore opted out of the conversation. Poor election turnouts in the country are 
evidence of this social and political apathy. In analyzing media development policies, Monroe 
Price wrote, “In any specific context, media might be rendered more plural, autonomous, and 
depoliticized, but still not serve as developer of public opinion or as a critic of 
government.”192 In the Bosnian environment, disparate publics listen to the media to learn the 
agendas of those wielding power, but they do not see them as an unbiased source of 
information or a watchdog of civic interests.  
 
If the media are to play the role of watchdog, in other words to be the heralded Fourth Estate, 
they must be trusted. Democracy cannot function without trust in the system, toward which 
media of all kinds play a critical role. Political and economic instability have created openings 
for corruption and market distortions. In this climate, media outlets have been unable to gain 
the financial stability they need to insure editorial independence and the freedom to hire full-
time journalists, and thus the profession has not differentiated and institutionalized its 
professional values. The public, in turn, have little faith in the politicized and instrumentalized 
media and have no expectation that they will act in the public interest. Journalists have 
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become reporters-for-hire, with neither a professional nor a civic mandate. Those journalists 
and associations that do aspire to uphold professional norms usually lack the financing, 
leverage, and credibility they truly need to challenge political forces and advocate for their 
rights. Further, journalism as a profession is not holding itself accountable, and citizens are 
not taking advantage of existing institutions to hold the media accountable as they could. The 
fact that print media remains self-regulated through the Press Council, which relies on 
voluntary acceptance by media outlets, was a concern to 2011 MSI panelists, one of whom 
reported seeing “some of the most monstrous things in print media in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
since the Dayton Accord was signed” during 2010 election coverage.193 
 
The underlying assumption of development strategies in general, and for media assistance 
specifically, was that institution building and legislative reform would transform the 
underlying political culture in Bosnia. But the viability of the model espoused hinges on the 
ability of the economy to support the emergence of necessary professional values and editorial 
independence. Economic reform policy has helped transition the market, but Bosnia is still 
near the bottom of the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings.  
 
After over fifteen years of programmatic strategies that have targeted all aspects of the 
enabling environment, many institutions are weak, professional values are not 
institutionalized, and the media are not fulfilling their democratic mandate, much less 
mobilizing political change or facilitating the emergence of a civic Bosnian identity.  Instead 
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the media sector is very much a reflection and manifestation of the enduring divisions and 
socio-economic challenges facing Bosnian society.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Kosovo: A Clash of Expectations 
 
In June of 1999, at the end of a 78-day NATO intervention to halt Serbian aggression toward 
the Albanian population, Kosovo became an international protectorate governed by the United 
Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) – established under United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1244. After the conflict, UNMIK’s mandate was to prepare 
Kosovo for self-government. In practice, the international community194 and a host of 
international donors sought to stabilize and democratize the territory in preparation for 
negotiations on its final status. Diplomats, donors, and aid workers attempted to employ the 
lessons learned earlier in Bosnia to ensure a smoother transition in Kosovo.  
 
At the time of the Kosovo intervention, practitioners and scholars involved with media 
development were developing a “tool box” of strategies and advocating a holistic or systemic 
approach to reform that would target the enabling environment as a key to creating a 
pluralistic and independent media sector. 
195
 In the end, donors did establish many new 
supporting institutions and promulgated laws in accordance with the highest European 
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standards. However, they did not anticipate the range of challenges, and in some cases 
outright distortions, they would face during the implementation of their policies and 
programs, resulting in a clash of expectations. As Senior Political Affairs Officer at UNMIK 
Jolyon Naegele pointed out, the difference between Kosovo and Bosnia was a lot more than 
just 4 years time – Kosovo faces another set of problems altogether.196    
 
Donors came with cash, hubris, a moral mandate, and a vast array of international 
organizations which were initially met with local energy and enthusiasm. The overly 
bureaucratic administration, however, functioned largely over the heads of the local 
population, resulting in potential missed opportunities to engage the population in the 
reconstruction efforts and to capitalize on local capacities. Economically, Kosovo – the 
poorest country in Europe – was in desperate need of economic development, which was 
ultimately held back due to its status as a protectorate, leaving it heavily dependent upon 
donor financing, remittances, and the informal economy. Both donors as well as the local 
citizenry became frustrated with inefficient administration, the glacial pace of reform, and the 
inability of policies to meet the immediate needs of the population. These challenges impeded 
the goals of donors to professionalize and commercialize the media sector.  
 
Over the last twelve years there have been positive developments as well. Kosovo has made 
significant improvements in legal reform and has established regulatory agencies and other 
supporting institutions. There is also unrestricted access to a range of media, barriers of entry 
to the profession are low, and ownership is relatively transparent. However, as in Bosnia there 
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are enduring problems relating to the implementation and enforcement of laws, self-
censorship that results from a fear of political backlash or threats, a heavily saturated market 
in which outlets rely on alternate revenue streams, and continued complaints by observers 
about heavily politicized reporting. The institutional and legal architecture is good and 
provides a groundwork, but that is not enough. Greater economic stability and political 
independence will be necessary to transform the market as well as the attitudes and practices 
that shape those institutions and the larger society.  
 
This chapter is based on programmatic work and research carried out in-country between 
2000 and 2007. In 2006, I conducted a series of 22 interviews and 12 surveys with local 
media professionals, international consultants, and program managers, as well as with 
representatives of the donor community. This period coincided with the heaviest level of 
donor involvement and investment in the media sector, which aimed to create the proper legal 
and institutional environment for democratic development. This research revealed the 
attitudes and opinions of stakeholders regarding the expectations, challenges, and effects of 
policies developed for the local media sector. The foundation laid during this time has set the 
stage for the future evolution of the media market. Where relevant, developments from 2010 
and 2011 are included to illustrate the long-term impact of these policies. For instance, despite 
2010-2011 IREX MSI rankings showing significant overall improvements in the sector and 
placing it now in the “Near Sustainability” category, The South East Europe Media 
Organization (SEEMO) issued a press release in July of 2011 appealing to Kosovar 
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authorities to support an environment in which media can operate freely.197 This discrepancy 
is similar to problems of measurement seen in the other countries in this study.  
 
Background of the Intervention 
Until the 1999 NATO intervention, Kosovo was a province of the Republic of Serbia
198
 – 
what was left of Yugoslavia after the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. It was and still is the poorest 
and most underdeveloped area of the former Yugoslavia. The territory of Kosovo is slightly 
larger than Delaware with an estimated population of 1.7 million, 88% of whom are ethnic 
Albanians, 7% who are ethnic Serbs, and 5% who are another ethnicity (Bosniak, Gorani, 
Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Turk).
199
 Kosovo holds particular historical and religious 
significance for Serbs, resulting in political and ethnic strife for decades between the Serbian 
dominated state and the Albanian majority.  
 
The Serb offensive that instigated NATO intervention was the culmination of the demise of 
Tito’s communist Yugoslavia and the rise of nationalism under the Milošević regime in 
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Serbia.
200
 Civil unrest began in the province in 1981-82 when protests at the University 
erupted over poor living conditions and escalated to demands for greater freedom of 
expression, release of political prisoners, and republic status for Kosovo within Yugoslavia.
201
 
By some accounts, a number of the dissidents who fled during this time emigrated to Western 
Europe and eventually formed a resistance network that would become the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA).
202
 A major turning point came on April 24, 1987 when Milošević gave an 
historic speech in Kosovo Polje (Field of Black Birds) to a crowd of Kosovar Serbs who were 
protesting alleged abuses by Albanians. By rallying to their cause, Milošević found his 
political platform and used it to consolidate his political power. Over the next few years 
Serbian state television waged a propaganda campaign accusing the Kosovar Albanians of 
violence against Serbs and secessionist aspirations. This justified an escalation of repressive 
policies leading to the dismissal by Milošević of Kosovo Party leadership. In protest, miners 
staged a strike; Milošević retaliated by instating martial law and revoking Kosovo’s 
autonomous status. Once fully under Serbian rule, Kosovo became a police state. Police 
violence, arbitrary detention, and torture became regular means for suppressing alleged 
“secessionists.” Albanians were widely removed from employment in state-sponsored 
institutions, including schools and universities. In order to survive, Albanians established 
parallel institutions of government and political parties, staged elections, and opened schools 
                                                 
200
 After Tito’s death in 1980, the Yugoslav economy went into a free fall due to mounting debt and poor 
investment policies that resulted in a widening income gap, a drop in living standards of nearly 40%, and 
inflation rising to more than 2000% by 1989. See: Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse (London: 
C. Hurst and Co. 1995) 69. 
 
201
 Yugoslavia was made up of six constituent republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina both contiguous to Serbia). Kosovo 
wanted greater autonomy and voting power in the National Assembly. 
 
202
 Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo (New York, 2001) 21. 
157 
 
 
in private homes. In 1992, Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the LDK party (Lidhja Demokratike 
e Kosovës [Democratic League of Kosovo]) was elected President of this shadow state. 
Despite severe repression, he advocated peaceful resistance, which gave him great symbolic 
power but no real political leverage.  
 
Most media in Albanian were banned or repressed during the years Slobodan Milošević was 
in power in Serbia, from 1989 to 1999. Radio and TV broadcasts on Radio-Television Pristina 
(RTP) in Albanian were brought to a stop and the only daily newspaper in Albanian, 
Rilindja,
203
 was closed down in 1990. At the same time, Milošević effectively cut all 
broadcasting capacities for the territory, with the exception of one half-hour news program 
from Belgrade delivered in Albanian, which had little local credibility. Radio-Television 
Pristina (RTP), managed by Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK party, was established in exile in Albania 
and broadcast into Kosovo via satellite. Satellite dishes linked people to news sources outside 
of Yugoslavia and they were able to watch not only RTP but also the BBC, CNN, as well as 
MTV and other international broadcasts. Aferdita Kelmendi, who later founded TV 21, 
received a range of small grants from international aid organizations during this period to 
train women journalists, start a women’s magazine, produce a series of short documentaries, 
and broadcast radio over the internet.  Although national papers printed in Serbian were 
circulated, they did not address the local population. The only Albanian newspaper tolerated 
by Milošević was an agricultural paper called Bujku (Farmer) – essentially Rilindja reinvented 
– which took on political issues surreptitiously, hiding such articles among those on top soil 
and tractors. The weekly Koha Ditore, which was started in 1993 by Veton Surroi as an 
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Albanian Time Magazine evolved into an independent daily by 1997. It was frequently under 
attack by Serbia and was condemned by US diplomats for its support of the KLA, but it was 
relied on by the local population and its circulation reached more than 50,000 by 1999.
204
 
During the NATO intervention, Koha Ditore moved operations to Tetovo, Macedonia and the 
paper became a symbol of the identity and aspirations of Kosovar Albanians. Ardian Arifaj, 
the Managing Editor of Koha, explained that publishing from Macedonia was not about 
politics but “the survival of Kosovo’s Albanians as a people with their own identity.”205   
 
Throughout the 1990s, the international community, preoccupied by the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, the wars in Bosnia, and fears of greater regional instability, did little to aid 
Kosovo’s Albanians. As frustrations in the region grew, so did the presence of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), an armed group committed to protecting ethnic Albanians and 
gaining Kosovo’s independence. The US condemned the “terrorist actions” of the KLA; some 
analysts believe Milošević may have read that as a signal that he could further crack down on 
the province.
206
 Between February 28th and March 1st of 1998, Serbian forces attacked 
villages suspected to be KLA strongholds. These attacks, known as the Drenica Massacres, 
forced the international community to react. They formed the Contact Group to negotiate a 
resolution between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, and Milošević. After a year of dead-end 
negotiations and the failure of the peace accords on March 24, 1999 in Rambouillet, NATO 
began air strikes before receiving authorization from the UN Security Council. The strikes 
had the tragic effect of escalating Milošević’s campaign of violence, which included arson, 
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looting, rapes and executions, ultimately driving 1.3 million ethnic Albanians from their 
homes and creating a refugee crisis in neighboring Macedonia.
207
   
 
Establishing the Protectorate 
Following the intervention, as outlined in Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo was to 
be temporarily governed by UNMIK, an international civil administration, and KFOR 
(Kosovo Force), an international security force. Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo was a true 
protectorate – it remained a legal part of Serbia yet was under international control. The 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), the head of UNMIK, was the highest 
civilian officer and was responsible for overseeing the transitional administration of Kosovo 
until its future, as either an independent state or a territory of Serbia, could be negotiated. The 
UN mandate in Kosovo was comprised of four pillars,208 of humanitarian assistance, civil 
administration, democratization and institution building, and reconstruction and economic 
development. As with the Dayton Peace Accords before it, freedom of speech was only 
nominally mentioned in the UNMIK Charter; but media development would ultimately 
become a major, as well as a controversial, part of democratization and institution building.  
 
Kosovo posed a unique and complex set of challenges which defied a “tool box” approach. 
First, the legality of the US-led NATO intervention and subsequent UN occupation was 
actively contested by Serbia as well as by many Serbian citizens of Kosovo. This created 
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legitimacy issues on a number of levels, but more significantly it created tough legal obstacles 
on the international and national levels when it came to administering the reconstruction. 
Furthermore, the international community was concerned about the prospect that 
independence for Kosovo – in other words the redrawing of more borders in Europe – could 
establish dangerous precedents for other secessionist groups such as the Basques in Spain or 
even the Serbians living in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia. 
 
When UNMIK, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other 
international organizations arrived in Kosovo, their primary focus was to secure the territory 
and establish a transitional administration until Kosovo’s future was determined. UNMIK’s 
mandate was temporary; it was an interim administration meant to operate only until 
Kosovo’s status was resolved and its policies were built on short-term strategies that 
constrained development, even when status negotiations dragged on for years. While the 
international community officially recognized the need for proactive and long-term 
development strategies as outlined in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe,209 this 
mandate was not fully extended to Kosovo due to limitations of trusteeship. This put Kosovo 
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in a type of political and economic limbo for years, when what it desperately needed was a 
focus on state building. Decades of ethnic conflict with the Serbian government had eroded 
state structures in Kosovo, and then its limited communications infrastructure was heavily 
damaged during the conflict, rendering it a veritable failed state within a failed state.
210
 On the 
one hand, to the international administration and donors, the territory was a seemingly blank 
slate without a functioning government or legal system,211 but in fact there were strong social 
and economic networks and political legacies shaping the environment.  
 
On the ground, Kosovo did present political, cultural, and historical similarities to Bosnia and 
Macedonia, but there were also significant differences that needed to be taken into account. 
Kosovo, along with other parts of the former Yugoslavia, was a post-conflict and post-
communist society, suffering from a weak economy, high unemployment, organized crime, 
corruption, and a lack of respect for rule of law; and similar to Bosnia it had an ethnically 
divided population that was demanding justice for having suffered egregious human rights 
abuses and which had developed contested narratives of the conflict. These factors 
contributed to the volatility of the post-conflict environment, which manifested in the media 
as vitriolic reporting and instances of hate-speech from both the Albanian and Serbian sides. 
As Regan McCarthy, Senior Advisor to the Head of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia noted, due 
to the role the media played in fueling the hostilities during the wars in Bosnia and in Kosovo, 
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media reform was not initially part of democratization efforts.
212
 Instead, media was seen as a 
part of peacemaking, a perspective which offers a very different motivation for reform. 
Peacemaking puts security above all other goals and thus justifies extraordinary powers to 
ensure that security. Under certain circumstances, those extraordinary powers – as was seen in 
Bosnia and, eventually, in Kosovo – can undermine democratization.  
 
The economic situation in Kosovo continues to pose one of the greatest threats to transition as 
well as to hopes for a professionalized media sector that is relatively independent from 
political and business alliances. Kosovo’s population is heavily dependent on diaspora 
remittances and its economy is afloat on the back of international aid.213 Because Kosovo 
lacked an official political status for so many years it was ineligible for assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and many other international financial 
institutions that could have provided much needed investment in the economy.214 An 
insufficient and unreliable energy supply also held development back. Unemployment in 2009 
was an alarming 45.4% (55% for Women and 39% for Men) with youth unemployment at 
72%, five times higher than the European average.
215
  Tellingly, data for 2010 are not 
available because the Labor Force Survey was cancelled due to financial constraints.
216
 But, 
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the European Commission’s 2011 progress report for Kosovo concluded that the country’s 
economic growth is weak and fragile and that, “Overall, the determination to pursue market 
oriented economic policies has been maintained, but measures were adopted that introduced 
severe distortions in the economy. Designing and implementing a coherent and credible 
economic strategy, linking policy priorities, structural reforms and public expenditure, remain 
a major challenge.”217 Polling by UNDP revealed that 72.4% of people living in Kosovo are 
willing to protest over economic grievances, which “indicates the dire need for fast and 
sustainable economic progress in order to promote and maintain social peace.”218 In this 
climate, it is to be expected that organizations surveyed for this study ranked economic 
problems, by far, as their greatest concern. While financial issues were clearly the most 
significant obstacle organizations felt they faced individually, within the media sector itself, a 
lack of professionalization ranked as the biggest challenge. One OSCE representative 
commented at the time that the Kosovo media sector needed to be sustainable, and yet the 
country as a whole was not.219 
 
Media Development Goals and Strategies 
Under UNMIK, the mandate for democracy and institution building went to the OSCE, and it 
was therefore the primary authority in charge of developing Kosovo’s media sector. The 
SRSG was responsible for policy formation and the OSCE for implementation. While 
freedom of expression was identified as a core component of the reconstruction, the stated 
goals were broad and the mechanics of media assistance specifically were not laid out in 
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either the OSCE mandate or in any primary documents. Keen to avoid many of the policy 
foibles and implementation flaws seen in Bosnia, such as duplication of efforts and lack of 
coordination, the OSCE commissioned international experts with experience in Bosnia to 
provide guidelines based on lessons learned there. Efforts in Bosnia had brought forth an 
awareness of the need to take a systemic approach to media development, and therefore these 
experts recommended that the overall mandate in Kosovo should be to support the emergence 
of the “necessary conditions” for a democratic media to evolve. To that end, a media affairs 
department was established to oversee the writing of new media laws and regulations and to 
implement standards, and to provide training and technical and financial support to 
independent print and broadcast media. Developing the media market included privatizing 
previously state-owned media holdings and technical equipment, transforming the state 
broadcaster into a public service broadcaster, and supporting commercial media. In addition, 
the SRSG would appoint all advisory bodies, including a Media Monitoring Division and a 
media regulatory commission modeled after the IMC in Bosnia, “to manage the frequency 
spectrum, establish broadcast codes of practice, issue licenses and monitor compliance.”220 A 
Media Policy Board comprised of six Albanians and one Serb would act as advisors on media 
policy.  
 
A broad array of donors comprising NGOs and representatives of concerned states provided 
substantial aid. George Soros’s Open Society Institute (OSI), USAID (through its Office of 
Transition Initiatives), IREX, and the Japanese Government, in cooperation with numerous 
European donors and agencies, were heavily involved in media assistance in Kosovo. The 
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total estimated donor assistance for the Kosovar media sector from 1998 to 2004 was 36 
million euro.221 While that amount may not sound like very much, the territory was small and 
the mandate was huge in relative terms. Key communications structures and institutions had 
to be created to meet basic information needs, as well as to prepare the populace for 
reconstruction efforts and eventual elections. After the establishment of infrastructure, the 
next goal was to professionalize the media sector and then create a pluralistic market balanced 
with public and private commercial outlets. Donors set about establishing these institutions 
and processes in an atmosphere of legal, political, and economic ferment.   
 
For example, the United States, with substantial investment from the Japanese government, 
invested over $20 million to establish the public broadcaster, Radio Television Kosova 
(RTK). The EU was also a key investor in and advisor on RTK, since it was to be modeled 
after the BBC. The OSCE, with its broad mandate, directly sponsored an array of programs 
including journalism training, interethnic or multiethnic programming, legal reform, and the 
establishment of the RTK, the Press Council, and the Kosovo Media Institute. They also 
supported the first journalists association, meant to represent the interests of the profession 
once media regulations were developed; functionally, however, it was more of a board 
composed of media owners and managers, which was most active when called upon by 
donors. In an effort to institutionalize professional standards and self-regulation, the Swedish 
Helsinki Committee joined the OSCE in funding the Press Council in 2005. Support to 
minority media was another core concern for which Norwegian People’s Aid and The 
Swedish Helsinki Committee took the lead. And, one of the largest investments in education 
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was from The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RNMFA), which funded the 
establishment of the Kosovo Institute of Journalism and Communication (KIJAC), a two year 
MA program.  
 
The US directed a large portion of their investment toward creation of a commercially-
oriented media sector. To that end, US-based donors realized they would need to support the 
institutions, outlets, and legal framework which were necessary to underpin market 
development. In contrast to Bosnia, the US chose not to establish new media outlets but 
instead to strengthen existing, nascent news organizations run by respected local media 
professionals. USAID sponsored two competing commercial networks, TV 21 and KTV. The 
primary US media development organization in Kosovo, IREX, implemented a series of 
media assistance programs including: ProMedia II (in Serbia and Kosovo), from September 
1999-June 2000; Kosovo Independent Media Program (KIMP), from July 2001-2004; and 
Kosovo Media Assistance Program (KMAP), a three year follow-on program launched in 
2005.  
 
The goal of KIMP was “to provide citizens across the province with the objective news and 
information necessary to participate in democratic and free market institutions.”222 
Programmatic activities included training for journalists, the strengthening of professional 
organizations and institutions, establishment of legal and regulatory frameworks for an 
independent media, and assistance to develop business, management, and marketing strategies 
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appropriate for the challenging Kosovar economic environment. KMAP, in the final phase, 
targeted legal reform (specifically, the Law on Defamation, FOIA, IMC, and the RTK 
broadcasting law), business development, professional associations, and management training 
to selected local media by business advisors. 
 
Policy Consequences and Distortions 
Although a number of individual actors tried to avoid the mistakes made in Bosnia, many 
were nonetheless replicated, producing policy distortions and unintended consequences. 
Donors in many instances took on similar spheres of influence in Kosovo as they had in 
Bosnia, as many of the same people and organizations simply moved southward. Regan 
McCarthy explained that, “organizations such as the UN or the OSCE do not have 
institutional memory, and so even though the same folks go from site to site, the same 
decision makers do not, and their relationships shift. So in essence, there is a tabula rasa when 
these organizations go into media reform.”223   
 
Ultimately, donor policies converged with a range of economic, political and social factors 
that skewed expected outcomes. Frequently, reforms were not properly synchronized because 
of the legal constraints inherent in Kosovo’s undefined status, leaving institutions without the 
much touted enabling environment. Within the development community, there was also 
concern that UNMIK was using “extraordinary powers” – such as those of the High 
Representative in Bosnia – which led to the paradox of employing undemocratic or “imperial” 
policies to promote democratic processes. One consequence of this was that the local 
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population was often more a spectator than a participant in the rebuilding of their own 
country, resulting in high levels of frustration and disillusionment with reforms, leaving many 
feeling that the international community lost important opportunities to engage local 
stakeholders, networks, and capacities. Donors also found that their best intentions sometimes 
clashed with local culture or the culture of international organizations. As in Bosnia and later 
Macedonia, the deluge of aid started up the international “washing machine,” alternately 
referred to by some in Kosovo as a “cargo cult mentality,” where large amounts of money 
were allegedly mishandled or misappropriated, or at least created dependent rather than 
independent organizations. Programmatic coordination was also an obstacle due to conflicting 
mandates or, in some cases, the sheer proliferation of aid and agencies. For instance, the 
OSCE’s mandate to promote democratization was often at odds with the UN’s mandate to 
enforce security, which in some cases produced policy paralysis and in others simply left 
them undermining each others’ efforts.  
 
The Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC), Vigilante Journalism, Mixed Mandates  
Policy implementers recognized these problems along the way and made repeated attempts to 
be proactive, coordinated, and efficient, yet policy formation remained largely reactive and 
prone to inertia. As Bob Gillette observed, political change often required a crisis.224 
According to Gillette, one of the first formative crises, in a series of crises, was related to the 
establishment of a regulatory body for broadcasting as well as print, an authority unheard of 
in the West. The story of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) in Kosovo illustrates 
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many of the paradoxes and complexities of media development in post-conflict societies. The 
TMC was given the responsibility to regulate print media due to the volatility of the 
environment and concerns that hate speech could lead to further violence. Just after the 
conflict in 2000, there were high levels of vitriolic reporting, professional standards were 
generally low, and democratic norms and the rule of law were weak. Jack Snyder and Karen 
Ballentine, as mentioned in Chapter Two, argue within the context of nationalism that: 
…promoting unconditional freedom of public debate in newly democratizing societies is, 
in many circumstances, likely to make the problem worse… Many newly democratizing 
states lack institutions to break up governmental and non-governmental information 
monopolies, to professionalize journalism, and to create common public forums where 
diverse ideas engage each other under conditions in which erroneous arguments will be 
challenged. In the absence of these institutions, an increase in the freedom of speech can 
create an opening for nationalist mythmakers to hijack public discourse.
225
   
 
As the following examples demonstrate, the same dynamic is at play in post-conflict 
environments. This study seeks to argue that not only are functioning institutions and 
professionalized journalism necessary but that they cannot be effective without the underlying 
attitudes and behaviors that enable the system to work. In the case of Kosovo and the TMC, 
freedom of speech and the balancing constraints of professional ethics, respect for privacy, 
and due process were not clearly understood or institutionalized within the local community, 
nor were they well presented by the international community. As a result, the politicization of 
the media had inflammatory consequences in a post-conflict society with still unresolved 
political issues, and journalism became a mechanism for vigilante justice in certain contexts, 
or a way to fight the war by other means.  
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The New York Times and Critiques of Kosovo Media Policy 
Nearly two months after the intervention in Kosovo, the New York Times ran a story entitled 
“NATO Peacekeepers Plan a System of Controls for the News Media in Kosovo.”226 The basis 
for the story was a leaked version of the report that had been commissioned from media 
development consultants in Bosnia, under negotiation between UNMIK-UN and the OSCE,227 
outlining the structure and mandate of the TMC, which would regulate print as well as 
broadcast media. In the article, Steven Erlanger reported that the United States and its allies 
were “establishing a system to control news media in the province that would write a code of 
conduct for journalists, monitor their compliance with it and establish enforcement 
mechanisms to punish those who violate its rules.”228 From the perspective of a Western 
educated and trained professional journalist, such regulations are antithetical to freedom of 
speech precepts as they are known in the West.  
 
Erlanger quotes Marilyn Greene, the executive director of the World Press Freedom 
Commission as saying, “The infringement of press freedom is obvious. Unfortunately, the 
lessons of Bosnia – how not to operate a reconstruction program – were apparently not 
learned.”  However, in this instance, donors were actually attempting to adapt the best of 
programmatic strategies proposed by those with experience in Bosnia. As discussed in the 
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Bosnia case study, the IMC was one of the most successful of media reforms in Bosnia, but in 
Kosovo problems came when regulation of the press to prevent incitement was included in the 
mandate. The rationale for criticism was that, if we (the West) are to be effective in our 
interventions, we must practice what we preach.  That rationale, however, was based upon the 
assumption that there existed a media system in Kosovo that adhered to Western professional 
norms; yet in Kosovo there were few self-regulatory mechanisms – there were few 
professionally trained journalists and the concept of codes of ethics, if understood at all, was 
not internalized by most journalists in the form of professional standards, nor was it 
institutionalized within the emerging sector. Additionally, due to the legacies of the socialist 
system and Milošević’s dismantling of the state, there were no democratic legal mechanisms 
in place in Kosovo nor an understanding of or respect for Western concepts of rule of law and 
due process. Officials representing the Kosovo regulatory plan defended it, explaining that it 
was not meant to censor but to create and uphold standards intended to prevent potential 
incitements to violence. The potential for freedom of speech to be destabilizing seemed ironic, 
and the solution of censoring or censuring the press for unprofessional or irresponsible 
reporting seemed hypocritical. The security needs were once again at odds with democratic 
processes.    
 
Erlanger also quoted Ronald Kovan, the World Press Freedom Committee’s European 
Representative, who cited a study of media management in Bosnia by Monroe Price, “‘The 
time to intervene or control propaganda is when brutality is imminent,’ not to protect the 
political environment afterward.”  Kovan was also of the opinion that before the war there had 
been a professional and “perfectly adequate Albanian-language press.”  However, post-
172 
 
 
conflict transitions, as this study demonstrates, are so tenuous that they can descend into 
brutality quickly. Furthermore, in a 2002 book, Monroe Price not only recognized this 
problem but also presented a potential policy to remedy it. Following on his theories about the 
legal enabling environment, he prescribed a temporary media law system or “module” that 
could be implemented in post-conflict zones where there is a legal void and few if any 
functioning institutions or processes of government.229 This module would include an 
independent regulator, similar to the IMC (broadcast regulation only, not print), with 
oversight bodies responsible for establishing codes of conduct as a normative base in line with 
international legal instruments and the standards of most democratic legal systems. It would 
then monitor content and conduct, investigate complaints, and act as formal prosecutor during 
the transitional period. Price acknowledges that such institutional mechanisms can lead to 
imperial forms of governance and therefore must be especially cognizant of fairness and 
objectivity when exercising their authority.  
 
A follow-up editorial published two weeks later in the Times, on August 30th, acknowledged 
the need for broadcast regulation but called the bureaucratic layers in Kosovo “overkill.”230 
The editorial expressed many valid concerns, such as the apparent use of undemocratic 
policies to encourage democracy, the need for pluralism, and the fear that monitoring and 
regulations would become a form of censorship reminiscent of the previous system. The 
author wrote that respected Albanian-language newspapers and radio stations had survived in 
Kosovo despite Milošević’s crackdown and, while additional training and financial support to 
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local news outlets could be useful, they do not need outsiders telling them what they can and 
cannot say. Inherent in these criticisms is an assumption that democratically inspired 
institutions and processes function similarly in all contexts, and that enforcing professional 
codes of ethics could become a form of censorship. Yet, as was illustrated in the Bosnia 
chapter, substantial training, financial support, and institutional and legal reform did not 
readily establish a highly professionalized and self-regulating independent media sector. And 
as the 2011 Bosnia MSI reported, during the 2010 election period they saw “some of the most 
monstrous things in print media” since the signing of Dayton.231  
 
The debate that began with those August New York Times articles left media reform in 
Kosovo stagnant for nearly a year. Policy analysts, pundits, donors, and implementers were at 
an impasse on how to prevent incitement without institutionalized self-regulation or overt 
regulation, or whether it was even a problem. While the future and structure of the regulatory 
body known as the Temporary Media Commission were under scrutiny, and while UNMIK 
and OSCE-MIK were embroiled in programmatic disputes, enthusiasm by the local 
community to start broadcasting after a nine year ban converged with generous donor 
budgets, a legal void, and many eager journalists and managers, untrained in Western 
reporting practices, to create a chaotic environment of quantity over quality. By the fall of 
1999, an estimated seven daily newspapers, several magazines, 10 registered television 
stations, and 72 registered radio stations were up and running, with more waiting in the wings 
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once funding and licenses were in place.232 Provisional broadcasting licenses were granted 
during this time by a range of bodies including UNMIK’s Press and Public Information 
Department, KFOR, and the provisional government headed by a political party aligned with 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Eberhard Laue, former Temporary Media 
Commissioner,233 referred to it as a “cargo-cult” mentality, wherein media outlets had a sense 
of entitlement to donor funds without a sense of responsibility to adopt or uphold standards. 
The result was an ethnically divided and frequently inflammatory media landscape on both 
the Albanian and Serbian sides, with vitriol directed both at the international community and 
among and between the Serbian and Albanian communities. Regan McCarthy observed,  
In Kosovo you had the international diplomatic bodies – the UN, OSCE, NATO, as well 
as an enormous wealth of internationally-funded NGOs – going in on their own, doing 
their own initiatives, not in cooperation with the diplomatic bodies. So that caused a 
phenomenal mess of too much money too early, competing internally for how to allocate 
that money, and undermining the heavy lifting that the international community was 
going to have to do to get control over the spectrum, to do the opposite of what had to be 
done in Bosnia which was in some instances to keep the Serbs off the airwaves because 
they were so fascistic and inciting. In Kosovo you had to keep the Albanians from doing 
that.234   
 
The situation led to a prolonged dispute between the UN, advocating regulation of the print 
media, and the OSCE, rejecting the UN proposition in favor of a journalists association to 
promote self-regulation through a code of conduct. These two perspectives were based on 
different and occasionally conflicting objectives – the primary responsibility of UNMIK was 
to maintain security and stability while the OSCE was tasked with democratization and 
institution building.   
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The Dita Affair 
A turning point came in April of 2000 when the newspaper Dita published a story and 
corresponding photo, including personal details, about a Serbian employee of UNMIK, Petar 
Topoljski, who the article alleged had committed crimes against Albanians during the NATO 
campaign. Topoljski’s workplace and home address were printed and he was found dead two 
weeks later. Local journalists, driven by frustration with a lack of political will and the limited 
capacity of the international administration, embraced their new democratic freedoms (or their 
own interpretations of them) and stepped into the institutional and legal void to investigate 
and try alleged war criminals in the court of public opinion. This style of reporting became 
known as “vigilante journalism.” UNMIK viewed the Dita story as a clear example of 
incitement by a newspaper and Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) 
Bernard Kouchner responded by shutting the paper down for a week and promulgating two 
resolutions that broadened the authority of the TMC and established Codes of Conduct for the 
print and broadcast media: 
UNMIK Regulation No 2000/36 on the Licensing and Regulation of the Broadcast Media 
in Kosovo, and UNMIK Regulation No 2000/37 on the conduct of the Print Media in 
Kosovo, both described as temporary. The first provides the basis for the authority and 
the responsibility of the TMC, and establishes a media Appeals Board. The second gives 
the TMC the power to impose sanctions on media operating in violation of the applicable 
law and codes of conduct.  It also establishes the right to appeal. Finally, it includes 
special provisions to protect life or maintain civil law and order, by prohibiting the media 
to publicize personal details on an individual if that would pose a serious threat to that 
person’s life and safety. Two Codes of Conduct were also promulgated.235 
 
Despite these new regulations, in July of 2000 Dita again published an article about three 
alleged war criminals – two of whom were Serbian Orthodox Priests – providing their names, 
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photos, and personal details. Two days later, two other priests were shot in a sort of 
generalized retaliation. The TMC issued a warning to Dita and levied a fine, which Dita 
appealed before publishing the photos and personal details of 15 more Serbs whom they 
alleged had committed crimes against Albanians. UNMIK and the OSCE came under fire 
again for “imperial” policies from international media organizations such as Article 19 and 
the International Federation of Journalists, as well as from the local Albanian media 
community who believed their right to freedom of speech had been violated. UNMIK argued 
that journalists “have a responsibility, where a democratic state is not functioning and where 
violence is a regular means by which differences are resolved, not to infringe the physical 
rights of individuals or to increase social tension; where those duties are violated, the 
authority has the right to discipline.”236 
 
The case instigated an international debate on due process, journalistic ethics, and freedom of 
speech. On the surface, the debate was about democratization and whether it stemmed from 
legal reform, institution building, or political reform, and whether it could be imposed from 
above or must be cultivated from the grassroots, or could be achieved by some alchemic mix 
of various strategies. The crux of the issue was norm creation in different contexts, but this 
became lost in discussions about governing architecture. Scholars such as Mark Thompson 
and Julie Mertus, both with experience in Bosnia, defended the new regulations and the Codes 
of Conduct as being fully supported by international law, including the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European 
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Convention on Human Rights.237  They believe that such measures are necessary in post-
conflict environments to safeguard public order, participation, and the rights of all members 
of the society.  
 
On the positive side, in the aftermath of hearings regarding “vigilante journalism,” the TMC 
was given much needed independence from the OSCE and supporting institutions were 
created to provide a more transparent and democratic system based on due process. For 
instance, the newly established Media Appeals Board acted as an autonomous check on the 
TMC and ultimately overruled the TMC’s decision to fine and suspend Dita, which paved the 
way for a public Media Hearings Board (MHB) to evaluate complaints going forward.238  
These institutions created a system of checks and balances within the regulatory arena and 
were designed in consultation with British legal experts and judges and written in accordance 
with the European Convention of Human Rights. 
239
  From this point on, the TMC has been a 
complaint driven office with all complaints heard and reviewed by the independent panel of 
the MHB before a sanctioning decision is made.
240
 Those subject to sanction have the right to 
appeal to the Media Appeals Board. These changes contributed to a relatively smooth election 
period in October of 2000.  
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Anna Di Lellio, Temporary Media Commissioner from 2001 to 2003, frequently came under 
pressure to wield her authority, not only to uphold codes of conduct but also to sanction 
newspapers which virulently criticized international figures, or even to act as judge and jury 
in settling local rivalries. Regarding the Dita affair, she observed that sanctions applied by the 
SRSG had the opposite effect than intended – the move unified local media against the 
international bodies rather than garnering support for implementation of the codes of conduct. 
In thinking about why all the media trainings and discussions on media law and privacy rights 
had such little impact, she concluded:  
The public, whose complaints landed on the desk of the TMC, was not the anonymous 
media audience looking for protection and rights, but individuals already engaged in 
violent fighting during the war and determined to continue fighting after the conflict had 
ended. The TMC’s idea of opening an arena of debate for the public and the media 
followed theories and practices of democratic governance. It took the public as civil 
society, so often interpreted as the ideal, modeled after the Anglo-American experience. 
The Kosovar public is very far from mirroring this model.241  
 
On March 16, 2004, another media crisis arose. In the ethnically divided and highly volatile 
town of Mitrovica, three Albanian boys drowned after jumping into a river to escape a 
runaway dog that had frightened them. The dog belonged to two Serbs who were walking 
down the road at the time; it was not clear if they had released the dog, were trying to catch 
the dog, or even if the dog was in fact dangerous. The only account of the tragedy was from 
the surviving child who believed that the Serbs had intentionally targeted the children. RTK 
interviewed the father of one of the deceased boys and he blamed the tragedy on “Serb 
chetnik hordes.” RTK ran the interview with the surviving child which ignited two days of 
rioting. NATO troops were on the ground but unprepared and unable to contain the violence. 
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Nearly 4,000 people – mainly minority Serbs – were displaced, and hundreds of homes and 
several Orthodox churches were destroyed. 
 
Once again, there was an international outcry over standards and security and much finger 
pointing among the governing institutions and the media. It came as a shock to most observers 
that the public broadcaster, which had been the recipient of a lion’s share of international 
investment and technical assistance, could violate the codes of conduct to such a degree. RTK 
was ultimately blamed for irresponsible reporting that had instigated the riots and was 
sanctioned. Over the next year, the OSCE reinstalled advisors at RTK and the broadcaster 
pledged 100,000 euro toward in-house journalism training. The UN/PRSG finally saw to it 
that a law on public broadcasting was written and promulgated.  
 
This crisis forced the UN and OSCE to once again confront the policy paralysis surrounding 
legal, institutional, and educational reform needed in the media sector. The Council of Europe 
and the European Commission were given the green light to spearhead legal reform; they 
helped guide a civil libel law decriminalizing defamation, and a copyright law, through 
Parliament. The law for a permanent regulator, the Independent Media Commission, was 
finally passed to replace the TMC. That law enabled the formation of a Press Council in 
support of self-regulation, thus relieving the IMC of any regulatory responsibilities over the 
press – then a pre-condition of the UN for status talks toward independence. Editors, eager to 
see the end of TMC oversight and their heavy fines, had an incentive to comply and 
participate with the Press Council. Over the next two years, the first university-level 
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journalism program was launched and the Kosovo Media Institute, a center for mid-career 
training and advocacy, was founded.  
 
International Accountability: Translators and Missed Opportunities 
Between 2000 and 2007 there was rising discontent in Kosovo regarding the role of 
international organizations in governing the province.
242
 In the early phases of transition they 
were welcomed, the expectation being that they would bring stability, security, development, 
and hopefully independence. But by 2004, Kosovars were growing weary of international 
oversight and stagnant political and economic development. An Index Kosova poll 
demonstrated a significant decline in both approval ratings of political figures and trust in 
institutions,243 and voter turnout had fallen from a high of 90% in 2000 to less than 50% over a 
four year period.244 There was much voter frustration due to the government’s inability to 
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address a low standard of living, and prolonged uncertainty as to the final status of the 
territory.245  
 
There has been a clear disconnect between local expectations and capacities and international 
implementing bodies. Organizations entered Kosovo under the auspices of a short-term 
intervention and failed to anticipate the longer-term state building that they would eventually 
have to support once the status issue was resolved. Lack of a clear development or state-
building approach, cumbersome bureaucratic structures and procedures, and often 
undemocratic practices, have all contributed to disillusionment with the development project. 
Further distancing the local community from foreigners were the high rate of turnover within 
international leadership, frequent or abrupt policy changes, and ineffective communication 
from the governing administration. In addition, the high-handed and patronizing international 
administration of Kosovo often left locals on the sidelines of the reform process. The resulting 
frustration came out in many discussions with local journalists and stakeholders and speaks to 
the issue of accountability between the international and local communities. Furthermore, 
these factors have undermined professional morale. Many of the journalists, editors, and 
media NGO representatives interviewed for this study expressed a strong sense of 
professional mission and a commitment to independence, but felt they had limited ability to 
impact standards in the profession and that they had little to no influence over national or 
international policies in their own country.    
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Representative of the international community swept into Kosovo with great power and very 
little knowledge of local stakeholders and their social networks. Whom to trust, whom to 
empower, and how to integrate reform are just some of the complexities that must be 
negotiated when coordinating peacekeeping and democratization strategies; in the case of 
Kosovo, international administrators were very concerned about inadvertently collaborating 
with Serbian nationalists potentially aligned with Belgrade, and about strengthening the KLA. 
They needed to walk a careful line to ensure that their initiatives were not co-opted by 
political factions, so that they were viewed as neutral by the local community. Many Albanian 
interviewees for this study questioned the decision making of the international community 
when it came to local leadership.  As one editor explained, “they really tried with training and 
support. But people who come from outside cannot understand the hierarchy and who is who 
in a society. Too often they are influenced by the people they meet in their limited circles and 
trust too quickly in those personal contacts.”246 They are “victims of the interpreters in 
society,” he said, meaning that those “interpreters” translate not only the language but also its 
context, giving foreigners a biased view of the players and their roles in a society. According 
to this editor, “the interpreters are now more or less the government.”247 A colleague added 
cynically that these people are indeed “senior political advisors.” To a large extent, 
international implementers will always be influenced by those they choose as their 
interpreters – the key is to have as large a network as possible from which to get balanced 
opinions and maintain consistent policies.   
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Anna Di Lellio took an attentive and nuanced approach to exercising her authority as TMC. 
She saw not only the legal and political complexities but also the paradoxes, and defined the 
problem as that of a “swamp,” in which the situation is so murky it defies “technical analysis 
and solutions.” She warned that “tool kits,” such as those advocated by Price and others, 
should be used as little as possible and instead promoted a context-specific approach that 
takes into consideration the subtleties of local ecology and culture. During her tenure she 
struggled to overcome the hypocrisy of institutions and practices that were created over the 
heads of the local population and which were staffed by people who were deemed to be 
objective only because they had little to no knowledge of the local culture, language, or 
history. Locals were routinely hired only for non-professional positions, such as drivers or 
translators, leaving Di Lellio to seek out Albanian colleagues that could help her interpret the 
political developments and impact of the TMC; she recognized that it was impossible to build 
effective institutions and processes without the involvement and commitment of the local 
citizenry at the ground level. 
 
The patronizing attitude of the international administration and the blank slate interpretation 
of Kosovo’s political and institutional environment led to some possible missed opportunities 
to capitalize on extant networks, attitudes, and values that should have been mobilized for the 
transition. According to historian Isa Blumi, while Kosovar society has lacked classic 
democratic institutions, it has nonetheless been highly developed and organized according to 
communal laws with a specific logic.248  Blumi argues that international policies in effect 
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deconstructed that existing social order, which the West had in fact praised before the 
intervention for having kept the society functioning. That local social order, according to 
Blumi, maintained community structures through civic qualities usually associated with 
nascent democracies, such as trust, a sense of collective responsibility, and mutual 
dependency.249  He believes that these indigenous institutions should have been bolstered and 
mobilized rather than distrusted and disregarded as primitive – that donors in effect may have 
gotten better results by employing a more contextual approach in which they supported 
existing social structures rather than imposing their own.  Instead, he writes, UNMIK’s 
centralized and divided bureaucracy, reminiscent of the previous system, coupled with 
coverage by the international media, perpetuated self-fulfilling prophesies of intractable 
ethnic divisions and subversive local networks. 
 
Ecology of the Media Sector 
Following is a review of the primary institutions of the emerging “tool box” and the evolution 
of the enabling environment in Kosovo seven years after the intervention. As illustrated 
above, programs evolved slowly as the bureaucratic and legal climate made reform a 
protracted and at times painful process. Driven by differing philosophical approaches, 
interests, and capacities, donors backed projects to professionalize the sector through training, 
education, and institution building, or to commercialize the sector through market 
development. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
to-face debate and negotiated settlements, in some instances providing a sense of recourse and fairness, if not 
justice. 
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Training and Education 
Seven years after international intervention, the tiny country of Kosovo had five journalism 
education institutions. The University of Pristina established a Faculty of Journalism in 2005 
and had just fewer than 100 students majoring in journalism by 2006. A private university, 
AAB, established in 2001 by a local business family, offers both BA and MA degrees and had 
approximately 300 students during the period of this research, in 2006. By that time, AAB 
had raised its standards to such a point that it was awarded an important contract to enroll 
selected RTK staff in their programs. Another locally run but smaller private journalism 
school, Faik Konica, was run by the Kelmendi family but established in 1999 with donor 
support from the EU, the National Endowment for Democracy, and People in Need. Faik 
Konica had evolved by the time of this study into a for-profit, self-sustaining institution. 
Overall, it is well respected in journalism circles but has often been criticized for not having 
high technical or training capacity. Donors, however, focused their investment in two other 
organizations: the Kosovo Institute of Journalism and Communication (KIJAC), which offers 
an MA program, and The Kosovo Media Institute (KMI), to provide mid-career training.   
 
Since opportunities for a degree in journalism are now plentiful in Kosovo, schools are 
producing many more young journalists than the market can absorb. Also, the quality of 
education varies significantly, depending largely upon the strength of financial backing and 
available resources.  
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Kosovo Institute of Journalism and Communication (KIJAC) 
In 2005, KIJAC, a graduate school of journalism and communications, was established with 
generous funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They committed to 
providing seven to ten years of funding in order to carefully plan for the sustainability and 
integration of the program into the emerging institutional environment in Kosovo. The project 
was spearheaded by Willem Houwen, who had worked as a Media Advisor for the OSCE, and 
his team designed the project with a long-term development approach. Norway’s Gimlekollen 
School of Journalism and Communication was the lead implementer, but they quickly set up 
international partnerships to draw from a large talent pool as well as to offer the students a 
broad range of opportunities. Gimlekollen sent many journalists with backgrounds in major 
news outlets, such as the BBC, Time, and the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, to teach 
hands-on and practical courses. Cardiff University School of Journalism and Media Studies in 
the UK took charge of teaching communications theory and research methods. The College of 
Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln taught web 
journalism and set up the KIJAC News Net website, modeled after NewsNet Nebraska.250 In 
2006, at the time primary research for this study was conducted, KIJAC was in their second 
year of operation and was going strong; the institute’s goal was to “guide the students in their 
quest for an understanding of the role of the media and journalists in a functioning 
democracy.”  
 
KIJAC provides an interesting model; it is an educational organization designed to bridge the 
chasm between public and private institutions, and it was created to meet immediate needs for 
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which a private framework offered necessary flexibility in the short-term, but to merge over 
time with the evolving public education system. Originally, founders had hoped to establish 
the program as part of the University of Pristina, but they knew that bureaucratic hurdles, 
slow Bologna reforms, and ideological residue pigeonholing journalism as a political tool 
would have crippled their efforts. The decision was made to focus all energies into an MA 
program that would provide cutting edge technical training as well as an intellectually 
rigorous journalistic education, with teachers drawn from leading international institutions 
and news organizations. The approach was also “supra-ethnic” – with students and faculty 
representing both the Albanian and Serbian communities.  
 
Because the market is simply too small to absorb hundreds of undergraduate journalism 
students, it was considered a better investment to direct resources toward a smaller and more 
select group of professionals. Donors covered most of the associated costs, estimated at 
35,000 euro per student for two years, but students also had to contribute 1000 euro per year 
toward their tuition. The Institute’s directors appreciated the need to develop human capital, 
and provided one scholarship each year for an outstanding student to earn a PhD at a 
European University. The objective was to train the next generation of journalism professors 
and communications scholars that would lead KIJAC.     
 
Unfortunately, a recent check back on how KIJAC is doing was disappointing. Their website 
was still operational but clearly had not been updated in some time, and the same applied to 
KIJAC NewsNet. More research revealed a Balkan Press Agency article from March 2011 
entitled “Students cheated by KIJAC University” with the opening lede, “Nothing has 
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remained out of the millions of Euros invested for the Kosovo Institute of Journalism and 
Communication (KIJAC).”251 The article goes on to declare the project a failure that has left 
130 students trying to finish their degree at the American University in Kosovo, which 
adopted KIJAC’s students and equipment. The 30 that did graduate apparently have degrees 
that are not recognized, since KIJAC was never accredited in Kosovo. At the center of the 
scandal is Willem Houwen, the former head of the school as well as the Chairman of the Press 
Council in Kosovo, who reportedly falsified his CV – claiming to be a PhD when in fact he 
never earned that degree.  
 
According to journalist and former KIJAC student Agon Fehmiu,
252
 Houwen avoided 
submitting the application for KIJAC’s accreditation because it would have exposed his 
deception. He claimed KIJAC did not need accreditation in Kosovo since its diplomas were 
internationally recognized due to their affiliation with and sponsorship by the three university 
partners, Gimnekollen, Cardiff, and Nebraska-Lincoln. It was only after numerous former 
students complained to the primary donor, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(RNMFA) that their diplomas were not recognized that an investigation was launched into the 
problem. Houwen, who was earning 120,000 euro per year, tax free, was eventually forced to 
admit to a web of lies. He was fired, and Cardiff University and the University of Nebraska 
severed their relationships with KIJAC. As of January 2012, the KIJAC Board of Trustees 
and the RNMFA are working with the Kosovo Accreditation Agency to ensure diplomas from 
the program are validated and recognized. 
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This is a tragic end to a very real effort to create a sustainable education model. Asked to tell 
me, in his opinion, what the legacy of KIJAC would be, Fehmiu responded this way: 
KIJAC will be remembered as an excellent MA program for Journalism and 
Communication that went wrong because of corruption and terrible mismanagement… 
Knowledge gained at KIJAC helped the students to be more courageous, professional and 
thorough during their reporting; therefore, the impact of KIJAC on Kosovan journalism 
was more than positive. If we carefully analyze the Kosovan media, both print and 
broadcast, we can notice that journalists who were KIJAC students have applied the 
knowledge they gained there and contributed in meeting the Western standards of 
accuracy, objectivity and responsible reporting… Kosovan media in general, have failed 
to provide professional and qualitative reporting, in order to inform citizens Kosovo-
wide; but, with the help of KIJAC students, this defect is vanishing rapidly.
253
  
 
The Kosovo Media Institute (KMI) 
The Kosovo Media Institute was originally conceived by the OSCE as a training center to be 
managed by local media professionals that could take over mid-career development once the 
OSCE phased out their programs. The idea was first explored back in 1999 but took over six 
years to come to fruition. The delay seems to have been caused by struggles between 
international donors and the local journalism community as to the ultimate mission and 
organization of such a center. Agron Bajrami, Editor-in-Chief of Koha Ditore explained, “it 
has taken several years for them [Kosovar stakeholders] to come to an understanding with the 
international presence that there needs to be a different sort of approach to do these things and 
not just to copy and paste from things that have been done in the region and elsewhere.”254 
Although the OSCE has supported the organization along with other donors, KMI was 
organized by the industry itself. It is member-based and its founders include the two largest 
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newspapers, Zeri and Koha Ditore, as well as RTK, AMPEK, three local radio stations, and a 
few minority media outlets. It was important to the Institute’s founders that some smaller, 
local outlets be included since they are in great need of assistance but are often left out of 
Pristina-based initiatives. Though KMI has international advisors, it is up to industry 
members to assess their own needs and design appropriate trainings, as opposed to taking 
external directives. Member outlets have priority, but individuals and non-members can also 
participate in activities for a fee. Courses are aimed mostly at training younger staff and are 
scheduled to meet the needs of working journalists.    
 
Funding from the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) allowed the KMI to fully 
launch in January of 2007. Additional donor funds were secured from the European 
Commission Liaison Office and the Open Society Institute. A consortium of international 
organizations is in charge of oversight and implementation, including IREX Europe, ECJ, and 
TIMUR and Partners. By 2011, the Center was offering diploma courses, training in political 
and economic reporting, and had launched a network of 26 radio stations across Kosovo to 
broadcast a weekly Radio Program called “Europe Now in Kosovo.” Although the Institute 
will be donor dependent for a few more years, it is the hope of its founders that, as the market 
begins to regulate itself and grow, the industry can cover a larger portion of operating costs. 
This will be an interesting organization to follow as it has strong local leadership and, at least 
at this point, a locally inspired mission.   
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Professional Organizations and Advocacy 
Neither of the two professional associations in Kosovo, The Association of Independent 
Broadcast Media in Kosovo (AMPEK) nor The Association of Professional Journalists of 
Kosovo (APJK), are yet self-sustaining; but both are necessary for further development of the 
sector and for the protection of journalists. Consequently, turnover in the industry is high, 
some journalists are forced to work multiple jobs, and many of the smaller media take on 
young, inexperienced journalists because they will work for less. Financial pressure from both 
owners and the oversaturated market leads journalists to practice self-censorship, locally 
referred to as “keeping quiet to keep alive” or “protocol journalism” – a perfunctory covering 
of press conferences and other official events with little to no analysis, investigation, or 
follow-up. This impacts the credibility of the media, the capacity of news outlets to function, 
and the effectiveness of donor media development strategies. Several journalists commented 
in interviews for this research that they need to regain the sense of professional pride they had 
in 1999, now transformed into humiliation due to dependence on the international presence 
and poor employment conditions.  
 
The Association of Independent Broadcast Media in Kosovo (AMPEK)  
AMPEK was started in August 2001 with core support from IREX. There were 19 founding 
members who finally named an operations officer in November of 2002. By 2006, there were 
35 members out of a total potential of 170 broadcast media. Their director, Ardita Zejnullahu, 
described the Association at the time as a quality-driven organization that only solicits 
membership to media who can contribute to their mission.255 AMPEK was actively involved 
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in the passage, and subsequent lengthy revision process, of the copyright law, and in the 
drafting process of the law establishing the IMC. In 2004 they received a citation from the 
South East European Network of Associations of Private Broadcasters (SEENAPB) for their 
contribution to the regional network, but Zejnullahu was determined to find even more 
opportunities for regional cooperation and resource sharing.  
 
The Association’s success is most often attributed to the dynamism of Zejnullahu, who is 
young and energetic. And, while she may not have had as much experience as some would 
have preferred out of the gate, she has proven herself a very capable fundraiser who knows 
how to lobby on behalf of the organization. AMPEK is struggling to achieve its objectives in 
a hyper-politicized environment and is deeply concerned about finding a sustainability 
strategy. So far, donors have continued to fund training, efforts to create a legal framework, 
and legal assistance for members. As the organization’s credibility is further bolstered, 
Zejnullahu hopes that someday membership dues will fund AMPEK; in the meantime, donors 
such as the National Endowment for Democracy seem content to maintain their support. The 
NED has specifically highlighted AMPEK as a success story, calling the decision by all of 
Kosovo’s Serbian-language television stations to join the organization “an unprecedented 
display of trust and confidence.”256  
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The Association of Professional Journalists of Kosovo (APJK)  
The APJK is the third attempt by IREX, since 2000, to create a viable journalists association 
in Kosovo. The first incarnation, the Association of Kosovar Journalists, was desperately 
needed at the time because journalists were often under threat, but its structure was fatally 
flawed. The board was comprised of editors and owners, creating clear conflicts of interest. 
The OSCE stepped in and attempted to establish a code of ethics, but it was rejected by 
journalists who felt it was being imposed upon them. Another effort to start an association by 
the Committee to Protect Journalists also fell prey to the local environment, as journalists 
were afraid to speak up for fear of losing their jobs. Finally, in 2002, the Association of 
Professional Journalists of Kosovo was registered as an NGO with UNMIK. The 
Association’s first director was a well known but rather controversial figure, installed by 
IREX, and was referred to by local media professionals as a “general without an army.”257 
Membership lagged under his leadership and several sources claimed he used the organization 
to further his own interests. The result was a collapse of credibility and a reorganization of the 
association. Agron Bajrami, Editor-in-Chief of Koha Ditore, described the problems that 
surrounded the establishment of these associations this way:  
Up until now, the associations were always an idea coming from outside and saying, 
“okay you need an association” to do this and this and this. And then IREX comes and 
says, “we have the donation and we can set it up for you.” And then they set it up and it 
does not function. And then they try to set up another one. And then someone gets 
elected who is totally out of line. And then you want to set up a third one. So it is a messy 
game because it looks like you are trying to do something that no one wants. And at the 
end of the day you will have to live with the fact that unless there is a grassroots need, no 
association will be functional.258 
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Bajrami brings up two common complaints by local stakeholders. First, that too many 
initiatives are imposed on locals based on outside assessments of their needs; and second, that 
the wrong local leadership for these initiatives has been chosen. There is sufficient evidence 
for these criticisms, but others in the media and NGO sectors say the key issue is 
accountability. Regarding APJK’s former director, for instance, it was the goal of IREX to 
give the Association a strong local leader whose management would allow IREX to remain 
relatively uninvolved. Unfortunately, because he was not held to account, the organization 
became captive to his personal and professional interests.  
 
A new board elected in December of 2006 was comprised of five reporters and two 
editors. Although there is no policy regarding board composition, journalists are usually 
preferred over editors. However, since all the positions except that of the Executive Director – 
an administrative position with no decision making powers – are pro bono, the most important 
factor in deciding who is elected is a demonstrated commitment to protecting journalists’ 
rights.  
 
IREX’s funding ceased in June 2006, but APJK continued to offer basic consulting until a 
new business plan secured additional support from the Balkan Trust Fund. By 2007, the 
Association had 400 registered members, but none were paying dues and rejected the idea 
when it was proposed in the summer of 2006. So, with donor money still flowing in, and 
considering the economic situation for journalists, the board felt it was not the time to solicit 
dues, especially since the Association did not yet have the credibility to demand them.  
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While IREX stands behind the Association and is optimistic that it will succeed, there is cause 
for concern. One member of the board remarked that the organization cannot even begin to 
implement programs because the staff is all-volunteer and most of their energy goes toward 
fundraising. IFJ has provided press cards and limited legal assistance, but that is not enough to 
build confidence or membership. Furthermore, the board has also apparently felt that it is not 
yet equipped to lobby for better employment conditions for journalists because the 
organization is not strong enough to confront editors. Under present conditions it is hard to 
see how the Association can possibly fulfill its mission – to advocate on behalf of journalists 
and promote a code of conduct. Several journalists commented during research for this study 
that the continued presence of neutral international advisors would be necessary to pressure 
local media into compliance. Despite the need for local leadership, international oversight that 
can rein in certain local interests who have the capacity to co-opt institutions and policies is a 
controversial issue; gauging the required levels and tactics of that oversight continues to be an 
experiment in alchemy. By 2010, the APJK was still extant but was criticized in the MSI for 
being mostly reactive rather than proactive. Unless APJK begins to show more commitment 
to its mission, it will crumble from a crisis of legitimacy.        
 
News Media 
Paradoxically, by 2006-2007 Kosovo had the highest concentration of media outlets relative 
to its population in all the former Yugoslav territories,259 with 115 licensed broadcasters (93 
radio and 22 television stations), 10 daily newspapers, 5 weekly papers, and numerous other 
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smaller publications.260 This 2007 reality was far worse than it had been in 2000 when donors 
first became concerned about the proliferation of media and sought to regulate the market 
through the TMC/IMC. A major OSCE assessment of local broadcasters in Kosovo from 
2005 concluded that, “the initial licensing policy which could be summarized ‘the more 
media, the more democracy and human rights’ has collapsed like a hot air balloon at high 
altitude leaving nothing behind but shattered broadcasters on life support from the donor 
community and KFOR.”261 The market, like those of so many other countries in the region, 
was oversaturated and ethnically segregated.  
 
The market has been difficult to regulate for several reasons: First, there are significant non-
transparent (and some allegedly illegal) forms of income artificially supporting outlets. 
Second, advertising time purchased by KFOR, the international community, and the 
government has skewed the market. Third, because of delays in establishing the IMC, it was a 
long while before regular licensing fees were paid or quality standards for acquiring or 
maintaining a license were imposed, and by the end of 2007, legal financial reporting 
requirements were still not in effect. Theoretically, new licensing requirements and legislation 
should also help regulate the market somewhat. Implementation of the copyright law, in force 
since 2006 but not yet practically applied, also ought to contribute to a more sustainable 
environment.  
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Agon Fehmiu summarized the situation: 
Economic pressure is another important factor which unfortunately determines 
newsworthiness in Kosovan media. Kosovo’s market is weak… One can say that this [is 
the] case everywhere in the world, and I do not deny that; however, there are certain rules 
and basics skills that are lacking in Kosovan media that lead to unprofessional 
journalism. If we carefully analyze the Kosovan media, printed or broadcasted, we can 
see that only a few of them tend to partially meet the Western standards of accuracy, 
while most of the others are political party envoys…  
 
Fehmiu added that, while the effort to report “relevant, useful and interesting news” that 
adheres to Western standards is not, in his words, a “Mission Impossible,” it is nevertheless 
sure to be a long and hard fought challenge to reach that benchmark in Kosovo in light of the 
economic, political, and social realities there.
262
 
 
Pluralism has certainly been achieved in Kosovo, but sustainability and independence are still 
pressing concerns. By 2010 little had changed in the market, numerous outlets were in 
financial trouble, and the current expectation is that bankruptcies and an inability to pay 
broadcasting fees to the IMC could potentially weed out weaker outlets. The market in 
Kosovo must begin to be actively regulated with other standard mechanisms, such as market 
research that includes distribution figures for print, advertising revenues, and independent 
auditing. Although IREX has been supporting a Joint Industry Committee since 2002, better 
industry and market data is needed in the print sector – accurate distribution and advertising 
numbers are unavailable. Greater transparency of financing is also necessary to ensure that 
taxes are being paid, accounting regulations are respected, and outlets are not being used as 
fronts for money laundering, a suspicion voiced by nearly all journalists interviewed for this 
research.  
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Donor strategies in this sector in Kosovo have been, in many ways, the result of earlier donor 
battles in Bosnia. The US has taken the lead in supporting private, commercial outlets, while 
European donors have focused their efforts on building the public broadcaster, RTK, along 
the lines of the BBC. Still, locals have felt that policy disagreements between US and 
European donors were fought over their heads and without their input, and in such a small 
community this has often turned personal. Specifically, the issues of if and how much 
advertising would be allowed on RTK, and the Convention on Trans-border TV, caused major 
friction in the donor community. The debate pitted KohaVision and TV 21, backed by the 
commercially-oriented US/USAID and Soros’s OSI, against RTK, backed by the public 
service-oriented European Union and OSCE. The effect was a delay in the passage and 
implementation of necessary legislation.  
 
KohaVision (KTV) 
IREX has invested heavily in Kosovo’s two national private broadcasters, KohaVision (KTV) 
and TV 21. They are stations with very different philosophies and market approaches, which 
is perhaps why they have been as successful as they are. By 2006 KohaVision (KTV) 
reportedly covered all of its own costs and had increased revenues three times, although they 
still received consulting and training services from IREX.  They have the very broad mission 
“to foster democracy in Kosovo through broadcasting high quality programming that consists 
of information, educational programs and entertainment,” but this is coupled with a firm 
determination “not to compromise!” according to their director.263 Their audience is targeted 
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to those who are young, urban, and between the ages of 10 and 45. In 2006, they had 112 full-
time employees and 8 freelancers, but turnover was higher than it should be because the 
station had become a transitory training ground for future RTK employees – their best 
journalists were lured away by bigger salaries and benefits. KTV has struggled to standardize 
their marketing, to truly get what they are worth, an issue IREX has worked on steadily with 
them despite the outlet’s rejection of some of the advice it’s been offered. Because KTV had 
an aggressive marketing manager, their revenues remained high in 2010 even though their 
audience ratings in 2010 were still the lowest of the three national broadcasters.  
 
TV 21 
TV 21 has been the biggest financial success of IREX’s investments in Kosovo. The mission 
of the station is “to create social change in Kosova using 21st Century information resources 
and technology.” The founders of the station are strong female political activists and their 
station was created with a solid public service mandate. One of the founders, Aferdita 
Kelmendi, received the 1999 Courage in Journalism award from the International Women’s 
Media Foundation for her work before the intervention. Back in November of 1995 she 
received a grant to start an NGO to train female journalists in radio, TV, print and conflict 
management. They trained up to 200 young women over the years on an ad hoc basis. In 
1997, they started a monthly magazine and published eleven issues that covered culture and 
politics through women’s viewpoints. With technical and financial assistance from Internews, 
they produced 15 short documentaries, 2.5 to 3.5 minutes each, called “Kosovo: A view from 
the inside,” which were broadcast by EBU, ANEM, and CNN world report. Also in 1997, 
they received a small grant from Star Network to broadcast radio over the internet. By 
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January 1999 they were broadcasting twice a day, but then their office was destroyed during 
the NATO bombing. They fled to Macedonia, where they teamed up with donors to establish 
their radio station in exile. In July of that year, they were able to move back to Kosovo under 
the protection of KFOR. Once back up and running in Pristina, KFOR needed their assistance; 
they began broadcasting 24 hours a day with news at 12 noon, 6 pm, and 9 pm. In 2000, with 
funding from USAID and OSI, TV 21 was established, and by August of 2001 they were 
broadcasting 24 hours a day, 73% of which was in-house production.  
 
Since 2005, though, the station has taken a more commercial path by significantly increasing 
its entertainment programming, most notoriously with tele-novellas. Much to the 
consternation of the owners, these shows have proven to be far more popular and profitable 
than programming produced by the station; yet, these shows have afforded them large 
advertising revenues. In 2006 the station still provided its flagship “flash news” every hour 
and maintained public affairs programming, and 50% of the programs it aired were locally 
produced. Marketing lessons well-learned, the founders used the increased revenue stream to 
expand into satellite markets in the US and Europe, and to invest in additional space for 
studios and events. Several journalists and advisors commented that this expansion came at 
the expense of the outlet’s staff. Allegedly, salaries were being paid up to six months late. 
Three disgruntled, former employees left to establish Radio Dukagjini, which in 2006 was 
among the most popular stations.  
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Radio-Television Kosovo (RTK) 
Public Broadcaster RTK, modeled after the BBC, broadcasts in five languages. It houses a 
television station and two radios stations, which operate with a third of the budget of 
Montenegro’s public broadcaster and half of the budget of TV Albania.264 It is the poorest 
public broadcaster in Europe and is in need of additional revenue streams to enlarge its 
footprint and allow for capital investments. In 2005, revenues were predominantly from fees, 
with a limited amount from advertising. According to estimates for that year, 73% of the 
budget came from fees, 12% from advertising, and 2% from donations. But by the time the 
2010 MSI was published, RTK was said to be receiving “considerable revenue from 
commercials,” at a rate comparable to private stations.265 
 
Since being implicated in inciting the 2004 riots, RTK has adhered to a strict code of ethics.  
Those high standards coupled with their role as a public broadcaster in an ethnically divided 
country means they have a professional commitment to representing the interests and views of 
the whole society. Therefore, its program goals for 2006 were to produce more dialogue-
oriented shows discussing interethnic issues. News in Serbian is broadcast at 7pm each night 
and 15% of RTK’s prime-time lineup is targeted to minority audiences. When covering 
human rights and minority concerns in their informational programming, they try to 
incorporate conflict resolution approaches. Advertising during these shows has proven a 
costly problem, though. Unfortunately, ethnic divisions affect advertising choices – few 
Albanians will advertise during the Serbian broadcast and even fewer Serbs will advertise on 
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the station as a whole. While RTK firmly states that they more than meet minority 
programming requirements in the broadcast law, a minority media fund was established to 
support small, local, minority productions. This was done in part to alleviate the overall need 
for advertising revenues, which is a point of contention in the industry. Although serious 
efforts are taken to produce quality programming, a 2006 OSCE survey showed that RTK’s 
minority programming was not well regarded by the Serb population. Despite years of 
international funding and guidance, by 2010 the station still did not have a viable system in 
place to collect broadcasting fees, leaving it reliant on government subsidies and hence open 
to political influence. Further, the level of editorial independence of RTK is hotly debated. 
While the station has received praise for its educational and entertainment programming as 
well as increasing its minority language shows, detractors continue to fault it for a political 
bias and for not fulfilling its mandate as a public service broadcaster.  
 
The condition of local and multiethnic media is much more problematic than that of the 
national media. A 2005 OSCE analysis of local electronic media described their status as 
“devastating” economically, as well as in terms of management, professional standards, and 
employment conditions. Despite all efforts to create interethnic programming and networks, 
Kosovar Serbs are still getting most of their information from Serbia- or Belgrade-based 
outlets, which reinforce nationalist viewpoints.266 A report from the Youth Initiative for 
Human Rights in 2006 claimed that reporting from Serbia was providing a false and negative 
view of the political situation in Kosovo.267 Unfortunately, efforts to provide quality local 
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Serbian language programming have been received with mixed reviews. Several 
representatives from both the international community and the local journalism community 
commented during this research that much interethnic programming is considered artificial, 
and that it has little impact.  
 
Regulation 
Regulation of the media sector in Kosovo is tasked to three organizations: The Independent 
Media Commission, for broadcast regulation; The Press Council, for self-regulation of print 
outlets; and the Kosovo Terrestrial Telecommunications Network, for regulation of the 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
       
The Independent Media Commission (IMC) 
The Temporary Media Commission (TMC), since 2006 the IMC, was based on a model 
successfully implemented in Bosnia for the broadcast media, but in Kosovo it took on added 
regulatory capacities for print media; this violated its original concept and seriously 
undermined the organization. It took over six years, far longer than anyone had anticipated, 
for the Temporary Media Commissioner to become an independent regulatory institution, 
delaying urgently needed reforms in the sector. From 2000 to 2005, the TMC heard all print 
complaints and required that the temporary Code of Conduct be renewed every 90 days by the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, until the Press Council was in place to 
assume those responsibilities. 
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In 2003, with a new Commissioner in place, focus turned to broadcast licensing. The TMC’s 
mandate was to maintain fairness and competition, monitor broadcast media, contribute to the 
drafting of legislation, and evaluate compliance. Since it lacked the authority to issue rules 
and regulations, a limited tender was conducted and many vital aspects of the broadcast sector 
were put on hold until the Independent Media Commission could be established with new 
frequency allocation policies. Although the IMC came into force in September of 2005, it 
took until November of 2006 to implement it due to various bureaucratic and institutional 
hurdles.  
 
Once the IMC was in place, new licenses could finally be issued, fees could be collected, an 
advertising law could be written, and the new board of RTK could be elected. Despite its 
independence, the IMC was once again burdened with controversial and extraordinary powers 
– it was given the responsibility to determine the percentage of advertising that RTK can sell 
each year. This placed the IMC in between the needs of the commercial broadcasters and the 
public service broadcaster, paving the way for potential corruption. Further complicating 
matters, the state’s contribution to the IMC budget was not fixed but had to be negotiated each 
year, exposing the organization to political pressures.   
 
The Press Council of Kosovo   
Kosovo’s Press Council, comprised of 15 affiliated newspapers, was registered as an NGO on 
September 21, 2005 – to promote and enforce the Press Code of Conduct, hear complaints 
about and make decisions on breaches of the Code, and to publish adjudications of the 
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Code.268 This was a major institutional accomplishment and relieved the TMC of a burden that 
weighed heavily on its capacity and its legitimacy. The Code of Conduct was finalized in 
March of 2004 after numerous drafts were reviewed by the OSCE and local editors. Its Statute 
was written in cooperation with affiliated newspapers to ensure a sense of local ownership, 
and the board is made up of editors-in-chief of those papers along with three independent 
local or international members who are nominated by a simple majority. Heeding a lesson 
learned in Bosnia, the Council was designed to exclude publishers or members of civil society 
from the board, preventing conflicts of interest and political interference. The Council has the 
authority to levy fines and to require members to print adjudications. Financially, the Press 
Council relied for its first few years on donors, though each affiliate does pay a membership 
fee based on how often they publish. As an incentive to pay the fee and to participate, 
honoraria are paid for attending meetings. There is strong fiscal oversight and concerted 
efforts to keep the operating budget low, as these issues have crippled other councils in the 
region.     
 
By late 2006, the Council had been active for over a year and had heard about 2-4 complaints 
each month, mostly from citizens. None of these complaints were terribly serious and they 
were fairly easy to adjudicate. Levels of cooperation were also quite high, unlike in Bosnia. 
One early success was a proposition to lower the VAT, but Agron Bajrami feels that the issue 
was not much of a test since there was already a high level of consensus for what was 
proposed. He thinks the real test for the Council remains in the future because, “not everyone 
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is in this business because of this business. And that will make a difference once we start 
dealing with the core of the problems.”269   
 
As is the standard European practice, but was not applied in Bosnia, The Press Council is 
referenced in the Law on Defamation as the first line of defense for complaints. The 
defamation law in Kosovo is one of the most progressive in Europe. It protects freedom of 
speech, recognizes the essential role media plays as a watchdog in democracy, provides 
effective compensation for people who have been harmed, and prevents unreasonable 
restriction on public discussion of public interest matters. For instance, Article 1 states, “The 
objective of this law is to regulate civil liability for defamation and insult while 
ensuring:…(d) the essential role of media in the democratic process as public watchdogs and 
transmitters of information to the public.”270 
 
 One of the more modern aspects of the law is the obligation to mitigate harm, which, in 
practice, means that all parties involved in a complaint have a responsibility to utilize all 
institutional and official channels to resolve the issue before going to court. While a plaintiff 
can disregard the view of the Council or refuse to address the offending party with their issue 
before going to court, the court, in making its decision, will consider this a failure on the part 
of the plaintiff to mitigate harm.271 Article 12, Obligation to Mitigate Harm, under the Civil 
Law Against Defamation and Insult states: 
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Prior to filing a complaint under this law, an allegedly injured person shall undertake all 
reasonable measures to mitigate any harm caused by the expression. In particular the 
complainant shall request a correction of that expression from the person who allegedly 
caused the harm. Such actions may include seeking a remedy from the publisher of an 
allegedly defamatory or insulting expression and filing a claim with any appropriate 
regulatory body (The Independent Media Commission) or self-regulatory body (Press 
Council).
272
 
 
The Council has been approached by journalists seeking assistance in protecting their rights. 
Such assistance is outside the mandate of the Council, but the fact that it is sought clearly 
demonstrates the need for a strong and credible journalism association. In Bosnia, the Press 
Council was established in cooperation with the journalists association, leading to conflicts of 
interest, so in Kosovo the organizations are being steadfastly kept separate. In order to 
familiarize the public with their activities and role, the Press Council aired a series of debates 
on RTK, conducted outreach campaigns, and cooperate regionally with other press councils.   
  
The Kosovo Terrestrial Telecommunications Network (KTTN)  
KTTN was established in June 2000 to rebuild destroyed portions of the terrestrial broadcast 
network, in preparation for the October 2000 elections. The project was lead by IREX after 
previous attempts by other international organizations failed. However, it was impossible to 
complete in time for the elections, so satellite broadcasting was utilized instead, and at a steep 
cost. The system was finally in place by December 2000, though, and provided coverage to 
80% of the territory. In July 2001, KTTN was registered as a domestic non-governmental, 
not-for-profit organization by local stakeholders RTK, RTV-21, KohaVision, and Radio 
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Dukagjini, under the supervision of IREX. Although it was an NGO, it was run like a for-
profit business, selling advertising space on its sites as a means of generating income to cover 
maintenance and operations.273  
 
While NGO status allowed the organization to continue to receive donor funds as well as 
commercial revenue, it disallowed eligibility for investment funds from banks. This prompted 
a two year deliberation on how best to restructure. The Network received 95% of funding 
from USAID until January 2004, when it started collecting fees. It was eventually turned into 
a private shareholder company, owned and operated by its users. This creates a conflict of 
interest – the owners are their own clients and have political and business interests that may 
influence the decisions they make regarding the financing of operations. However, it was a 
compromise that IREX had to make in order to fulfill their primary goals of making KTTN 
independent from the state and sustainable as quickly as possible. Also, because the system is 
built on analog not digital technology, they see the organization as having a limited life span. 
Once an upgrade occurs, the business will need to be completely reorganized.  
 
Conclusion 
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence, but it was not universally recognized 
by UN member states. Due to the tenuousness of Kosovo’s political and economic situation, 
UNMIK will continue its oversight role for the foreseeable future. Large donors, however, 
have significantly reduced their roles or are wrapping up their programs, and most smaller 
donors have exited. After seven years of media assistance, the international donor community 
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has codified a democratic legal framework, established primary professional and regulatory 
institutions, and developed a pluralistic media market with a public broadcaster and 
independent commercial media. University-level journalism education is also offered by a 
number of schools and mid-career training is available at the Kosovo Media Institute. For the 
most part, all the structures for a democratic media sector have been established, but the 
durability of the system has yet to be tested since it is still heavily financially subsidized by 
remittances, foreign aid, and non-transparent business interests. Recent Media Sustainability 
Indexes show significant progress in establishing freedom of speech and a pluralistic market, 
but the issues of professionalization, self-regulation, independence, business management, 
and supporting institutions make reaching adequate levels of sustainability a continued 
struggle. 
 
The reform of transitional societies takes time, but the reconstruction process in Kosovo was 
nonetheless much more protracted than it needed to be, and it revealed chronic policy 
shortcomings in media development. An enormous amount of aid and technical assistance 
relative to the size of the territory was invested over a short period and proved difficult to 
manage and coordinate. The result was similar to the “washing machine” syndrome in Bosnia 
where too much aid came too quickly, enabling donor-driven and donor-dependent programs 
that were often unsynchronized with reforms in other sectors and fell sway to the 
“interpreters” chosen by implementers. Donors and international administrative bodies 
frequently cooperated poorly due to a lack of trust, territorial disputes, and a lack of 
institutional memory or learning.  
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Practitioners with experience in other post-conflict situations tried to put their knowledge 
from those environments to work in Kosovo, but found their efforts frustrated by the culture 
of the international governing bureaucracy. The UN and OSCE, for instance, both had short-
term mandates and often worked at cross purposes, i.e. UNMIK – an interim governing body 
– has sought to maintain peace and security even at the cost of undermining the 
democratization and institution building efforts of the OSCE. Practitioners such as Price and 
Gillette believed reform had to start in the legal environment, to codify and enforce standards; 
if necessary, with a temporary legal “module” until long-term reform could be implemented. 
Blumi and Di Lellio, while advocating legal reform, were skeptical of “tool boxes” and 
argued that there were social structures, values, and processes extant in the society that should 
have been empowered and shaped through the process of institution building rather than 
ignored or deconstructed. The Kosovar public in general and the media sector in particular 
have had to navigate donor politics that have dominated and often immobilized the very 
reconstruction they have sought to enable.   
 
On the ground, out of exuberance to exercise newfound freedoms (or perhaps, as the more 
cynical have commented, in anticipation of donor funds), media outlets sprang up all over the 
territory. Despite significant investment in training and media monitoring, the outbreak of 
ethnically-charged violence from “vigilante journalism” revealed enduring weaknesses in 
self-regulation and professionalism. The other side of the coin – the caustic and highly 
politicized media from Belgrade that broadcast the views of Serbian nationalists into Kosovar 
Serb communities – only added fuel to the fire. This challenged the international 
administration to negotiate a way to protect freedom of speech as recognized under 
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international standards, yet maintain stability while addressing the problem of hate speech and 
incitement. In this instance, the application of international laws and national legal reform 
were important to set and enforce standards, but when democratic freedoms were applied they 
became distorted because the standards and practices that make systems work were missing in 
Kosovo.   
 
The overall media development strategy to create necessary conditions for a democratic sector 
to emerge was positive and was informed by previous interventions. However, a primary 
focus on the architecture of institutions, the legal environment, and the market was based on 
an assumption that democratic norms and professional values would evolve out of those 
structures.  Ultimately, professional standards proved hard to institutionalize, new laws took 
time to gain traction, professional organizations were superficial and generally unstable, and 
many programs were donor driven and/or donor dependent. The media market was also 
skewed as the result of oversaturation and a weak advertising market dependent on 
government and international agency advertising revenues.  
 
At this point in time, it is hard to assess what role greater economic development will 
eventually play in the professionalization and commercialization processes of the Kosovar 
media sector, since, as an OSCE official observed, the whole of Kosovo is not currently 
sustainable. On the local level, Kosovar society has demonstrated a strong, independent, and 
self-governing spirit that has allowed it to endure numerous foreign regimes. That spirit will 
hopefully help keep the country on a path toward state building and democratization. 
However, democratic practices and professional ethics will most likely emerge once 
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economic development allows for greater independence from coercive political and business 
interests, and when the engagement of the local community in political processes gives 
citizens and the media a sense of agency.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
When Power Meets the Press:  
How Tycoonization has Left Macedonian Media Choosing between Ethics and Elites 
 
Risto Popovski of Makfax news agency explained to me the core problem and paradox of the 
media situation in Macedonia: “You cannot live from the news, you must have a business.”274  
After a decade of media assistance and democratic reforms in preparation for the EU 
accession process, the media in Macedonia appear on the surface to be profitable businesses 
poised to play the role of watchdog in this emerging democracy. However, in practice they are 
frequently used as instruments of the political and corporate actors who subsidize them. 
Donors did invest in the enabling environment of the media in order to support the 
commercialization and professionalization of the sector. They funded programs to create the 
necessary legal frameworks for rule of law, regulatory organizations to structure the market, 
as well as educational and professional organizations to establish standards. Signs of progress 
and a cautious optimism heralded donors’ eventual departure. But any momentum was soon 
undermined by the weak economy, incomplete legal reform, and strong political parties. The 
success of donor policies to establish the institutions and practices of a democratic media 
sphere was dependent upon a market and a political dynamic which never emerged.  
 
The research for this chapter is drawn from my professional experiences implementing media 
development programs in Macedonia from 2000 to 2006. Through New York University, with 
a generous grant from the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, we 
funded a range of programs meant to improve reporting on diversity issues and bridge ethnic 
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divides. In November of 2006, as part of a broader study on organizational sustainability, I 
conducted interviews with 27 media professionals and carried out a short survey with 8 media 
organizations representing the dominant professional associations, regulatory and advocacy 
organizations, journalism education institutions, and news outlets (print and broadcast). The 
perspectives and concerns of those media professionals informed this research.  
 
It was during that period of 2000-2006, when donors were most active, that the IREX Media 
Sustainability Index rated the Macedonian media sector as having improved from a low 
ranking in 2001 of 1.73 (an “Unsustainable Mixed System”), to a high of 2.58 in 2005 (just 
more than the median “Near Sustainability” ranking).275  According to the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe, approximately 23.8 million euro were spent on media development in 
Macedonia from 1996-2006. As noted earlier, comprehensive data on total investment in 
media development is not available, but this number reflects levels of support and strategic 
approaches. The bulk of that support went to the Media Environment (11.2 million), funding 
associations, legal reform, and regulatory bodies, as well as media monitoring and research. 
Another 9.2 million was spent on “Direct Support” for media, which included funding for 
everything from salaries, to rent, to technical equipment. Training received a mere 3.4 million 
euro. By comparison, total expenditures in Kosovo were 58.6 million and in Bosnia 87.1 
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million euro. As in Kosovo and Bosnia, a primary objective in Macedonia was to support the 
peace agreement, in this case the Ohrid Agreement signed after the 2001 insurgency, by 
bolstering independent, ethnically balanced, non-nationalistic reporting. As in those other 
countries, donors sought to professionalize and commercialize the sector to Western models 
and standards. 
 
In 2006, as media appeared to be seeing an upward trend of professionalization and 
sustainability, donors began winding down their programs, much to the concern of local 
media professionals. In a few short years, by 2010, the MSI slid precipitously to 1.55 – below 
2001 levels. Similarly, Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Index ranked Macedonia as 
Partly Free with a total score of 46 in 2002, rising to 51 in 2005, and dropping back to 46 in 
2010. This chapter explores the policies and developments that contributed to the 
strengthening of the sector as well as the circumstances which led to its unraveling. As an 
epilogue I will detail a series of media-related scandals which broke over 2010 and 2011 as I 
was finalizing this chapter, the result of which has been a veritable government-led coup over 
opposition media and a rollback of much of the progress achieved until 2006.
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Figure 5.1 
IREX MEDIA SUSTAINABILITY INDEX: MACEDONIA, 2001-2010
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Chronology of Media Assistance in Macedonia 
In 1991, the Republic of Macedonia declared independence peacefully during the breakup of 
the former Yugoslavia. While it managed to avoid being drawn into the wars of succession 
that plagued its neighbors, it did suffer economically from the breakup and those regional 
conflicts. Macedonia is a mountainous, landlocked country of just over 2 million people in a 
territory slightly larger than the state of Vermont. It is a diverse nation and, according to the 
most recent census from 2002, 64.2% are ethnically Macedonian, 25.2% are ethnically 
Albanian, and the remainder of the population is a mix of Turkish, Serb, Roma, and others.  
As the least developed of the former Yugoslav republics, Macedonia was in a difficult 
position at independence. It no longer received transfer payments from the Yugoslav federal 
budget and it had little modern infrastructure and industry on which to build a new market 
economy. To make matters worse, its trade options were limited due to the war in Bosnia, 
international sanctions on Serbia, and a trade embargo by Greece over a dispute related to its 
name. The war in Kosovo in 1999 followed by a local ethnic Albanian insurgency in 2001 
further depressed the economic sector and polarized the society. Ethnic divisions coupled with 
the struggling economy contributed to a protracted and, at times, volatile transition. 
 
Media development in Macedonia began in 1992 as part of a democracy assistance program 
sponsored by the Soros Open Society Fund Macedonia, later renamed the Foundation Open 
Society Institute Macedonia (FOSM). The foundation’s long-term goals were to assist the 
country in establishing its new independence, and to promote social stability and economic 
development as part of a broader program of regional development and cooperation with 
Europe. In the short term, the objective was to prevent Macedonia from descending into 
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ethnic and political conflicts similar to those which were destroying the other ex-Yugoslav 
Republics. In that first year, FOSM alone spent over $300,000 on a range of programs 
addressing humanitarian assistance, education reform, and health care, as well as media.  
 
The media component focused on developing a commercial market through capacity-building 
initiatives for small, private media meant to provide a balance to state-run media. At 
independence, the media sector was dominated by the state broadcaster Makedonska Radio 
Televizija and the state-run newspaper publishing company Nova Makedonija. In an absence 
of regulatory legislation or bodies, new radio and television stations proliferated. FOSM 
provided funding for equipment and technical assistance for 6 television and 10 radio stations 
and bought paper for newspapers strapped for foreign currency. In 1994, in preparation for the 
second parliamentary and first presidential elections, the FOSM program expanded to include 
training for election reporting, media monitoring, multi-lingual programming, a news 
exchange, and a printing plant. Ironically, the next year, the Foundation and its benefactor 
George Soros came under attack from Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov and state media 
for allegedly attempting to foment discord through spurious support for legalization of the 
Albanian University in Tetovo as well as Greek claims to the name Macedonia. Counter 
intuitively, the Foundation scaled back support to the media in 1995, shifting their priorities to 
educational programs.  
 
It was not until 1999 that media development would again become a priority for international 
donors, not as part of a calculated aid strategy or even as a planned intervention but as the 
spontaneous response to a refugee crisis. USAID had been working in Macedonia since 1997, 
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predominantly in the legal and economic sectors. Due to a need for public outreach they hired 
two journalists and developed a small office for press conferences. Roberto Belicanec and 
Zaneta Trajkoska, who had been organizing those press conferences, saw an opening for an 
organization that would assist journalists. With support from USAID, the US Embassy, and a 
small startup grant from ABA-CEELI (American Bar Association - The Europe and Eurasia 
Program) they launched their own local NGO, the Press Center. Shortly after its 
establishment, refugees fleeing the bombing in Kosovo began flowing over the border. As the 
only functioning journalistic organization on the ground, the Press Center became a hub for 
covering the crisis and managing logistics for many foreign journalists. They also assisted the 
UN in establishing a radio program for the refugees. Once the crisis abated, international 
donors began approaching them to partner on a range of programs to develop the struggling 
sector. 
 
Although it had been nearly a decade since Macedonia declared independence, the media 
sector, like the political and economic sectors, was still in transition. There was a mixed legal 
system, with new democratic laws passed since 1991 alongside many that remained from the 
socialist system. Freedom of speech was guaranteed under the constitution but there was no 
freedom of information law and state institutions were notoriously inaccessible. Libel and 
defamation were criminal offenses but the courts were so inefficient that few were ever 
prosecuted. The state broadcaster and all licensing were still fully under the control of the 
government through the Broadcasting Council and hence there was no independent regulatory 
body. Printing, distribution, and kiosks were also all state run. At the time, the media market 
was underdeveloped yet the sector was oversaturated and thought to be heavily subsidized by 
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government and corporate elites. For a population of 2 million, there were approximately 30 
public and 111 private broadcasters, 11 daily newspapers, 21 weekly publications, and 20 
monthly and periodical publications.
277
  This situation was due in large part to the Law on 
Broadcasting passed in 1997, which handed licenses to all operating broadcasters expecting 
the market to regulate itself.  However, the weak economic situation, small and fragmented 
advertising market and absence of reliable market research, made it difficult for outlets to 
define their audiences and develop as viable independent businesses.  
 
One of the most troubling phenomena in Macedonia which has seriously undermined the 
evolution of an independent media sector is “Tycoonization,” described earlier in chapter two 
(66-69).  The various linkages between the powerful business and political elites and the 
ownership structures of leading media, is so complex, pervasive, and pernicious that it reads 
like a Russian novel.  In Macedonia, as in Bosnia, the power of the tycoons is due to a range 
of factors related to the legacy of these previous systems and spaces opened by the transition 
process. For instance, political turrnoil, lagging economic reform, frailty of the formal 
economy, robustness of the underground economy, poverty, and weak rule of law, along with 
faulty privatization and highly developed social and informal networks, have created 
circumstances ripe for corruption and unregulated business opportunism. In addition, the 
cultural legacies of political control over media and collusion between industry and 
government further contribute to the problem.  This dynamic is one that donor programs have 
not been able to alter. 
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In such an environment, professionalizing the media posed significant challenges. When 
donors entered Macedonia there were few opportunities for journalism education and training. 
A journalism program existed at the University in Skopje, but the school had just started 
Bologna reforms. While mid-career training was occasionally available, it was largely ad hoc 
and dependent on donor-sponsored programs. Consequently, reporting was often 
commentary-based with little fact checking, and self-censorship was common due to political 
and business influences. Specialized reporting, such as niche and investigative reporting, were 
rare. A frequent criticism of unprofessional reporting at the time was the use of anonymous 
sources. Journalists defended the practice, citing limited access to public officials and public 
information, lack of transparency of ownership, and a fear of being targeted. There were also 
few functioning professional organizations or media-related NGOs, which journalists 
interviewed for this research attributed to a lack of professional awareness and organizational 
capacity. The one operational association, The Association of Journalists of Macedonia 
(AJM), a relic from the previous system, made attempts to restructure but had little credibility.  
 
Working conditions for journalists in Macedonia were similar to those in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Many worked without contracts, leaving them without health insurance or social security 
payments. Those that did have contracts claimed they did not feel protected from unwarranted 
dismissal or undue influences over their reporting. Also, salaries were often paid late and 
journalists frequently had to take second jobs to make ends meet. It is difficult to maintain a 
sense of professional mandate and ethics under such precarious working conditions; and not 
surprisingly, overall professional standards under these conditions were poor.  
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February of 2001 brought another crisis, this time in Macedonia. The Albanian National 
Liberation Army (NLA; or ONA in Macedonian and UCK in Albanian), an insurgency from 
within the Macedonian-Albanian community fighting for greater civil rights, seized territory 
and battled government forces throughout western and northern Macedonia. In the early phase 
of the conflict, the media maintained a relatively balanced and professional stance. However, 
as the conflict wore on the media became more polarized, politicized, and inflammatory. 
Journalists became publicly involved in political action, raising alarm bells for international 
observers. On August 13, 2001 the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed, formally ending 
hostilities. The Framework required that the governing coalition include major opposition 
parties and it laid out constitutional and legislative changes to improve the civil rights of 
minority groups. 
 
In support of the Framework, a true media intervention was launched in August of 2001 by 
USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in partnership with the International 
Organization of Migration (IOM). The program was named Confidence Building Initiative 
(CBI)
278
 and its core objective was to increase citizen access to balanced information and 
diverse points of view. OTI programs are designed to be short-term, high-intensity 
interventions with expectations of rapid yet sustainable impact. According to Sally 
Broughton-Micova, head of IOM’s Media Department at the time, the CBI had $1 million to 
burn as quickly as possible. They cooperated with NGOs and media outlets to help bridge the 
linguistic and cultural divide that characterized the media. To that end they produced positive 
messages, such as in PSAs, as well as balanced and independent bilingual reporting, to offer 
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information alternatives in the volatile environment. Over a period of 18 months they 
completed over 95 projects; this is an impressive figure, but Broughton-Micova noted that 
many of the projects fell apart once donor funding ended.
279
  
 
New donors entered Macedonia and those already on the ground stepped up their programs to 
address the changing needs of the media sector. The focus was primarily on strengthening 
minority media, transitioning the state broadcaster into a public broadcaster, and 
implementing legal reform. The OSCE, for example, began working with private and public 
media with a focus on minority media and representation of minorities. FOSM continued to 
support the development of media pluralism and monitoring, and legal reform – most 
specifically of the National Strategy for Broadcast Development. They also become a leader 
in coordinating donor initiatives through the Independent Media Fund (IMF), an informal 
donor network providing small grants to private media in support of community and minority 
media. Assistance was better coordinated and targeted in Macedonia than in other countries 
and there were some successes.  
 
In 2001, The Danish School of Journalism (DSJ) proposed the establishment of a journalism 
training center that would start with three years of funding and potentially have additional 
donors. Trajkoska and Belicanec decided to dissolve the Press Center so that Trajkoska could 
form the Macedonian Institute for Media (MIM), sponsored by the DSJ. Belicanec opted to 
focus on media legislation and founded the Media Development Center (MDC) with backing 
from IREX. While he recognized the importance of training, he felt that donors favored 
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training projects since they are easy to organize and provide quantifiable results or impressive 
“body counts.” More importantly, he felt, legal reform would get to the heart of the problems 
of the media sector in Macedonia by addressing the collusion between political and business 
interests and the media, or “tycoonization.” In his words, “you cannot destroy with training 
the acts of power that subsidize you;” for instance, “at A1 Television, you do not have an 
editorial process…the editor just recites what the owner wants.” One of the first campaigns 
MDC took on was the government proposed Law on Public Information, which would have 
required all journalists to be licensed from the state. The MDC, with guidance from IREX, 
was instrumental in opposing the law and along with pressure from other donors the initiative 
was shelved. 
 
IREX began working in Macedonia in early 2001 with a small office of just several people 
tasked predominantly with work in the NGO sector. Gazmen Ajdini likened the media 
situation at the time to a game without any rules and, in his opinion, donors entered the fray 
10 years too late, after all the businesses and power players had already staked out their 
territory and had vested interests and networks of operation. IREX, according to Ajdini, 
believed the best way to balance those established interests and inspire a more democratic and 
professionalized sector was to focus on NGOs and associations, hence 95% of their activities 
were in that sector. IREX programs roughly broke down into four areas reflecting the 
evolving enabling environment approach. They supported: (1) training and education of 
journalists through funding of the Macedonia Institute for Media, (2) advocacy and 
professionalization through the Association of Journalists of Macedonia, (3) legislative reform 
through the Media Development Center, and (4) business development through the 
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Association of Print Media (APM) and the Association of Private Electronic Media in 
Macedonia (APEMM).  
 
One of the most important organizations that IREX targeted for reform was The Association 
of Journalists of Macedonia (AJM). In 2000 it was nearly defunct, with over 2,000 non-active 
“members.” It had been established over 50 years earlier under Tito’s rule and had crumbled 
after the transition. In an effort to reinvent a local organization rather than create a new, 
Western-inspired one from scratch, they sponsored a new General Assembly and coordinated 
new leadership to recruit younger members. With a focus on institution and capacity building, 
they managed to register 700 members.   
 
To broaden its outreach, AJM opened six regional centers in Tetovo, Bitola, Ohrid, 
Kumanovo, Strumica, and Štip. Each established a press center for local journalists and 
registered 60-70 members. Skopje was the hub and hosted a range of debates and roundtables 
on issues such as election coverage, legal reform, and professional practices. These 
roundtables often went on the road to the regional centers. English classes were also added to 
the road show. The main office in Skopje had a press club on the premises which had been 
given to them by the state 40 years previously. After the success of the Media Center in 
Bosnia, donors were supportive of that model as a means of generating revenue while creating 
a professional meeting point. Hence, new funding and partnerships were sought with 
MobiMak, the mobile telephone company, and with Skopsko Brewery.
280
   
                                                 
280
 Before this could be done, AJM had to see through to the end a two-year court battle with a restaurant that 
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In an effort to increase awareness of professional values and standards, AJM wrote a new 
code of ethics in cooperation with the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), which was 
rolled out in November of 2001. Journalist and media analyst German Filkov likened this 
period to a Journalism Spring. “It was kind of a journalism reunion and, at that time we felt 
once again the power of journalists being united around one single thing in which we 
believed…It was an interesting and positive atmosphere. We all signed. But now, it is hung so 
high no one can see it. The idea of a code of ethics is a problem in Macedonia. Not only in the 
journalistic profession.” 281  When asked what had happened, Filkov explained that throughout 
2002 there was a lot of activism on behalf of journalists’ rights but that after the election, 
when the political party VRMO lost to the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), 
everything fell apart; a condition some attributed to a political alliance between the 
Association and the new government.
282
  
 
A major change in the media landscape and in establishing industry standards occurred in 
2003. It came not from donors but from a development in the market place. The German 
conglomerate West Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung Media Group (WAZ) bought the three top 
Macedonian dailies, Utrinski Vesnik, Dnevnik, and Vest in order to dominate the print market. 
Reactions to the acquisitions were mixed. On the one hand there was concern over WAZ 
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having a monopoly in the print market, since the three papers together gave the company 
control over some 90% of the market. At the time, there were no anti-trust laws preventing 
such a large market share. Smaller papers complained that, even worse than the ownership 
monopoly, would be the resulting advertising monopoly.  
 
On the other hand, WAZ represented much needed foreign investment and the introduction of 
Western management practices. Working conditions did improve for journalists at those 
papers. Labor regulations were respected, and journalists received employment contracts, 
regular salaries, health benefits, and contributions into the state pension plan. One of the most 
important changes WAZ made was to separate the editorial from the business sides of their 
papers. They established Media Print Macedonia to handle all the printing, marketing, and 
distribution for the three dailies. WAZ also invested heavily in updating the papers with new 
layouts, improved technology, internet access, and a strategy to differentiate them in the 
market – each with a distinct audience and editorial line.283 All of these developments helped 
to strengthen professional practices throughout the sector.    
 
By 2004 things were improving politically, economically, and in the media sector in 
Macedonia. The tragic death of President Boris Trajkovski in a helicopter accident in Bosnia-
Herzegovina that February shocked the public but did not derail the country. Implementation 
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement was moving along and had established relative stability. 
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The country continued to enact the legal reforms required under the Framework along with 
harmonizing with the EU in preparation for the membership process. In the media sector, 
donors continued to sponsor legal reform, ad hoc training, restructuring of Macedonia Radio 
Television (MRT), and capacity building for associations. On the education front, MIM 
launched its year-long journalism Diploma program in cooperation with DSJ and IREX.   
 
Pluralism in the media sector continued to increase, which many saw as a mixed blessing. 
Despite the dominance of WAZ, two new Macedonian dailies (Vreme and Večer) and three 
Albanian dailies (Koha Ditore, Flaka, and Bota Sot)
284
 began publishing. The new dailies 
seemed to prove that WAZ did not have total hold of the print sector. Three new private 
national television stations also entered the market (TV Telma, Kanal 5, and an Albanian-
language satellite channel called TV Alsat-M) along with 21 local broadcasters. Some MSI 
panelists felt this “pluralism” was out of control and that new licenses should not have been 
issued until the law on broadcasting under negotiation at the time had been implemented. 
Furthermore, they feared additional broadcasters could lead to more corruption since all three 
had ties to business tycoons or politicians, or both. Others countered that market forces and 
full implementation of the Broadcast Law would eventually regulate the sector. It was 
expected that the new law would help reverse this trend by requiring yearly disclosure of 
income, reduction in the number of licenses, and strict programming standards and 
requirements.   
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The goal of a pluralistic sector is to achieve a marketplace of ideas, where different groups in 
a society are represented and the sector is commercialized with a mix of public and private 
media. Although more media were entering the market in Macedonia, they not only 
represented narrow interest groups but they were dependent upon them. Any regulations 
limiting media monopolies were routinely ignored. For instance, the Broadcast Law 
prohibited cross ownership among broadcast and print but that was creatively circumvented 
by Velija Ramkovski, the owner of A1 TV, who declared publicly that he had fired the editor-
in-chief of the newspaper Špic – a newspaper he supposedly did not own but apparently had 
the power to manage.
285
 In another example, The Law on Broadcasting included articles 
requiring balanced and truthful reporting that does not serve any particular group or political 
party, yet media monitoring during elections and related reports concluded that  the 
“broadcast media were primarily used as a means for achieving political goals and for the 
articulation of political, economic and other interests.”286  
 
About collusion between big business, politicians, and the media, Roberto Belicanec had this 
to say: 
It is interesting if you make an analysis, that none of the TV stations in the country were 
created by someone who is a journalist. But most of the newspapers in this country were 
created by people who were journalists. So they do not need the TV stations for 
journalism, they need them for something else, they need them for the influence, they 
need them for a bargaining coin. We have a person who is sitting in the current coalition 
whose company owns Sitel television. So we joke now that the government is a coalition 
of VRMO-DPMNE and Sitel television. His party is nothing without the television 
station…You have to face reality. You cannot say what the media should or should not 
be. That liberal story of the watchdog in democracy is not functioning. Why? It is very 
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simple; because criminals and companies have more money than civil society will ever 
have. That is the end of the story. Media go where the power is.
287
  
 
By 2007 there were four national broadcasters (A1 TV, TV Sitel, TV Telma, and Kanal 5), all 
with political and business ties. Corporate ownership of major media may be the norm 
internationally, but in this situation the owners did not necessarily respect editorial or 
journalistic independence and the stations were frequently used to further their interests. A1 
TV-Vreme group was the most powerful, with a national terrestrial TV station, a national 
satellite TV station (A2), 3 national newspapers (Špic, Vreme, Kohe e Re), 1 weekly (1E) and 
a distribution network.
288
 It was owned by the very visible Velija Ramkovski, who is now the 
subject of a contentious investigation by Macedonian authorities, who have revoked the 
station’s license. TV Telma is owned by MakPetrol, a leading importer of oil and petrol 
products. TV Sitel is part of the Večer-Sitel-Cetis group which includes the national 
newspaper Večer and a printing plant.289 The group is owned by RIK Sileks, a Macedonian 
mining and trading consortium. Ljubisav Ivanov Dzingo, leader of the Socialist Party, just 
happens to own RIK Sileks –  along with access to TV Sitel and Večer.290 Kanal 5 is jointly 
owned by Pecatnica BS, a printing company, and the corporation Metal Sivas. Pecatnica BS 
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was founded by Emil Stojmenov, the son of Boris Stojmenov, leader of the political party 
VMRO. Not coincidently, Kanal 5 runs large volumes of advertising for VMRO.
291
  
 
In the case of smaller local broadcasters, the situation is only marginally better. During the 
transition of MRT from a state broadcaster to a public broadcaster, local stations were either 
privatized or remained state sponsored until privatization could be finalized. In the cases 
where privatization was successful, many were bought by local stakeholders under less than 
fair circumstances, resulting in few independent stations functioning according to Western 
norms.  
 
MRT has never fully transitioned from a state broadcaster to a public broadcaster due to 
political obstructionism, poor management, and perpetual financial crises. In a highly 
controversial move in 2004, MRT management eliminated their marketing department and 
distributed a memo indicating that all employees, including editors and journalists, were 
allowed to sell advertising. The rationale was the need to cut the budget and seek additional 
revenue to fill a funding gap until the new fee system was functioning. Another example of 
questionable management decisions involved the introduction of a channel devoted to the 
Parliament. MRT has three stations – one in Macedonian, one in Albanian, and a third that 
was designated as something akin to C-SPAN, for broadcasting parliamentary sessions. Media 
analyst Snežana Trpevska estimated at its introduction that only about 5% of the public would 
actually watch such a channel. She believed this third channel should be used for educational 
and cultural programming if the station were to fulfill its legal obligation under the new 
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law.
292
 Eventually, MRT management came to the same conclusion that the spectrum could 
be better used; but instead of diversifying its programming it used the channel to re-broadcast 
sports events.   
 
As noted earlier, the Macedonian print market is dominated by the German conglomerate 
WAZ. By 2006, the company owned a controlling interest in the three largest daily 
newspapers, one weekly newspaper, a distribution network, and a printing plant. The head of 
WAZ in Macedonia, Srdjan Kerim, was a Minister of Foreign Affairs under the VRMO-
DPMNE and Liberal Party coalition in 1999 and in 2007 became Speaker of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. As an ethnic Albanian, he is a leading figure in that 
community with considerable political influence.
293
 To further complicate the ownership 
structure, the Macedonian company GOFI DOOEL owns minority shares in WAZ’s Utrinski 
Vesnik and Vest newspapers as well as the printing house Grafički Centar where Utrinki 
Vesnik is printed. Owner of GOFI DOOEL businessman Trifun Kostovski, landed a seat in 
Parliament as an independent, running with SDSM in 2002.
294
 In 2003, the government 
coalition of which Kosotovski was part, granted subsidies to all three newspapers under 
acquisition by WAZ. When the government was asked why subsidies were given to papers 
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purchased by a wealthy foreign company, the government responded that they had not been 
informed of the merger.
295
 
 
The rest of the country’s print sector was not faring much better in 2006 and, according to 
media analyst Snežana Trpevska, illegal media concentration was the cause of a general 
plummeting of ethical standards. A price war among ten daily newspapers (not including the 
WAZ papers) resulted in many being sold below cost, leaving publishers unable to pay 
salaries to their journalists. When asked if owners were concerned at all about a 2005 UNPD 
opinion poll that revealed 70% of people do not trust the media, and which asked whether 
people might buy more papers if they trusted media more, Secretary General of the 
Association of Print Media (APM) Martin Trajkovski said that owners do not care what 
people think, they just want to sell papers. He elaborated: “It is a strange situation. People are 
desperate here, so they do not know what is true and what is not true… If they get a 
newspaper, it is to see what is going on, but they are not buying [what they read]…they know 
that maybe some political organization is behind it…like everywhere in the world you can 
pay a journalist and they will write whatever you need.”296  He laughed at the comment, and 
meant it as a joke, but it is not a far cry from the daily reality and his cynicism was genuine. 
 
The country’s small advertising market has also meant that advertisers have had significant 
influence. Robert Popovski explained, “If you have a year-long contract with a company you 
need to be careful what you write. If you choose to present negative information about the 
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company, you risk losing a contract that pays 15 salaries.”297 The problems of a small market 
are compounded by the fragmentation of outlets in Macedonia. Because of the language 
divide between the Macedonian and Albanian communities, which live in parallel public 
spheres, the media and advertising markets are split as well. 
 
Throughout 2005 and into early 2006, progress across the sectors was incremental but 
positive. Macedonia completed the questionnaire for EU accession and waves of legal reforms 
got underway, including a few in the media sector, such as the law on Electronic 
Communications and a draft Law on the Performance of Broadcasting Activity. While many 
Macedonian laws pertaining to the media followed EU standards, implementation was a 
constant struggle. But, nationalist rhetoric was on the wane as were attacks on journalists; 
distribution channels, printing houses, and transmissions services were all private and the 
government had stopped subsidies to print outlets; and there was also a strengthening overall 
in the NGO sector. AJM had restructured again and reinvigorated the Council of Honor to 
promote self-regulation through the Code of Ethics. The Association of Print Media (APM) 
and the Association of Private Electronic Media in Macedonia (APEMM) were also active 
and at work on legal and advocacy issues. Important improvements took place in the 
regulatory environment. The new Broadcast Law was nearing implementation, which would 
provide the legal basis for a range of reforms. The Broadcast Council, for instance, would be 
reorganized to give it more political independence through a new nomination procedure, and 
fiscal independence through a new system of collecting broadcasting fees. The Council would 
also take over responsibility from Parliament for issuing new licenses according to new 
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standards. Also, according to the new law, the MRT Board would no longer be decided by 
Parliament but by civil society.
298
 Still, it took nearly three years to adopt the law, even with 
MDC leading a two-year lobbying campaign in cooperation with an army of donors that 
included the OSCE, IREX, the Council of Europe, Article 19,  The US Embassy, and 
Transparency International.  
 
Various structural changes resulted from these legal reforms, from functioning professional 
associations and greater availability of professional training to improved professional attitudes 
and standards. This progress and ensuing optimism was reflected in an increase in IREX’s 
MSI ranking for Macedonia to 2.58, well into the “nearing sustainability” category. MSI 
Panelists, however, pointed to enduring weaknesses in the sector, such as the lack of a 
Freedom of Information Act, the fact that defamation and libel remained criminal offenses, 
and lagging implementation of the vital new Broadcast Law. The market also remained 
oversaturated, a condition exacerbated by unlicensed media broadcasting on the spectrum and 
the reliance of many stations on pirated programming.  
 
Once Macedonia achieved EU candidacy, and with over a decade of assistance and 
documented successes behind them there, many donors decided it was time to plan their exit 
strategies. This policy change was in part a response to the anticipation of EU IPA funding for 
civil society development, which would become available during the pre-accession process. 
But, organizations surveyed as part of this study were openly concerned about this, expressing 
that, in general, the EU has shown more interest in supporting state institutions and has 
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donated less to civil society organizations, leaving a funding vacuum for that area.  Ajdini of 
IREX, as well as Violeta Gligorovska, Program Coordinator for Media and Publishing at 
FOSIM, felt that donors were leaving the job unfinished, and that many fragile initiatives 
would be lost in the chasm between donors’ exits and Macedonia’s receipt of EU IPA funds. 
299
 Gligorovska added that many donor strategies were short-term and project-based, and 
lacked a development approach, thus impacting the sustainability of many programs. She saw 
the NGO sector as too weak, the media market as too unregulated, and the economy as too 
poor to support these organizations without external reinforcement.
300
       
 
Press Now was one of the first major donors to leave Macedonia, ending its cooperation with 
the Journalism Department at the Faculty of Law at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in 
Skopje in 2005 before full reform was achieved, though it did continue to support a few 
smaller local media initiatives. In 2005, both IREX and Norwegian People’s Aid closed their 
media development programs, and IFA (Institute for Auslandsbeziehungen) from Germany 
followed suit in 2007. The OSCE largely supported the reform of Macedonian Radio-
Television and implementation of the new Broadcast Law, but even it phased out all media 
programs between 2006 and 2008. While the Swedish Helsinki Committee worked on rule of 
law and institutional capacity building, and specifically supported projects with a number of 
organizations included in this study – the Macedonian Institute for Media, The Broadcasting 
Council, and the Media Development Center – they too brought an end to their programs by 
2008. Only FOSM and the DSJ remained, but on a much more targeted and reduced level. 
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A major political shift took place in 2006 with parliamentary elections that had unforeseen 
consequences. In March 2006, shortly before the election, the daily newspaper Vreme 
“reported that several journalists from various media houses were working for the PR firm 
Fabrika without the consent of their newsrooms. According to the paper, the undercover spin 
doctors prepared public speeches for ruling Social Democrat ministers, as well as questions 
and answers for press conferences.”301  Interestingly, most other media ignored this scandal 
even though it was the talk of the town and a preoccupation among most journalists. The 
Journalists Association (AJM) condemned the actions of the journalists in question, but had 
no means of sanctioning them other than through shame – a penalty that has little punitive 
effect in a country where such behavior is often excused because most journalists are so 
poorly paid. To put this in context, it is worth reiterating that Vreme was owned, albeit not 
transparently, by Ramkovski (the owner of A1 TV), and the journalists in question were 
working on behalf of the Social Democrats – a rival party to Ramkovski’s newly formed Party 
For Economic Recovery.  
 
Going into the 2006 election, the Party for Economic Recovery, ostensibly representing the 
interests of farmers, was heavily critical of the Social Democrat-led government. Ramkovski 
claimed at the time that the government was attempting to intimidate him in retaliation for his 
party’s platform when auditors were sent to investigate his company finances. In the election, 
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the governing coalition led by the Social Democrats (SDSM-DUI-LDP)
302
 lost to a coalition 
led by VMRO-DPMNE,
303
 a right-wing democratic party that later proved to be obstructionist 
and hostile to the opposition. Ramkosvki’s party ultimately failed to win any seats in 
Parliament, but he allegedly cut a deal with the new Prime Minister Gruevski whereby he 
would disband his party and get behind VMRO-DPMNE in exchange for bigger subsidies for 
agriculture. Changes at A1 TV followed, and when regular news anchors were swiftly 
replaced with “presenters” the move was widely believed to have been Ramkovski’s way of 
punishing the anchors for his party’s loss and installing staff more receptive to his 
influence.
304
  
 
The new government immediately began to exert its influence over the media sector, 
exploiting its legal and organizational weaknesses. One of the first targets was MRT. Legally, 
the government was obliged to pay the operating expenses for both MRT and the 
Broadcasting Council until the new fee collection system was in place. However, the 
government refused to pay during this transitional period, leaving both organizations 
paralyzed and nearly bankrupt. With insufficient operating funds, MRT staff went unpaid for 
months, leading to a five-month long strike and the broadcaster’s effective collapse by the end 
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of 2006.
305
 All of the problems at MRT led to a drop in the quality of programming, an 
exodus of journalistic talent, plummeting ratings, and a public so dissatisfied that some simply 
refused to pay broadcast fees.  
 
Next, the government sponsored a social marketing campaign that infused the ailing market 
with much needed funds but created a competition for and dependency on this veritable 
government subsidy, opening the door yet again to political influence. The government also 
became the biggest advertiser in the country, doling out advertising fees predominantly to 
pro-government media. In violation of the new Broadcast Law, it also continued the practice 
of subsidizing public interest programming from the meager broadcast taxes. This practice 
was supposed to cease precisely because it was often abused for political patronage. At the 
same time, media professionals and organizations found they had fewer and fewer 
mechanisms to confront coercive political powers. Professional organizations were losing 
steam after donor withdrawal and a subsequent drop in financial and institutional support. A 
lack of financing and political will to implement the new Broadcast Law left the Broadcast 
Council without the capacity to overhaul licensing procedures or uphold new standards. 
Continued unfair competition, coupled with the limited advertising market, left the media 
sector buckling under its own weight. On the legal front, libel was still a criminal offense but 
finally punishable by fines rather than a jail sentence. Economically, salaries were not keeping 
pace with the cost of living, leading to increased corruption. The debilitating forces of 
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poverty, corruption, and political coercion threatened to unravel much of the progress that had 
been made over the previous years. 
 
Ecology of the Media Sector 
Training and Education 
A key factor in supporting professionalization is the quality and quantity of educational 
opportunities, which not only elevate basic standards but promote journalism as a valid 
profession organized around particular principles and values. In 2000, there were no 
University-level journalism programs on a par with Western standards, but by 2007 there 
were five. The Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje has completed the Bologna 
reforms and offers a three-year BA, a two-year MA, and a PhD in journalism. The 
Macedonian Institute for Media, in cooperation with DSJ, has elevated from a certificate 
program to a BA program and the organization is a leader in advocacy and research. BA 
programs are also offered by three private Universities: FON University, South East European 
University (SEEU), and the New York University in Skopje (NYUS). While these programs 
still face bureaucratic and financial obstacles, there has been significant progress in this area.   
 
The Macedonian Institute for Media (MIM)  
After the 2001 conflict, MIM undertook a number of “media intervention” programs, to 
improve coverage of the crisis and bridge the divide between the ethnic Albanian and 
Macedonian communities. It was clear there was need for a longer-term journalism education 
option that balanced theory and practice and filled the gap until the University completed the 
Bologna reforms. In cooperation with DSJ, MIM created a one-year journalism school and the 
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Progamme for Education of Roma Journalists. MIM believed they had a long-term mandate 
for training even if they lacked a long-term funding strategy. IREX supported MIM, but had 
only a short-term strategy. They sent international trainers largely to facilitate a “training the 
trainers” program, which IREX believed would carry on the professionalization mission once 
donors had closed their coffers. The downside of this arrangement was that the costs of 
establishing and administering the organization, along with running the programs, were so 
high that MIM became entirely donor dependent.
306
 Despite their success and well-
established, good reputation, MIM struggled for years to find alternate revenue streams, 
through services or other commercial projects, in order to continue their core educational 
programs.  
 
Luckily, DSJ proved to be a faithful partner and provided stable funding, professional 
exchanges, and guidance for over a decade. In 2008, based on the success of its one-year 
journalism program, MIM partnered with the DSJ and the Windensheim University in 
Holland to found the School for Journalism and Public Relations. The program  is accredited 
by the Macedonian Ministry of Education and Science and offers a bachelor’s degree in 
journalism or public relations. The program not only requires internships, it offers 
international exchanges with partner Universities. Organizationally, MIM is extremely well 
connected within the media community and cooperates with media organizations worldwide. 
Above and beyond their educational programs, they conduct research, publish books and 
                                                 
306
 Its initial overhead was high due in part to capital investments in the premises and facility. With a limited 
budget, they could only take 24 journalists a year at an estimated cost of 9,000 euro per head, which far 
surpassed the average cost of a university education of 1,500 euro and is well beyond the financial capacity of 
most interested students. 
242 
 
 
reports on media-related issues, and advocate for initiatives such as the Journalists Code of 
Ethics and against violations of journalists’ rights.  
 
Department of Journalism, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University 
The country’s leading Department of Journalism is at the Faculty of Law at Ss. Cyril and 
Methodius University in Skopje. In 2007 they began the multi-year undertaking of adopting 
the Bologna process to bring their curriculum in line with European standards. The 
department struggled to find the resources it needed to both further develop the journalism 
program and increase its independence from the faculty of Law and Political Science. There 
were many challenges; sufficient funds were not allocated for the purchase of necessary 
course materials, or for their translation into Macedonian, and professors had to be trained to 
teach new curricula. Professor Zoran Kostov and Program Coordinator Biljana Griovska from 
the Department of Journalism expressed significant frustration with negotiating reform amid 
the University bureaucracy and with subsequent challenges to meeting donor expectations. 
For instance, Press Now and OSCE donated funding to provide four years of summer school 
for journalism students at the University, but Press Now ultimately pulled its support, 
claiming the University was not making progress fast enough and demanding they hire 
additional staff – a bureaucratic hurdle because, as a state institution, hiring entails the long 
process of authorization from the Ministry of Education. The journalism faculty felt these 
demands were unreasonable and that they were doing the best they could within the system 
they inhabit. 
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By 2008, the University offered a BA, an MA, and a PhD in Journalism. While the Bologna 
reforms were officially completed, challenges to proper implementation remained. The 
journalism program was not well organized, there were too many students, and many 
specialized journalism and communications courses were still taught by professors from 
different disciplines, such as those pulled from the faculty of Political Science and Law.
307
   
 
Professional Organizations and Advocacy 
Professional and advocacy organizations form another pillar of the professionalization 
process. Despite substantial investment in these associations in Macedonia, they remain weak. 
The result has been pervasive self-censorship rather than self-regulation. In 2006 there was 
only one trade union in Macedonia – The Union of the Graphical, Information, Film and 
Publishing Industries and the Production of Paper. The Union did have journalists as 
members, but it was not exclusively meant for journalists and had only one full-time staff 
member. Reliable membership data does not really exist but it is estimated that there were 
300-500 workers from the media sector in the union. Ironically, in order to join, a worker 
must have had a valid contract with an employer; this disqualifies most journalists since non-
contractual work is one of the biggest issues they face and is in fact one of the primary 
reasons they need to join a union!  
 
This study included a total of eight media-related professional and advocacy organizations, 
which constituted all of those in Macedonia at the time that had any recognition. The five 
strongest are discussed in more detail below. The other three were smaller and less visible, 
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and were only as active as project funding or personal motivation allowed. Overall, these 
organizations were unsustainable without continued donor assistance. Those that were 
surviving with limited to no donor funds, and were fee-based, were finding that their mandate 
was succumbing to either political or personal interests. Those that were still 
programmatically active, and subsisting with minimal donor support, were designing new 
business models.   
 
The Association of Printed Media in Macedonia (APM)  
APM was established in 2000 as the Association of Printed Media and News Agencies of 
Macedonia. The news agencies soon split off to create their own organization, while APM 
was organized by publishing house representatives and media owners to advocate on issues of 
common interest, and to improve freedom of speech and general economic conditions within 
the media sector. In 2002, APM was reorganized with support from Norwegian People’s Aid 
and later IREX. Norwegian People’s Aid supported the regulation of the newspaper industry 
through market research and a bureau of circulation. The Broadcast Council similarly tried to 
form a Joint Industry Committee with APM and APEMM, the broadcast association, to 
support market research and self-regulation. Both these initiatives failed, though, due to a lack 
of consensus. When asked why cooperation was so difficult, the Secretary General of APM 
responded that “everybody wants something different and it was difficult to cooperate on that 
level… Maybe everybody wants their share and there are some secrets about their personal 
information and their income. You know, people are not that open.”308 
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In 2007, the Association had eighteen members, but only seven were active and they met only 
about every three months. They operated without a business or strategic plan, or a code of 
ethics. It was a very practical organization driven by profit motives. For instance, they 
cooperated on three economic issues: state subsidies, newspaper pricing, and advertising 
revenues. They successfully lobbied to end state subsidies, which they felt were unfairly being 
granted to state-sponsored publishing houses, and pushed to jointly raise the cost of their 
papers, which generally operated below cost. The result was a drastic drop in distribution, 
forcing them to revert back to the policy of each setting their own price. The one “agreement” 
holding the organization together for a time was geared toward the collection of advertising 
revenues from delinquent agencies. If an agency remitted late, then all members would pull 
advertising from that agency until payment was made. APM courted APEMM to join the 
agreement, but there was no interest. By 2009 the organization had collapsed.  
 
The Association of Private Electronic Media in Macedonia (APEMM)  
APEMM was first established in 1994 as the Association of Commercial Broadcasting 
Companies, and it was the most independent of four electronic media associations despite 
being largely dominated by one industry owner. In 2002, with support from IREX, it 
reorganized and registered itself as the Association of Private Electronic Media in Macedonia, 
uniting key stakeholders in the industry to promote self-regulation, advocacy for competition 
within the media market, and lobbying of authorities. Its primary projects have been the 
implementation of the Broadcasting Law, regulation of intellectual property rights, and 
adoption of a national broadcasting strategy. They received core support from IREX until 
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2005, when it left Macedonia and took its operating funds with it. The Association then 
depended on membership fees, but not all of its 110 members could pay the dues.   
 
In December of 2006, the APEMM Board of Directors met to discuss plans to reorganize yet 
again. The larger broadcasters complained that smaller local broadcasters were using too 
many resources and bringing too little to the table. The Association’s new incarnation would 
only have about 60 members and would exclude those who were not paying dues or were not 
seen as quality news organizations. Three media professionals interviewed for this study at 
that time commented individually that the APEMM appeared to be losing independence and 
had begun succumbing to political affiliations since donor funds had dried up. By 2009, the 
organization had collapsed due to an inability to reconcile the competing interests of its 
members.  
 
 
The Association of Journalists of Macedonia (AJM) 
The Association of Journalists of Macedonia has reinvented itself numerous times since 2000. 
In December 2006, a meeting of the general assembly was held in order to elect a new board, 
general secretary, and president. Robert Popovski, the Executive Director, said he hoped the 
Association would continue operating but that “without foreign support we cannot exist. We 
do not want to be helped by the government in any way. We do not want to be helped by our 
local business firms, because they have their particular interests. The only way to deal with 
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the problems is to have international support, or from the NGO community, but not from our 
government because they would put their hands on us.”309 
 
With donor funds drying up and the income from membership fees insufficient to cover 
operating costs, the organization was staffed by all volunteers, who had limited time and 
resources to devote to the association. Popovski, for instance, was also the executive director 
of Kanal 5, where he hosted a talk show. This arrangement seriously constrained the capacity 
of Association administrators to do advocacy work, since they often feared for their paying 
jobs when that advocacy work created a conflict of interest with their news organizations. 
Despite these limitations, they assisted some 50-60 journalists a year with legal or 
employment issues, organized protests, and regularly heard complaints relating to violations 
of the Code of Ethics via their Council of Honor.  
 
In 2009, the Association established a steering committee to restructure the organization yet 
again, in order to strengthen its capacity. During an interview with IREX for the Media 
Sustainability Index 2009, Robert Popovski, then-president of AJM, rated his organization at 
1 on a scale of 1-4 (1 being the worst and 4 being the best) due to its inability to galvanize 
support for the profession and to protect journalists. Despite greater efforts to respond to 
ethics violations, he lamented the Association’s overall lack of effectiveness.  
 
The Media Development Center (MDC)  
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The MDC has been one of Macedonia’s most active advocacy organizations, focusing 
primarily on battling political influence over the media sector. They led the National Strategy 
for Broadcast Development and assisted in drafting the new Broadcast Law. Executive 
Director Roberto Belicanec explained: “The previous (1997) Broadcasting Law allowed for 
excessive political influence in the media – especially in terms of licensing procedure – 
allowed for non-market mechanisms of income generation, impeded fair competition and 
merging processes, and rendered media vulnerable to political control. MDC drafted one 
version of the Law, lobbied for the draft to enter procedure for government review, and 
monitored future drafting activities.”310 It was also heavily involved in the conversion of 
MRT from a state-owned to public broadcaster, and assisted the new management in the 
establishment of procedures and the creation of a Plan of Transformation. This was another 
effort to weaken any bonds of political control remaining from the state-owned structures and 
networks. Although the passing of the Freedom of Information Law was repeatedly 
postponed, the MDC advocated heavily for its implementation. In 2006, the MDC was 100% 
donor supported but was looking into ways to diversify their funding sources. To that end, 
they commissioned a series of studies on the program needs of the national audience, and an 
analysis of the economic issues and technological needs in the media sector. However, like so 
many others, the MDC remained unsure as to how they would continue to do this important 
work under current conditions.  
 
The NGO Infocenter  
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The Infocenter began as a project of the Media Development Center; but in 2004, with the 
support of FOSM and the Swiss Development Agency, it formalized its programs and 
registered as a local NGO. Originally, the mission of the NGO Information Center was to 
facilitate civil movement by engaging the media and the public to hold the government 
accountable. In an effort to establish communications and information sharing between the 
media, NGOs, and government bodies they organized over 300 press conferences in 2006 
alone, with just a minimal staff of five. These press conferences, they believed, were 
particularly successful at opening up the channels of communication between the media and 
NGOs, resulting in NGO participation on news shows and increased press coverage of their 
activities. The Infocenter also worked with local governments on public information 
campaigns, and had a media monitoring project called Media Mirror that analyzed how the 
media reported on various issues – specifically, political biases. They felt this monitoring had 
an impact on self-regulation. Even if most in the media would not admit to it, they read the 
reports to see how their coverage was assessed, and would complain if they did not like how 
their reporting was portrayed.  
 
From an institutional standpoint, this work was much harder than expected. First, the media 
were hard to cooperate with since most editors aligned themselves with the interests of the 
owners and were either not interested or too skeptical about the need for collaboration with 
NGOs. Then further, it was hard to mobilize the public; they had a negative view of NGOs 
and saw their work and the civic movement as a form of money laundering. As the Infocenter 
faced the specter of sustainability, it considered offering public relations services to the 
40,000-strong Macedonian small business market, but they did not want to lose their civic 
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mandate. In particular, they were hoping to find a means of continuing their Media Mirror 
monitoring project. By 2011, the Infocenter had become a full-fledged public relations 
agency; although, they did manage to continue media monitoring in cooperation with MIM, 
with funding from FOSM.    
 
Regulation 
The Broadcasting Council is the only regulatory body in Macedonia, but it has struggled for 
years for both its financial survival and its legitimacy. There is no press council in Macedonia, 
and despite donor interest in 2006 in supporting one, local opinions on establishing one were 
mixed. Snežana Trpevska believed such an organization was long overdue, but that it could 
only function with international leadership because existing associations did not have the 
strength from within to do the job.
311
 In the absence of a press council, the AJM’s Council of 
Honor performed some of the same functions. It acted as a complaint commission, attempting 
to enforce the Code of Ethics through promotion of self-regulation and the public 
announcement of its decisions. The Council of Honor, though a body within a journalists’ 
organization, was made up of both journalists and editors, and sometimes faced conflicts of 
interest when the editors felt pressure to represent owner interests. The media sector will not 
be able to properly commercialize and professionalize until these issues are resolved.   
 
The Broadcasting Council  
The Broadcasting Council was established in 1997 as the primary regulatory body in 
Macedonia. It did not have, at that time, the authority or independence necessary to be 
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effective. Not only were the members all elected by Parliament, but the government, not the 
Council, made all final decisions regarding the issuance of licenses. The Council was reduced 
to simply offering opinions to the government, on these issuances and on penalties for 
breaches to the Code. About this dynamic, Belicanec quipped during his interview that “of the 
nine people on the Broadcasting Council, seven of them were qualified since they knew what 
a TV set is.” 
 
In 2005, a new Broadcasting Law was passed and it included provisions for the election of a 
new Council, to be chosen through authorized nominators from The Academy of Sciences, 
The Association of Journalists, the University of Skopje, and the Parliamentary Committee on 
Elections. In theory, this new Council would have greater political independence from the 
government due to revised nominations procedures, and greater financial independence as a 
result of funding received from new broadcasting fees. In practice, however, the government 
was able to circumvent those revised procedures and influence the nominating process. And 
ironically, the Council was still left without mechanisms to enforce the new law or sanction 
breaches, and reported during preparations for the 2006 election that their recommendations 
were not taken into consideration by the government while negotiating the Election Code.
312
 
Furthermore, in 2006, the Council faced the same financial crisis as Macedonian Radio-
Television. The government, which was required by law to allocate six months worth of 
funding until the new fee collection system could be implemented, had failed to do so. The 
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Council only received 27.2% of the funding they expected.
313
  The Council alerted the entire 
donor community to this problem, specifically appealing to the OSCE and various Embassies 
for assistance. Donors who were already supporting the Council watched their efforts being 
undermined by political and financial crises.  
 
Commercialization, Professionalization, and Economic Development 
Although Macedonia was struggling economically, donors did acknowledge the significance 
of economic development from the outset and it was an area of substantial interest and 
investment. USAID began working in Macedonia in 1993 with the goal to assist in job 
creation and encourage foreign and domestic investors by improving the overall business 
environment and investment policy. The government took economic reform seriously and  
lowered its overall debt, adhered to a fixed exchange rate, and passed important laws for 
private ownership, trade liberalization, and financial sector reform. Growth averaged around 
4% from 2000 to 2006. Yet, in 2006, GDP per capita was just $7,800, unemployment was at 
37.3% (actual employment is estimated to be around 25% if the gray economy is factored in), 
and 29.6% live below the poverty line.
314
 While progress was made, it was insufficient to 
support the emergence of an independent, commercialized, and professionalized media sector, 
or the institutional enabling environment which donor programs had hoped to shape. 
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On the surface, the media market in Macedonia appeared open, competitive, pluralistic, and 
seemingly commercialized. There were no barriers to entry and there was an abundance of 
accessible news sources. Outlets may have looked stable and profitable but in practice there 
was little transparency of ownership or financing. And as discussed above, the sector was 
encumbered by oversaturation, and was suffering from hyper-competition and was hence 
dependent upon subsidies and beholden to business and political interests. The market was 
fractured and advertising revenues were so limited that the sector could support the profusion 
of outlets. Additionally, the absence of reliable audience data and rating information 
prevented companies from defining their audience and cultivating market logic, and the 
business model exported by donors failed to take hold. Without a viable advertising market, 
outlets could not become financially independent enough to afford the necessary structural 
changes that must take place in the newsroom to guarantee editorial independence or to 
provide the security and status for journalists to adequately professionalize.   
 
Despite efforts to consolidate the sector, journalism as a profession has not been able to 
differentiate and assume a social mandate. Revisiting Alexander’s three benchmarks for 
differentiation (Chapter 2, page 13) – universalism in national civil cultures, demands for 
universalistic information, and the growth of professional norms and self-regulation – 
Macedonia is lacking in all three. For instance, the society is divided ethnically and 
linguistically between the Macedonian and Albanian communities, which speak different 
languages and watch news sources that reflect different realities. Additionally, the society is 
politically divided, with two dominant parties largely representing the Macedonian 
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community, and two smaller Albanian parties. The media sector reflects and perpetuates these 
conflicting identities and interests.  
 
Local and international efforts to promote self-regulation and professional standards have 
been undermined by political influence and weak economic forces. AJM has repeatedly 
reorganized to strengthen its advocacy capacities, its Council of Honor, and the Code of 
Ethics, but it has been an uphill battle. In 2006, donors expressed interest in funding a press 
council, but the idea had no traction. Belicanec felt Macedonia was not ready for self-
regulation. In his opinion, journalists are not yet strong enough as a profession to self-
organize effectively, face industry issues, and confront strong political and business 
influences.  
 
Poor labor practices and economic instability have impeded the emergence of a professional 
identity and the values required for self-regulation. According to Zana Trajkoska of MIM, 
journalists were apathetic, and were tired of working without protections and of the endless 
transitioning – feeling their work has little impact and received no positive feedback. This 
attitude was reflected in the survey results for this study. Overall, respondents were only 
moderately confident in their social and professional accomplishments. Only 37.5% rated 
themselves successful in raising public awareness of critical social, economic, or political 
issues, or in influencing national or local government laws or policies. Just one quarter 
reported being very successful at improving standards and ethics of journalism in either their 
organization or the country. Furthermore, no respondents ranked themselves as very 
successful at promoting the independence of media in Macedonia. 
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Donors involved in media development targeted the enabling environment, the institutions, 
and Macedonian legal structures in anticipation that they would generate democratic values 
through these channels. In development circles, this is the embodiment of the chicken and egg 
quandary. One of the key lessons learned from this research is that if you build institutions 
and write ideal laws, democratic processes do not necessarily follow. Most of the institutions 
supported through these programs were either too weak or hollow to survive. One example is 
Macedonia’s protections for freedom of speech, which is guaranteed by laws that are in line 
with European standards. However, poor implementation due to lack of political will has led 
to a failure to regulate ownership and broadcast licenses, and a lack of civic interest has 
resulted in a failure to demand accountability or enforce standards. It is this issue of 
institutional and market weakness which prevents Macedonia from emulating Hallin and 
Mancini’s North/Central European Model, in which an advocacy press and professionalism 
coexisted. In their model, a strong market along with effective unions and associations 
promotes self-regulation. In addition, the government respects the media as a social institution 
and protects its regulatory procedures. In Macedonia, institutions lack not only economic 
resources but the vital social capital and self-expression values to make them function. 
 
Economic development as discussed in Chapters One and Two contributes to the rise of self-
expression values and social capital. According to Inglehart and Welzel’s study, economic 
development produces greater access to education, resources, networks, and occupational 
structures. This access drives a demand for civic freedoms and a sense of agency. 
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Emancipative values emerge from this process and “translate structure into action.”315 In 
effect, this creates the space and a role for media in the democratic process as well as the civic 
agency to demand accountability, which completes the feedback loop that makes the system 
work.  
 
A related concept is that of social capital: the norms, social relationships, and trust which 
empower institutions and shape the “quality and quantity of societies’ social interactions.”316 
As highlighted in a report by the Center for Economic Analyses on Social Capital in 
Macedonia, a lack of social capital has been one factor in slow GDP growth in post-socialist 
countries and plays a role in poverty, which often results from groups being at a distance from 
the formal economy and other social resources. Chronic problems such as inefficient 
government administration, unstable policies, and corruption are symptoms of poor social 
capital – all of which impact levels of trust, agency, and in turn, economic growth. It is a 
vicious circle. Without sufficient economic development, the market will not commercialize 
properly and emancipative values and social capital cannot emerge to support the processes of 
differentiation and professionalization, which empower institutions.   
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Policy Distortions 
The gap between economic development and institutional reform within the context of foreign 
assistance goals in Macedonia has contributed to a few policy distortions similar to those seen 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. Donors heavily sponsored the establishment of non-governmental 
organizations as a means of developing civil society and social capital. Many of these 
organizations, such as the Media Development Center, have contributed to reform initiatives, 
civic awareness, and activism. They have also provided much needed jobs, training, and 
opportunities for talented and conscientious individuals in a difficult labor market. However, 
there are a few caveats regarding the sustainability of these organizations as well as their civic 
mandate. In 2006, for instance, there were approximately 6,000 registered NGOs in 
Macedonia, of which only an estimated 5-10% were active. In some cases, these NGOs had 
completed their missions and were no longer operational, in other cases they were project 
driven and would reconstitute themselves if and when they got additional funding, while 
others simply failed due to a lack of funding or an unviable mission. 
 
The boom and bust of the NGO wave has had a negative impact on the reputations of these 
organizations and hence their credibility. People working in the NGO sector frequently 
complained during interviews that NGOs had a poor reputation with the public and were often 
referred to as “spies” or as organizations used for “money laundering.” This unfortunate 
perception is the result of lapses in accountability during the period of humanitarian crisis in 
1999-2000, when large amounts of aid entered the country and much of it disappeared into 
thin air or was spent in questionable ways. In a highly publicized media-related scandal in 
1995, A1 TV received 1.5 million USD from the Media Development Loan fund, ostensibly 
258 
 
 
to upgrade their equipment; but the money was diverted to purchase chicken meat for another 
business interest. MDLF discovered this transgression and sued A1 TV in an 8-year court 
battle that involved the US Government. The dispute was finally resolved in March of 2006 
when A1 TV agreed to return 1.8 million USD. Not surprisingly, A1 TV never reported on 
this scandal.  
 
In an effort to become more sustainable, some organizations have diversified their funding 
only to find that administrative requirements, often in the name of transparency and oversight, 
undermine their capacities. Survey respondents indicated they had indeed increased 
diversification of their organizations’ funding, with 4 organizations responding that they had 
more donors in 2005 than in 2000, and a few reporting that they had begun to generate 
income from products and services. These are generally healthy trends, but the reality of 
diversified funding is that it can create greater administrative demands. According to 
Belicanec, “In previous years it would cost 100,000 euro for operations and we were able to 
cover costs with 2 grants, and now we have to make five contracts of different kinds…with 
five other organizations, which means five reports and more administration for the same 
money, and it is consuming more time in the office than running the programs.”317 Elena 
Simonoska of the NGO Infocenter noted that her organization does not aspire to be donor 
driven, but because fundraising is a full-time job for which donors generally do not pay, the 
Infocenter does not have the staff to support both core activities as well as fundraising 
efforts.
318
 And, fundraising is a highly skilled job that requires a complex understanding of 
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how to prepare proposals and budgets, and of all the various rules and regulations required by 
various funders. Organizational survival can thus become a matter of getting the next grant 
rather than a question of quality programmatic activities.    
 
Foreign-sponsored NGOs have been a significant employer of young people in Macedonia, 
but the turnover rate is high, which further weakens the sector. Martin Trajkovski, the 
Secretary General of the Association of Print Journalists, is not journalist and does not have a 
background in media. He worked previously as a graphic designer for an NGO; when asked 
about his work at the NGO and how he came to the Association, he explained that the non-
profit world is like a “transit sector” for young people, in which they are able to get jobs and 
some training before moving on to better paying positions.  
 
In her study entitled, “Challenges of Media Intervention in Post conflict Macedonia,” Sally 
Broughton-Miceva concluded that some donor strategies in the country actually distorted the 
development of the media market they were trying to foster. For greater long-term impact, she 
felt the project she worked on, CBI, should have taken market forces more into account and 
had more flexibility in working with the state broadcaster MRT.  In her words, “the system 
damaged their competitiveness in the long run and hampered their commercial 
development.”319 The “system” of donor programming she referred to did this in two ways: 
First, grants were given to cover production costs for programming deemed constructive in 
mitigating ethnic conflict rather than to sponsor programs meant to build long-term capacity, 
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such as capital investments in equipment, training, business development guidance, and 
marketing strategies. Donors also requested that broadcasters air these programs and public 
service announcements free of charge, since production costs were covered. Broughton-
Miceva believed broadcasters took this easy production money to cope with short-term costs 
even if it meant they were undermining their long-term marketing opportunities. A better 
approach, she argued, would have been to pay for airtime with commercial broadcasters, or 
opt to cooperate with MRT, to reinforce their public service mandates, and have national 
coverage and bilingual programming. American donors in particular, however, prefer to work 
with independent commercial broadcasters rather than with state broadcasters such as MRT, 
which at the time was still heavily controlled by the government.    
 
Over and above a dependency on funding, a dependency on the political leverage brought to 
the table by donors emerged. Several media professionals interviewed for this research 
expressed the opinion and concern that only international assistance brings the money and 
power that can alter the status quo in Macedonia. They voiced a need for foreign leadership to 
strengthen regulatory and self-regulatory bodies and to put pressure on the government to 
respect its own laws. For instance, when passage of the new Broadcast Law was stalled, the 
Broadcast Council and relevant NGOs appealed to donors to put pressure on the government; 
they could not galvanize enough pressure organizationally or from within the Macedonian 
public. This reality was further reflected in survey results, in which organizations rated 
themselves fairly poorly on their ability to impact conditions in the media sector.  
 
Conclusion 
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In Macedonia, donor strategies to promote professionalization and commercialization were 
modeled after policies implemented in Bosnia and Kosovo, targeting the enabling 
environment. As in those places, results in Macedonia have been mixed. On the face of it, 
donors programs seemed to have made significant strides in legal reform, economic 
development, and institution building, but progress was superficial and heavily dependent 
upon the continued funding and political leverage of donors. Once those donors exited, many 
of the structures and procedures they left behind began to crumble.   
 
An economic environment that is weak overall, coupled with a strong centralized government, 
has impeded effective commercialization of the market in Macedonia, leaving it open to 
corruption through Tycoonization. The media market specifically, as was seen in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, is pluralistic but not diverse. It is small, fragmented, oversaturated, and largely 
dependent upon subsidies from political and businesses alliances. Hence, it does not operate 
by free market logic and cannot self-regulate. Without financial independence, media outlets 
have not been able to initiate the management and structural changes necessary to functionally 
separate the editorial and business sides of their operations, or to protect the editorial line 
from owner influence. This dynamic has prevented much of the journalistic and management 
training sponsored by donors from taking hold. Consequently, media outlets are not viewed as 
legitimate businesses but as tools of the political and business elite. In this atmosphere, 
citizens do not trust the media as a reliable source of unbiased information, and media are thus 
robbed of their democratic role as a catalyst for civic agency.
320
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Professionalization has fallen prey to these same forces. Journalism has not differentiated as a 
profession toward an identity and mandate based on ethical standards. This is not surprising in 
Macedonia, since journalists daily face economic instability, poor working conditions, 
inadequate legal protections, and existential physical threats, along with having little social 
mandate from industry or civil society. Professional associations had initial success – with 
donor support – in attracting members and self-organizing, but they also quickly fell victim to 
political divisions, the special interests of members, and economic pressures. On the positive 
side, educational opportunities for journalists have significantly improved and will hopefully 
contribute in the long run to raised standards and the formation of a professional identity.  
 
Donors have underestimated the necessity of synchronizing reform initiatives in Macedonia. 
Many media sector policies relied upon and assumed complementary and supporting legal and 
economic reforms. Despite considerable legal reforms to create laws on par with European 
standards, weak implementation has left institutional reforms fragile at best and illegitimate at 
worst. As was seen in the North American and North/Central European models, the processes 
of commercialization and professionalization were mutually reinforcing and reflected specific 
market forces. An outgrowth of these processes was the emancipative values and social 
capital which gave agency to those systems. This critical dynamic was not accounted for in 
donor strategies and failed to emerge organically in Macedonia, leaving many of the best 
intervention efforts to fall flat. In some instances, these gaps led to policy distortions that 
impacted the legitimacy and sustainability of the sector. For example, in post-conflict 
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interventions such as with OTI/IOM, donors were disappointed when short-term 
commitments with long-term expectations simply contributed to the distortion of already 
fragile markets and created donor dependency. 
 
Ultimately, every country must find its own way, and donors cannot be expected to solve all 
local political and economic woes. However, when donors do provide assistance, their 
policies must be informed by a deeper understanding of the interdependence of reform 
initiatives, so that they can set realistic expectations for their policies and for local partners 
and avoid adding to disillusionment in the democratic process. The models and practices 
donors have attempted to inspire in Macedonia and elsewhere must be animated by a “spirit of 
democracy” that grew not only out of institutions and laws but out of specific socio-economic 
and political dynamics. There are many talented, hard-working journalists in Macedonia who 
have demonstrated that spirit; yet they are struggling in an often hostile environment to 
exercise their professional mandate. Sadly, many are losing faith in the process as media 
sector laws, institutions, and news outlets are co-opted by narrow, elite interests.    
 
Epilogue 
Between 2007 and 2011, “tycoons” and politicians in Macedonia tightened their hold over the 
media sector. A dramatic political battle waged through the media came to a head in August 
of 2011 with a virtual coup by a triumvirate of the governing political party, its allied media, 
and business tycoons over a rival. By 2008, the Gruevski government was exerting even more 
influence over the media through a dependency on its advertising and a disregard for the law, 
leading to an erosion of press freedoms. Its reach extended to the police, resulting in an 
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increase in police violence against journalists, including very public arrests on camera meant 
to threaten journalists seen as too vocal, as well as to warn the judiciary. Many journalists 
responded by boycotting press conferences. Then, a major shift in power occurred in late 
2008 when Ramkovski broke his alliance with Gruevski and the VRMO-DPMNE party after 
the collapse of the Swedmilk dairy, a special interest of Ramkovski. A1 TV’s reporting 
followed suit and blamed the government for troubles in agriculture.  
 
Macedonia’s MSI ranking regressed in 2009 to an “unsustainable, mixed system.” The new 
Broadcast Law had failed, MRT still lacked a system of fees collection and was funded 
directly by the government, and 17 new satellite concessions were granted, further 
fragmenting the already oversaturated market. Although the Access to Information Law had 
passed in Parliament, in practice it was seen as widely interpretable. Previously “inefficient” 
and sleepy courts were suddenly occupied with a load of libel and defamation lawsuits for 
which unusually exorbitant fines were levied. According to MSI panelists, the increase in 
lawsuits was less about irresponsible reporting and more about elites trying to silence 
journalists or news organizations.
321
 MSI also reported increased pressure on editors by 
owners and noted that AJM’s Council of Honor had issued 30 violations to the code of ethics. 
Journalists fought back, staging protests against low wages and the influence of political and 
business interests. Unfortunately, institutional support for the media was crumbling. APEMM 
finally collapsed, unable to resolve the competing interests of its members, and the NGO 
sector continued to shrink due to financial constraints. Increased government influence, police 
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aggression, irrational court rulings, and a weakening of professional organizations created a 
dangerous and unstable situation for journalists.  
 
In November of 2010, the Independent Union of Journalists and Media Professionals (IUJMP) 
was founded to address issues specific to the industry. Tamara Causidis, the head of the 
Union, set her sights first and foremost on tackling collective agreements with media owners 
who routinely violate labor laws. In another positive trend, access to the Internet was on the 
rise in Macedonia, with 45% of households connected.
322
 The downside of this statistic is that 
Internet use as a news resource became second to television, significantly cutting into the 
fragile Macedonian print market.  
 
At the end of 2010, fed up with regular criticism from A1 TV, Gruevski publicly charged the 
station with bias and attempting to undermine national interests; he urged his supporters not to 
trust their reporting. In August of 2010, A1 had hired two journalists who claimed they had 
been fired from Kanal 5 for political reasons. A1 took the moral high ground, stating that they 
would offer a more “democratic” work environment. Kanal 5, which is coincidently owned 
indirectly by an M.P. in Gruevski’s government, responded by charging Ramkovski with tax 
evasion. Ramkovski countered that Gruevski was the real criminal and accused him of paying 
A1 over 4 million euro from the state budget between 2006 and 2008 for political advertising 
in support of VMRO DPMNE. A war had begun. 
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In a live broadcast on November 25, A1 TV announced they were under siege by the police, 
who were attempting to shut them down for criticizing the government. Financial inspectors 
said they had been sent not to interfere with the television station but to search for records 
pertaining to 6 other companies owned by Ramkovski which were registered at the same 
corporate address. A1 TV journalists made an open call for citizens to come to their defense 
and asked for an explanation from government officials. Several hundred people assembled 
outside the station, including opposition politicians and human rights activists. Rival stations 
Sitel, Kanal 5, and MRT went live in response, hosting interviews with government 
representatives, all of whom denied the charges and claimed the drama was a ploy to detract 
from the investigation into Ramkovski. Later that night, A1 TV’s editor-in-chief, along with a 
few journalists, reported that they were beaten and harassed by the police. By the next day, all 
was quiet and A1 TV returned to regular broadcasting. Several hundred people, including 
opposition politicians, concerned citizens, staff from Ramkovski-owned newspapers, and 
employees of A1 protested the investigation. 
 
From November 2010 through August 2011, the media sector in Macedonia unraveled. On 
December 2, 2010, Ramkovski was arrested for tax evasion, money laundering, and financial 
irregularities – charges he claims were politically motivated. With his business assets frozen, 
Ramkovski’s three papers (Špic, Vreme, and Kohe e Re ) were threatened with imminent 
closure. On January 29, 2011, opposition parties walked out of Parliament to boycott the 
legislature in protest over the government’s actions toward Ramkovski. In response, the 
government called elections in June, which the ruling coalition ultimately won but with a 
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significantly reduced majority. This narrow win, though, seems to have further emboldened 
Gruevski to continue his marginalization of the opposition and the media.  
 
 By July 3rd, Špic, Vreme, and Kohe e Re were shut down for allegedly owing 1 million euro 
in back taxes; and A1 was forced to reduce its programming and lay off many of its 
journalists pending an investigation of allegations that it owed 9 million euro in back taxes. 
Over 300 journalists reportedly lost their jobs due to the demise of Ramkovski’s media 
holdings. That weekend, on July 2nd, all seven members of the Council of Honor of the AJM 
resigned over the state of journalism in Macedonia, declaring they no longer had any leverage 
to fight for their rights as long as journalism was held hostage by power brokers. On that next 
Monday, the Journalists’ Association AJM and the Macedonian Journalists Union IUJMP 
staged another protest against violations of journalists’ rights and political influence over the 
media.
323
 Also in July, WAZ announced that it would cut its staff, prompting another series of 
protests; a total of 5 journalists were later fired by WAZ after taking part.  
 
Alarmed by the situation, various international organizations put pressure on the Macedonian 
government. The South East Europe Media Organization (SEEMO) issued a press release 
condemning developments there, and the OSCE warned that Macedonia had effectively 
eliminated nearly all opposition press with the closure of Ramkovski’s newspapers. Brussels 
(EU), the OSCE, and Amnesty International all urged the government to allow the media 
groups in question to pay off their debts in installments so that they could continue to operate. 
Pro-government media voiced their opinion as well; Sitel and Večer together sent a letter to 
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the government urging them not to negotiate with Ramkovski. In the end, the government 
refused to allow Ramkovski to pay the debt in installments.  
 
On July 20, 2011, without any public debate or notice, the government passed an amendment 
that increased the Broadcasting Council from 9 to 15 members, with most new members 
hailing from state commissions or bodies and giving the government further control over the 
Council. The government justified the change as a move that would make the work of the 
Council more transparent and efficient. The EU responded that they were investigating the 
impromptu amendment to assess if it was in line with European regulations. The Independent 
Union of Journalists and Media Professionals (IUJMP), MIM, and AJM jointly issued a 
statement opposing the amendment. AJM threatened to withdraw their members from the 
Council and organized a protest. But, neither condemnations and investigations by 
international governing bodies nor protests by local professional organizations and journalists 
deterred the government from silencing the opposition.  
 
In violation of the Broadcast Law, the Broadcast Council, and Council of Europe regulations, 
A1 TV’s frequency was canceled and screens went black on July 30th. And with that, former 
A1 TV editor Borjan Jovanovski announced in the press that Gruevski had finally won.
324
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion: Lessons to Write Home About 
 
This study has explored the evolution and export of dominant democratic media models and 
their impact on recipient communities in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Donor 
governments and international organizations expected that media could play a transformative 
role in the reconstruction and transitions of these societies. To that end, media assistance 
programs sought to professionalize and commercialize the media sectors. While structural 
changes contributed to bringing the media sectors more in line with European standards, a 
strong independent pluralistic media has not emerged nor has the media been able to influence 
“hearts and minds” or inject values and attitudes to the extent that was anticipated. I have tried 
to show through these three case studies that, in the future, media assistance must pay closer 
attention to the relationship between economic growth and institution building as part of 
democratization strategies. Despite significant economic reforms, growth and stability never 
reached a threshold to act as catalysts for systemic change in these instances.   
 
It would have been completely unrealistic to expect these countries to transition into modern 
liberal democracies in a decade or even two, and I don’t believe donors envisioned such rapid 
change, but the protracted nature and contentiousness of the reform process were not 
anticipated. In addition, economic development has been the weakest of the development 
processes for various reasons, and what little there has been was neither well coordinated with 
development in other sectors nor did it necessarily raise levels of investment to empower 
business development and institution building. If donors had been more successful with 
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economic reforms, specifically in lowering poverty and unemployment to less destabilizing 
levels, these countries would be much better off not only economically, but politically and 
socially. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia are some of the poorest states in Europe; they have 
outdated industries, few natural resources, and the legacy of the communist system to contend 
with. No miracles would have occurred there like they did in Germany or Japan, even if 
donors had made the economy their first priority, but success in this case is a matter of 
relativity. Unfortunately, the dire economic situation in these countries turns much political 
decision making into a zero-sum game since political parties generally fall along ethnic lines. 
Drawing from Chua and Del Castillo, discussed in Chapter Two, economic development, if 
done correctly – so that it brings greater prosperity to the majority of the society and not just 
to specific elites or an ethnic group – would help bridge some of these ethnic divisions and 
create a more stable political, economic, and social environment. The modernizing aspect of 
economic development is fundamental for building a functioning stable democracy where 
there is the opening and capacity for some of the media to assume a public service role. 
 
For commercialization and professionalization processes to support independent media, they 
require a complex balancing act in which the interaction between economic development and 
emerging democratic values creates the independence, space, and mandate for the media to 
act in a watchdog capacity, and spurs occupational specialization as well as the differentiation 
process that enables necessary professional values to strengthen the sector and balance the 
forces of commercialization. If media are a reflection of political and social systems, which 
are in turn shaped by the economic environment, policy makers need to understand how 
market conditions influence those interdependent systems, even indirectly. Media can only 
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influence political and social change if values exist to reflect, shape, and inspire into social 
action. 
 
These questions are especially salient and urgent now as we are experiencing global crises of 
democracy, journalism, and the economic order. We are arguably in the midst of a fourth 
wave of democratization, if we use Huntington’s famous model, which has begun with the 
Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, and the ongoing and intensifying Syrian uprising. In recent 
decades, dramatic technological advances – the proliferation of cable television and digital 
and social media – combined with a concentration of corporate ownership have contributed to 
new modes of reporting, means of distribution, and shifts in the economic foundation of 
traditional media that are changing the structure of our media system. Furthermore, the world 
economic crisis has brought greater levels of poverty, inequality, and instability even to 
established democracies.  
 
These political and economic shifts mean that normative definitions and understandings of 
democracy as well as the underlying media systems, and hence journalism, are becoming 
more important. In these current circumstances, we are all (every country and region in the 
world) potentially experiencing transitions of one kind or another. How we define our 
situations, negotiate our paths, and envision our futures will depend on those normative 
constructs. Forces shaping media transitions include a combination of democratic aspirations 
and the understanding of media freedoms, the local cultures of communications, and external 
influences from international media, allied governments, and international organizations.   
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The classic challenge of how to balance democracy and capitalism has resulted in a situational 
irony; international development strategies advocate neoliberal economic policies purported 
to free up markets for international trade and spur economic prosperity that are 
simultaneously undermining political policies to democratize through institution building. 
Furthermore, there is hypocrisy within policy expectations, because recipient countries are 
asked to build strong institutions based on a normative model of democracy that is faltering in 
the societies promoting its use. This problem plays out in the media sector as an imbalance 
between commercialization and professionalization. While recognized in some circles, this 
issue – that the values system behind an economic model may undermine the values system 
behind political objectives – is largely ignored in policy formation. How can we expect to 
establish democratic political or media systems in environments where the concept of 
democracy itself – in all its global guises – is perpetually adjusting to significant political and 
economic changes?   
 
These changes lead us to the broader questions of how media systems will evolve in the 
current world order, what role media in its various forms will play in governance, and what 
components are necessary to insure it fulfills its mandate. Are international journalism 
standards, over and above the classic US, multiple European, and other models, emerging? 
What role should media development play in our foreign policy and how can it be better 
integrated to achieve greater sustainability and impact? Future research on media 
development must address these questions.     
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A Comparison of Case Studies  
The case of Bosnia illustrates how policy evolution has led to the mapping of a model media 
system and to the identification of an enabling environment for democratic development. This 
environment includes a legal foundation for rule of law and the establishment of specific 
institutions, including educational institutions, regulatory agencies, professional and advocacy 
organizations, and public service broadcasters. Within this environment, donors have sought 
to professionalize and commercialize the sector. Commercialization was expected to create a 
pluralistic marketplace of ideas in support of good governance and donors gave financial and 
technical support to independent news organizations along with substantial training to shape 
sustainable business models. Public service broadcasters were financed to balance commercial 
outlets as well as to help create an inclusive civic voice. Professionalization policies included 
substantial training, education reform, and the establishment of relevant regulatory and self-
regulatory mechanisms. A democratic legal framework was expected to provide the necessary 
protections to enable the system to operate. Combined, these became a “tool box” of 
strategies for future interventions. 
 
Once that “tool box” was unpacked and the institutional architecture was in place in Bosnia, 
donors and international administrators found that the system didn’t function as anticipated, 
and much progress that had ostensibly been made began to recede or crumble once donor 
funding waned. Donors ascribed some of the blame to the contentious political situation in the 
country and the legacy of the previous system; and they assumed some of the blame 
themselves as well – identifying flaws in their own implementation process as well as in 
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policy design, both of which undercut their success by resulting in uncoordinated programs, 
inappropriate training, and duplication of efforts.  
 
Donors tried to take the lessons they learned in Bosnia to their intervention efforts in Kosovo. 
Attempts to better plan and coordinate assistance went awry in the deluge of organizations, 
competing mandates, and projects. Despite recognition of the need for long-term development 
strategies, policies were only short term due to the legal obstacles related to the issue of 
Kosovo’s final status. This ultimately held back critical reforms, especially in the economic 
sector. Although the economic situation there is as difficult as in the other countries, perhaps 
even worse, the full effects of economic indicators are mitigated by heavy support in the form 
of remittances and aid.  
 
In the media sector, however, donors thought that they had the model for Kosovo figured out; 
they established an advanced legal foundation based on the best laws in Europe, along with all 
the complementary institutions – the frameworks of which were designed to be mutually 
supporting. In this case, they did not create new media outlets, but instead offered aid to 
existing outlets that showed professional commitment and capacity. Yet despite that, the 
media sector in Kosovo, like others in the region, shows signs of oversaturation and high 
levels of dependency on either government advertising or alternative revenue streams. Some 
media-related institutions meant to support professionalization, such as the journalism 
association and the Press Council, were introduced into the local ecology in a top-down, 
quasi-imperial manner by the international administration. Once again, donors were faced 
with weak outcomes and some outright distortions of their model.  
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Macedonia provided a different set of circumstances surrounding international intervention 
and subsequent assistance programs, and still the end result was similar.  Assistance was not 
systematized, synchronized with reform in other sectors, nor imbued with longer-term 
objectives. Since it came with fewer strings attached and a less imperial attitude, buy-in for 
media development was quite high in Macedonia. However, without lasting donor 
commitment and the leverage that comes with international oversight, professionalization and 
commercialization were quickly prey to many of the same political and economic forces that 
arose in neighboring countries. An environment of weak economic development and rule of 
law, poverty, ethnic unrest, and powerful political parties paved the way for tycoonization to 
dominate the media landscape. These factors have undermined the capacity for a 
professionalized, independent, and pluralistic media to take root.   
 
In each of the countries in this study, a lack of synchronization among reforms, political 
divides, and poor economic growth have contributed to a web of interrelated challenges and 
distortions. On the state level, there are strong political parties representing entrenched ethnic 
divisions, weak rule of law; economically, there are high levels of unemployment and 
poverty. Citizens are consequently in survival mode and tend to be apathetic in the face of 
unaccountable politicians, institutions, political parties, and tycoons.  
 
In the media sectors of these countries, commercialization and professionalization have been 
conflicting forces rather than mutually supporting processes of democratization. This situation 
has created fragmented and oversaturated media markets, resulting in hyper-competition and a 
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lack of self-regulation. Public broadcasters, while they are de jure independent, find that they 
are de facto subject to coercion by ruling parties. The dependency of media outlets on 
alternative revenue streams has prevented their evolution into sustainable businesses with 
editorial independence, full-time professional journalists, and a healthy separation of editorial 
and business functions. Without the stability of full-time living wages, adequate benefits, and 
protection from outside interests (pressure from owners and politicians), journalism has not 
been able to fully differentiate and institutionalize a unique identity and universal standards, 
nor has it established a solid foundation on which to advocate on behalf of the profession. In 
turn, this has resulted in professional organizations that have almost no basis for support and a 
public that is distrustful of both the media and the political system.  
 
Without the establishment of professional norms and effective institutions, independent 
pluralistic media will not only struggle to survive, but the whole concept is in peril in the 
region. Regan McCarthy pointed out some of the problems and paradoxes of institutionalizing 
those norms; she sees press councils and journalism associations as imperative so that 
journalists can protect themselves, especially from state and international interference. If 
journalists fail to self-regulate, as was seen in Bosnia and Kosovo, then the state will be 
forced to regulate in volatile situations such as with the TMC in Kosovo. She believes self-
regulation is a core component of professionalism and that this type of “co-regulation” of the 
press is completely inappropriate. “Journalists should not have to be slapped to be good 
journalists,” but self-regulation in post-communist societies, she warns, “is a very subtle 
process because it is the process of changing minds or consciousness. All those journalists 
were from a system where you got big slaps every time you were not in line with the central 
277 
 
 
committee… the Party had a special department to monitor the press and media and punish 
those who were out of line.”325 Many journalists in Bosnia have told her that they support 
self-regulation but that it has been difficult in the current environment and that “co-
regulation,” even of the press, is sometimes necessary. This brings us back to that distortion, 
of using undemocratic means to democratic ends, and the need to find a better way to foster 
those professional attitudes and behaviors.   
 
Trust is another key requirement for democratization and for a functioning media sector. 
Media have been expected to act as a watchdog in support of good governance, to expose 
inequalities and corruption, and to unite and mobilize citizens demanding political change. 
This cannot happen without trust in the credibility of the media as well as in the 
responsiveness of the political system itself. Furthermore, trust is also the basis of 
interpersonal networks that can play both a positive or negative role in democratization. One 
negative example is seen in the networks that are the basis of tycoonization in the region. 
 
In his book Democracy, sociologist Charles Tilly wrote that democratization cannot take 
place if there are strong autonomous, non-state forms of power dominant in society, if there 
are elements of categorical inequality, and if those inequalities are replicated on the state 
level.
326
 In all three countries included in this study, there are autonomous, non-state actors, 
such as “tycoons,” and there are categorical inequalities in the form of institutionalized ethnic 
divisions – inequalities which are replicated at the state level. The media, as we have seen, 
reflect those divisions, inequalities, and power centers, and function as tools of those 
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alternative power centers and detrimental trust networks. While Tilly does not cite economic 
development as a required causal factor in his model, under the right circumstances it can act 
as a catalyst for greater equality, which is necessary for social transformation.  
 
These case studies also demonstrate that the all-important feedback loop between citizens, 
media organizations, and the state is flawed in these countries. This is largely the result of 
local political divisions compounded by the structure of international administrative bodies. 
David Chandler wrote, regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, that it was “faking democracy,” 
and that the international intervention “undermined autonomy and self government on the 
assumption that external assistance is necessary for building an alternative that will more 
effectively bridge segmented political divisions.”327 International policies in Bosnia and 
Kosovo have created weak, decentralized, over-bureaucratized states, often unaccountable to 
citizens and overly dependent upon the international community.
328
 Similarly, Carothers has 
labeled Bosnia and Serbia as democracies with “feckless pluralism” – states with weak civil 
societies where there is a gulf between political leaders and the public that has resulted in a 
lack of political legitimacy in the government and its leaders.
329
 In this kind of an 
environment it is difficult for the media to act as a watchdog since there is little expectation of 
accountability and few means to enforce it.  
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Of all the tools and prescriptions implemented by international organizations, it is interesting 
that economic development efforts never reached that threshold necessary to support systemic 
change. Economic development, as part of its role in democratization, shapes attitudes and 
behaviors on various levels. Modernization processes in society can create emancipative 
values such as demands for elections and rule of law, as well as self-expression values such as 
civil liberties and equal rights, as illustrated by Ingelhart and Welzel’s World Values Survey. 
When achieved, economic growth can help people in countries emerging from ethnic conflict 
to overcome insecurities (physical as well as psychological) that perpetuate social divisions.  
  
The media model that was exported to these countries was based on the historical experiences 
of the US and of Northern Europe, and as discussed in Chapter Two, a common catalyst of 
this liberal model was a growing economy that fueled markets and strengthened the middle 
class – both of which contributed to shifts in economic and political influence. Within the 
media sector, economic growth enabled the emergence of profitable media organizations that 
had significant editorial independence and a broad audience base. In this environment, 
journalism was able to develop as a profession with standards and a social mandate. It was 
within the dynamic of economic development and political change that the processes of 
commercialization and professionalization became mutually supporting, culminating in the 
period of High Modernism as defined by Hallin and Mancini. Through this complex, lengthy 
and, at times, messy process, democratic attitudes and behaviors emerged, inspiring civic 
action, animating institutions, giving life to the rule of law, and thereby instigating the 
necessary shifts in power and perspective that have allowed the system to work.   
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The historical experiences of the US provide insight not only into how a democratic media 
sector can evolve, but also how it can devolve. In the 1960s, American society went through 
drastic changes, leading to a loss of public trust in leaders and institutions that was largely due 
to the experiences of Vietnam, Watergate, the civil rights movement, and the “culture 
wars.”330 Journalism became more adversarial toward political power at the same time that it 
began to feel the pressures of significant economic changes that were taking place in the 
country. The classic liberalism of the previous period gave way to neo-liberalism, where 
deregulation began to dismantle the protective laws and institutions of both the economic and 
media systems, so that market forces could maximize profits. Communications theorists 
responded with Nerone’s Last Rights, a rebuke of Four Theories of the Press, which argued 
that the press was losing its place as mediator of the public sphere in the democratic process 
because information was no longer about an exchange of ideas but, thanks to corporate 
monopolies, had been turned into a commodity.
331
  
 
During the 1980s, major corporate mergers and acquisitions put control of the US media into 
the hands of fifty corporations. Ben Bagdikian documented this trend in his book The Media 
Monopoly, warning that mass advertising was exerting undue influence over content. By 
2000, media sources proliferated, giving the appearance of an extraordinary diversity of 
content; meanwhile, corporations continued to consolidate their power and influence behind 
the scenes. In Rich Media, Poor Democracy, Robert McChesney wrote about the paradox that 
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media in America have become an anti-democratic force in this information age rife with 
global media empires. He blames demands for profit and of advertisers for creating a “poison 
pill” for democracy, by advancing “hypercommercialism,” and contributing to the 
“denigration of journalism and public service.”332 McChesney believes this paradox 
constitutes a political crisis not only because of the dire consequences it has for our political 
process but most importantly because “the very issue of who (emphasis in original) controls 
the media system and for what purpose is not a part of contemporary political debate.”333 
Sociologist Herbert Gans warns that the public service mandate of the media is deteriorating 
and that journalists are increasingly disempowered by corporate budget restrictions, profit 
margins, cutbacks, and a preference for soft news.
334
 He believes significant reform is needed 
to rescue democratic values from the grip of corporate interests.  
 
Clearly, even in developed democracies, commercialization and professionalization are out of 
balance, eroding both media independence and its social role as ascribed in the liberal model. 
Just as professions differentiate, they can de-differentiate, and hence experience a weakening 
of values, professional mandate, and autonomy.
335
 Autonomous power centers, as well as 
rising levels of inequality similar to those Tilly has warned can lead to de-democratization, 
are gaining influence in developed democracies. John Keane, writing from the British 
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perspective, observes an inherent contradiction between market liberalism and trends in 
democratic governance:  
The key point is that market liberalism is incapable of actualizing the “libertarian” values 
it affirms. It is hoist with its own petard of “freedom of choice,” and that is why its critics 
must open their eyes wider. They need to give their criticisms of market liberalism more 
bite and public appeal by emphasizing not only that markets fail to guarantee the open 
expression and representation of opinions, but also that market liberalism is in love with 
arcane and “invisible” state power, which also contradicts freedom of communication 
among a plurality of citizens.
336
  
 
Keane, McChesney, Nerone and others have all recognized that economic forces have served 
to decrease levels of independence and transparency in media systems as well as the capacity 
of the media to function as a mechanism in support of good governance, yet today we have 
not learned lessons from our recent past and continue to export the globally conflicting 
paradigms of liberal democratic institutions and neo-liberal economic policies.   
 
From Western Models to International Standards 
Throughout 2011, as protests for democratic freedoms ignited around the globe, Freedom 
House and Reporters Without Borders reported that press freedoms were in fact receding. 
Freedom House’s 2010 report announced that access to a free press worldwide had declined 
to its lowest point in a decade because repressive governments were stepping up their efforts 
to control all forms of media, traditional as well as internet-based.
337
 Reporters Without 
Borders’ Press Freedom Index showed double digit drops for Bosnia and Macedonia, as well 
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as for the United States. Only Kosovo made minor advances in the rankings, rising to 86 from 
92. The report linked problems in Bosnia and Macedonia to their economic ills:  
The economic crisis accentuated the Balkan media’s problems – use of the media for pri-
vate or criminal interests, unfair competition in very small markets, and self-censorship 
by a growing number of badly paid journalists. Judicial officials – many of them poorly 
trained, allied with the government and often corrupt – seem more interested in harassing 
the media than ending impunity for those who threaten or physically attack journalists. 
This was the case, for example in Bosnia-Herzegovina (58th), Montenegro (107th), Albania 
(96th) and Macedonia (94th), which lost 40 per cent of its media with the closure of Plus 
Produkcija, a company that owned three dailies and the leading privately-owned TV 
station.
338
  
 
The United States had a tough year as well; not only did Standard and Poor’s downgrade its 
credit status in response to a loss in confidence in the American political system’s ability to 
manage federal finances in light of the “political brinkmanship” displayed during the debates 
over raising the debt ceiling, but the country’s Press Freedom ranking was also downgraded 
27 points by Reporters without Borders, to an embarrassing 47. This plummet in confidence 
reflected the number of arrests of journalists covering the Occupy Wall Street movement.
339
 
While a 20 point drop could be called excessive, my guess is that it served as a means of 
publicly censuring the US, which is expected to act as a role model for democratic behavior, 
especially during a period of extraordinary popular unrest in support of democracy 
worldwide. It is difficult to criticize the behavior of authoritarian regimes for cracking down 
on protesters and journalists they claim are destabilizing when videos from the US of police 
                                                 
338
 Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2011-2012, January 25, 2012, 
http://en.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2012/C_GENERAL_ANG.pdf, 3.This index only began in 2002; for the 
sake of comparison, that year, the US was ranked 17th, BiH 43rd, and Yugoslavia (Kosovo was not yet 
independent) 60th. In 2010,BiH ranked 47th, Kosovo 92nd ( a 17 point drop from  previous year), Macedonia 
68th  (down 34), the United States 20th, and the United Kingdom 19th. In the 2012 rankings, Kosovo has moved 
up to 86th and the United Kingdom has dropped to 28th, largely due to the News of the World scandal.  
 
339
 Also see: Melissa Bell, “U.S. falls 27 places in worldwide freedom of press rankings,” Blogpost, The 
Washington Post, January 25, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/us-falls-27-places-in-
worldwide-freedom-of-the-press-rankings/2012/01/25/gIQAFWZvQQ_blog.html (accessed February 20, 2012). 
284 
 
 
pepper-spraying, beating, and arresting protesters and journalists are broadcast internationally 
and posted online. If the United States can find solutions to its own political, economic, and 
media-related problems, it might then be in a better position to offer democratization 
strategies to other countries.  
 
From a practitioner’s standpoint, trying to implement programs and standards that are not 
being upheld at home often feels like an exercise in hypocrisy, which undermines the 
credibility of any project. Rosemary Armao of the Center for Investigative Reporting readily 
acknowledges that media development often touts models that are no longer functioning at 
home.  
I am working on training for election coverage. Our (American) coverage of elections is 
horrible. Our press is filled with criticism of how it is done, yet that is what we are 
teaching… We don’t live up completely to our standards here (at home); so the standards 
need to be set and you try to live up to them. You learn from the gap of where you are 
and where the standard is. That is the way it ought to be. That means, if a story comes in 
and there are unnamed sources, or it is not completely sourced, you throw it back – you 
do not just say, “Well that is the best the Bosnians can do, or the Spaniards can do.” That 
does not work. That is a mistake. So I think the standards are exactly right and it is living 
up to them that will make a difference. 
 
Instead of trying to export institutions and models, a potentially better approach is to 
acknowledge systemic challenges and flaws while striving to meet internationally-recognized 
professional standards. In a similar vein, within the American context, Schudson advises that 
the news media adopt a kind of “schizophrenic” approach, to be of two minds, striving to 
reach classical democratic norms while accepting the social and political limitations of a less 
than fully engaged citizenry.
340
 Adjusting expectations, setting more realistic goals, and 
distilling various traditions down to core practices and standards may allow for greater 
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acceptance of an international standard. However, getting to that point still requires levels of 
editorial vision, support, and independence that can only come from stronger economic 
foundations. 
 
Future media policy should take a more context-specific approach, allowing for cultural and 
historical differences, while advocating for basic professional standards. More consideration 
should be given to lessons from societies facing similar economic and political challenges and 
with analogous historical experiences. For instance, policy approaches should be considered 
from some of the post-soviet countries, or countries of the Mediterranean pluralist tradition. 
When designing policy, local stakeholders should be given more responsibility in crafting 
solutions.    
 
Communication structures and the role of journalism certainly vary among Asian, Islamic, 
African, or Western societies, but there are basic roles that information or news media are 
realistically expected to fulfill in self-described democracies, regardless of their cultural 
specificities. This is not to say that there is not room for gossip, scandal, sports scores, drama, 
and astrological and weather forecasts – things which have always played a role in human 
communication as means of interpreting and documenting our communal lives.
341
 Just as 
fundamental is a basic need for factual and trustworthy information that can facilitate citizen 
participation in social and political processes. 
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A short list of basic media roles or functions should include the ability to provide information 
on events in their context, offer analysis and frameworks for understanding those events, act 
as a public forum of ideas from various groups in society, mobilize interest and concern for 
policies and programs, cultivate social empathy so people can understand the viewpoints and 
perspectives of all segments of their society, and investigate potential abuses of power.
342
 
These functions work best when media operate in a democratic political environment where 
media assume these responsibilities as part of a professional mandate. That is to say they have 
established a professional identity and adhere to ethical standards. Media in different political 
contexts with a different understanding of their role can take on different functions or 
different interpretations of these functions, such as publicizing government policies under 
authoritarian regimes or “mobilizing” in the most negative sense, as was witnessed through 
the proliferation of hate-speech throughout the Balkan wars and in Rwanda. Media 
organizations negotiate their role within their social, political, and economic environment. 
Even in the best of circumstances, as Schudson writes, “Journalism does not produce 
democracy where democracy does not exist, but it can do more to help democracies thrive if it 
recognizes the multiple services it affords self-government, encourages the virtues that 
underwrite those services, and clarifies for journalists and the public the many gifts news 
contributes to democratic aspirations.”343   
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In fact this last role of media as a watchdog over the public good is part of Kosovo’s Civil 
Law against Defamation and Insult. Article 1 states that, “The objective of this law is to 
regulate civil liability for defamation and insult while ensuring: …(d) the essential role of 
media in the democratic process as public watchdogs and transmitters of information to the 
public.”344 As new democracies reform their laws, they are increasingly looking to draw from 
modern versions of laws that protect a broader spectrum of rights.
345
 It is possible that future 
media legislation will include expanded media freedoms as well as definitions and protections 
of its role in society.  
 
When writing policy and designing programs, expectations of the capacity of media to 
support democratic transitions must also be realistic. Media institutions cannot create 
democratic attitudes in a vacuum or invoke them from within a broken society, but they can 
replicate and influence extant values. Schudson argues that the influence of news media is 
cultural, tapping into existing attitudes, which it can shape but not control; and therefore 
media cannot be expected to have the power to prevent or promote social change.
346
 Dan De 
Luce and Mark Thompson came to a similar conclusion in a study of Bosnia. They wrote that 
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the expectation for media to dissolve ethnic divides was unrealistic, but that a more 
achievable goal is to separate media from direct political control.
347
   
 
New strategies for sustainable independent media are needed to address the current economic 
realities. This may mean better enforcement of existing laws, the drafting of new laws or 
regulations to further insulate media from corporate influence, or new business models. These 
countries are not only struggling with the fundamental problems of market regulation, 
concentration of ownership, and professionalization, they are now also feeling the effects of 
market changes from digital media. While on one hand they are working to strengthen 
traditional media and institutions, they are simultaneously being threatened by new 
competition from online sources – along with all the economic, business, and legal challenges 
this new environment brings. There are examples in the region of media organizations such as 
CIN, discussed in the Bosnia chapter, and a similar organization called BIRN (Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network) that are working to bridge traditional and new media. They 
adhere to a social mandate, offer content to local newspapers and TV, and also provide it 
online. They employ local journalists, offer professional reporting on local and regional 
issues, and network internationally, but they are still donor dependent and need to find 
workable business models to survive in the long term.  
 
Media professionals and scholars in the United States and Europe are facing similar 
challenges. McChesney, for one, advocates finding revenue sources to support significant 
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non-profit and non-commercial news outlets to meet the information needs of citizens. In a 
study entitled “The Reconstruction of American Journalism,” Leonard Downie, Jr. and 
Michael Schudson propose a range of possible approaches including new corporate structures 
for media, such as hybrid legal entities that allow both for-profit and non-profit investment, a 
greater commitment from the US government to support public service broadcasting, and in 
turn, a greater commitment from public broadcasters to increase coverage of local news; they 
also encouraged universities to act as centers for professional news reporting.
348
 
 
As technological advances change the shape of media, and as new business models evolve, so 
will journalism practices. Tumber and Prentoulis make a very important point about the 
changing nature of journalism and how digital media offers increasing access to news along 
with unfiltered and unedited information from endless sources. In addition, changes in 
attitudes toward political authority and a rising lack of trust in many political systems has led 
to more reliance on interpretive forms of journalism.
349
 In such conditions, quickly becoming 
the norm globally, the basic roles of journalism become even more important, as does the 
need for accurate, truthful, and credible information gathering and the establishment of 
professional ethics.     
 
Risto Popovski’s comment that one cannot live from the news business in Macedonia is 
typical of the reality in transitioning countries with weak markets. For a public service-
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oriented editor or media owner to produce quality journalism, he or she must frequently find 
alternative revenue to support their mission, without capitulating to pressures from tycoons. In 
established democracies with strong markets, editors are facing similar challenges, albeit in 
different environments. LaMay charges that corporate owners in the US are not in the 
business because they desire to produce news or fulfill a public service mandate, but because 
they are meeting an insatiable desire for ever increasing profits. In order to save public 
service-oriented journalism from the dual international crises facing both journalism and 
democracy, he calls on policy makers to develop and implement new economic and business 
models for journalistic enterprises. For this to happen, there must first be broad recognition of 
the problem, followed by consensus and mobilization to address it. That alone is a tall order, 
and one that will require a long-term approach that accounts for evolving economic and 
political dynamics; but this is what will be necessary to correct the system – at home and 
abroad.     
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